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The overarching theme of this dissertation is to investigate the potential impact of 
government policy on house prices in Australia. This thesis focuses on housing markets 
in each capital city of Australia’s eight states and territories. The study analyses how 
house prices in these capital cities respond to policy decisions by the government after 
controlling for a number of key supply and demand factors, including new housing stock, 
income and employment opportunities. The ways in which government actions influence 
housing markets vary considerably across states. The ensuing analysis sheds light on how 
the governments’ policy decisions affect housing prices through three specific channels 
in three consecutive, self-contained, chapters.  
The first essay investigates the impact of government revenue administered at different 
levels by the local, state and federal governments. A novel panel of house prices for 
regions within Australian capital cities from 1999-2011 is utilised to analyse a number of 
channels through which government generate revenue from the housing markets. These 
are through stamp duties, land tax and municipality rates. Stamp duties are levied at the 
point of transaction and interpreted as the transaction cost of relocating any dwelling. 
Land tax revenues are levied annually and targeted at households who do not permanently 
reside in their dwelling. This can be termed as the value investors attribute to their 
continued possession of dwellings. Municipality rate revenue is also levied annually. The 
empirical analysis is twofold.  
First, a panel fixed effects model investigates determinates of house prices for regions 
within Australian capital cities. The results indicate that land tax and stamp duty revenues 
both have a positive impact on house prices in Australia, the impact of real municipality 
revenue is negative. Furthermore, results show that dwellings completed, and real interest 
rates are key factors of house prices in Australia. Second, these results provide motivation 
for the inclusion of variables in a panel vector autoregression (PVAR) model. This model 
allows us to control for potential endogeneity present in the fixed effects model and 
highlights how shocks to the variables of interest impact on one another.   
The second essay analyses the impact of state government decisions to change stamp duty 
and land tax rates. To assess the fallout of these decisions, unique data is collected to form 
a panel of tax rates. These are taken from amendments to government legislation relevant 
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to land taxation and stamp duties in each state and territory. Using this information, the 
average duty rate for each state and territory are determined beginning from the year 
1986. Consistent with the previous essay a yearly panel of regional data from 1999-2011 
is used. This allows the identification of land tax and stamp duty rates which are levied 
to first homeowners, owner occupants, and households owning properties for non-
residential purposes. Significant rate changes are identified through structural break 
analysis. Interacting these breaks with tax rates levied to households yields the effect of 
rate changes on house prices in Australian capital cities. After controlling for structural 
breaks in the tax rate series using binary indicator variables, house prices are regressed 
on tax rates and a vector of controls, allowing for heterogeneity between regions and time. 
Findings indicate that in general the effects of increases in rates are positive. However, 
increasing the minimum rate levied on owner occupants may have a dampening effect on 
house price growth. 
The third essay sheds light on how house prices are affected by the flow of domestic and 
international residents as they move into and out of Australian states and territories. The 
focus is on how variations in immigration as well as interstate population flows affect 
house prices. House prices are taken from the Australian Bureau of Statistics quarterly 
historical house price index (HPI), between 1986 and 2005. Interstate arrivals are 
considered an important factor contributing to house prices in Australia. On the other 
hand, net overseas migration does not appear to have a significant effect on house prices. 
This muted impact could be attributed to the lack of substantial transfer of net wealth due 
to domestic departures. The empirical estimation examines the short-run relationship 
between migration and house prices using a fixed effects model. The presences of a long-
run cointegrating relationship is explored using panel dynamic OLS (PDOLS). Net 
interstate migration seems to be a slightly stronger indicator of house prices. This result 
may be due to a relatively stronger willingness to pay for housing in the preferred state 
compare to the existing state of residence.   
The sample period used in the third essay should be noted when interpreting the findings. 
This thesis does not consider migration patterns beyond 2005. Steady increases in the 
proportion of Australian residents born in New Zealand, China, India and the Philippines 
in the post-2005 could have a stronger contribution to house prices which is not captured 
in this analysis.  
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The thesis demonstrates that government policy, in general, has a small but significant 
role in the determination of house prices in Australia. Thus, a degree of care must be 
taken when altering policies. Thought must be given to the perverse effects of policy 
changes within housing markets as well as possible externalities. For instance, the results 
indicate that increases to both the amount of revenue extracted from the housing market 
by the government as well as the rates levied on homeowners generally have a positive 
impact on house prices. Thus, any attempt to ease budget constraints by raising revenue 
from the housing market could have a significant impact on those who do not have equity 
in the housing market, such as renters. This effect will be particularly felt by those who 
wish to move into owner occupancy. The impact on rental prices is more ambiguous as a 
rise in house prices may lessen the burden of owning and renting property through an 
easing of the user cost of capital. Regarding immigration policy, findings show that the 
inflow of individuals from other states has a greater bearing on house prices than the 
inflow of immigrants from overseas. Further investigation is needed to understand how 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Australian housing market provides an interesting case study to explore the 
transmissions through which governments may influence house prices. Australia is an 
exciting place to live. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Liveability Index ranks three 
Australian capital cities—Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth—in the top ten most liveable 
cities in the World for 2016 (2016). Sydney also ranks highly, dropping just outside of 
the top ten ranking for 2016. Sydney ranked third of the four Australian cities in the top 
ten most liveable cities for 2015 (Economist Intelligence Unit 2015). Stapledon (2016) 
notes that Australian cities share a number of qualities, such as climate and coastal 
settings, with California, USA. However, Australian housing markets still show traits of 
heterogeneity. This thesis explores possible influence of government policy using 
contemporary panel analysis to exploit the heterogeneity between housing markets in 
Australian capital cities. The findings contribute to a better understanding of avenues 
through which government policy may affect house prices. 
Rahman (2010) provides an excellent overview of house price trends in Australia from 
the 1970s to 2010. Stapledon also provides an interesting overview of house prices in 
Australia over the last 50 years with some description of contemporary studies (2016). 
Financial innovations during the late 1980s have enabled easier access to credit (Wood 
& Bushe-Jones 1990). This event preceded a period of sustained growth of house prices 
in Australia. Strong house price growth in Australia and resilience to the 2007-08 Global 
Financial Crisis has prompted much attention in the demand side determinates of house 
prices across the country.  
Over the last decade house prices in Australian capital cities have increased dramatically. 
This occurrence has led many interested parties like industry groups, commentators, and 
academics to claim that house prices are overvalued (Powell 2015; IMF 2015; van 
Onselen 2016). Fry, Martin and Voukelatos (2010) attribute overvaluation of house prices 
before 2006 to demand shocks and post-2006 to macroeconomic shocks. The authors 
highlight the importance of wealth effects driven from equity and housing markets to the 
overvaluation of Australian house prices. Tumbarello and Wang (2010) also find 
evidence of overvaluation in Australia’s house price through their cointegration analysis. 
Windsor, La Cava and Hansen (2015) use survey results to establish that homeowners 
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tend to overestimate the value of their dwellings slightly. These findings indicate that 
expectations are an important factor for house prices in Australia.  
Wadud, Bashar and Ahmed (2012) explore the importance of monetary policy 
transmission for house prices in Australia. Contractionary monetary policy significantly 
reduces housing activity but has no negative effect on real house prices. Shocks to income 
also have a positive effect on house prices. These results are in line with Fry, Martin and 
Voukelatos (2010). Further studies have examined house prices relative to their 
fundamentals. 
Common trends in the evolution of credit standards and correlated housing risk premia 
are determining factors of comoving housing markets in developed nations (Carrington 
& Madsen 2011; Hirata, et al. 2013; Sa, Towbin & Wieladek 2014). This commonality 
in house price trends is particularly prevalent in open economies with little friction for 
foreign capital to enter local housing markets. There is growing belief that it is the 
underlying common fundamentals of housing markets rather than market 
synchronisations that are of greatest concern to monetary and fiscal policymakers. Arestis 
and Gonzalez-Martinez (2016) and Cesa-Bianchi (2013) attribute co-movements of 
economic fundamentals such as interest rates, income, residential investment, bank credit, 
and equity prices to the correlations between house prices in different housing markets in 
developed nations. This thesis controls for many of these attributed fundamentals 
contributing to greater clarity in understanding how government policies impact on house 
prices in Australia. 
Otto (2007) finds that fundaments can explain more than 50 per cent of house prices in 
Australia, particularly in the larger eastern cities of Melbourne, Brisbane and Sydney. 
Mortgage rates and inflation are important to the determination of house prices in each 
Australian capital city. Additional variables considered by the Otto (2007) suggest that 
population growth and state final demand also have a positive effect on house prices. The 
large effect of mortgage rates on house prices contrasts with earlier work by Bourassa 
and Hendershott (1995) who found the effect of interest rates to be considerably smaller. 
Numerous contributors discuss Australian house price determinants at a household level 
(Abelson & Chung 2005; Abelson, Joyeux & Mahuteau 2013; Abelson et al. 2005). These 
studies discuss the evolution of Australian house prices and note the importance access 
to cental buisness districts in the structure of housing markets.  
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The above studies exemplify the breadth of research examining demand side influences 
of housing markets in Australia. Some ground has been made in understanding the 
importance of land and urban boundaries (Ball et al. 2014; Costello 2014). However, 
there is a growing belief that greater attention is needed to decipher the supply-side effects 
(Stapledon 2016; Yates 2016). Further, little has been done to understand the relationship 
between government decisions and their impact on house prices in Australia. These 
decisions can hinder growth in housing supply and impose barriers which limit household 
mobility. This thesis fills this void. 
Judith Yates states that “policy development is complicated by Australia’s federal 
structure with the separation of powers between Commonwealth and states, enabling each 
to play the ‘blame game’ when little appears to be done to address either immediate issues 
or underlying causes” (2016, p.335). This thesis explores a number of transmission 
channels where various levels of governments may influence house prices in Australia. 
Specifically, this thesis investigates how Australian capital city house prices are affected 
by the government regulation, changes to housing taxation rates and the flow of migrants 
into and out of Australian states and territories. 
The key aim of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of how government policy 
may impact Australian house prices. The thesis contributes broadly to the Australian 
literature using contemporary panel analysis. Government involvement in the housing 
market may vary substantially between states due to variations in State Government and 
Local Municipality decisions to implement policy and the degree to which policy is 
implemented. Two separate transmission mechanisms through which these government 
policy decisions may affect house prices are explored in the first two essays. First, 
Chapter 2 assesses government revenue that is extracted from housing markets at various 
levels of government. This revenue is used to proxy for regulatory burden which may 
impact on housing supply. Second, the impact of specific tax rates that are levied to 
homeowners at a state and municipality level are investigated in Chapter 3. In addition, 
Federal Government intervention in housing markets may occur through immigration 
policy. This transmission is the focus of the final essay in Chapter 4. These three questions 
are analysed in three consecutive, self-contained chapters and are further outlined in the 
subsequent subsections below. 
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One of the main concerns in estimating the impact of variables of interest on house prices 
in the Australian context is the reliability of house price data that spans a significant time 
series. Two house price series are assessed in this thesis. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 exploit 
the heterogeneity in house price data for inner, middle and outer regions of each 
Australian capital city (Figure 1.1). This house price information has been obtained from 
the Real Estate Institute of Australia (REIA). The second house price data are gathered 
from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). It depicts a quarterly house price index 
(HPI) from 1986 to 2005. These data are used to explore the impact of migrant flows on 
house prices. Due to a methodological change in the calculation of the HPI by the ABS, 
this is not available beyond 2005. The ABS series provides a sample period that dates 
back further than the REIA series which is beneficial for the analysis in the final essay. 
Both series allow us to exploit the cross-sectional heterogeneity present in Australian 
housing markets. 
 
Figure 1.1: Real house price ($’000) heterogeneity across regions (REIA 2013) 
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1.1 Chapter 2: Government Revenue Extraction from Housing Markets 
in Australian Capital Cities: What Happens to Prices? 
Government revenue is generated from housing markets in Australia primarily through 
two avenues. First, rates are levied on households who own property. Revenue generated 
from land tax and municipality rate revenue, which are determined and enforced by state 
and local government respectively, are of particular interest. Second, taxes may be levied 
when a property is transferred. The most important transfer tax identified in this analysis 
are ‘stamp duties’ on conveyances. This is a tax levied by the state and is proportionate 
to the sale value of the property.  
To assess the burden of government revenue extracted from housing markets in 
Australian capital cities, a novel data set is employed comprising of inner, middle, and 
outer regions for each Australian capital city (provided by the REIA). The empirical 
analysis applies a fixed effects model allowing for time and regional heterogeneity. Key 
demand and supply side variables are controlled for based on the existing literature. The 
inclusion of the total number of dwellings completed annually controls for the growth in 
housing supply. The findings suggest dwellings completed are an important measure of 
housing stock in Australia. Furthermore, the investigation reveals that land tax and stamp 
duty revenues both have positive bearings on house prices in Australian capital cities. 
Revenues generated from local municipalities appear to exert downward pressure on 
house prices. 
To address potential endogeneity, this study resorts to PVAR analysis and include the 
main variables of interest based on the findings from the fixed effects model. To be 
specific, the PVAR system consists of stamp duties, land tax, municipality rate revenue 
as well as real interest rates, dwellings completed and real house prices. The PVAR 
estimation has particular relevance for policy makers in Australia to better understand 
how, and by how much, revenue extracted from housing markets effects house prices in 
Australia. The findings from the PVAR analysis broadly support the findings from the 
fixed effects model and reveal the dynamics of revenue-extracting policies on house 
prices in Australia. 
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1.2 Chapter 3: Do Land Taxes and Stamp Duties Contribute to House 
Prices in Australian Capital Cities? 
Building on the first essay, the second essay delves specifically into the government 
decision to intervene in housing markets through rate changes. This study examines the 
impact of stamp duties and land tax rates on the growth of real house prices in Australian 
capital cities using house price data from the REIA. The data enables the exploration of 
heterogeneous house price growth between regions located within city boundaries. 
Building on Davidoff and Leigh (2013), we examine three different types of stamp duties. 
Stamp duties are levied on all individuals who purchase a property. These rates are levied 
at the point of transaction and depend on whether the household is a first homeowners 
(FHO), principal place of residence homeowner (PPR) or non-PPR.  The chapter takes 
into account the difference between rates levied to each of these households. Households 
who are entering the housing market for the first time are known as FHO and receive the 
largest discount on stamp duty rates. If a household purchases a property as their PPR, 
they are also eligible for a discounted rate, though not as large as FHO. Households who 
own property for purposes other than residing in it are not eligible for any stamp duty 
discount or exemption. The latter is assumed to be stamp duties levied on investors. These 
data are collected and collated from various Acts tabled in state Parliaments for all eight 
Australian states and territories. The database creation is another unique feature of the 
chapter and the ensuing empirical analysis. 
State governments determine land tax and stamp duty rates as a vehicle for generating 
government revenue. The decision to change rates may be influenced by the observed 
increase in property prices over time. Alternatively, the government could preference 
greater (less) government revenue given constant housing stock growth and transactions. 
The methodological calculation of the average annual rates mitigates the issue of 
dependency between property prices and rates. Structural breaks in these series are 
identified and interacted with the rate series to investigate the effect of government 
decisions to alter tax rates. 
The empirical findings suggest that, after allowing for heterogeneity across regions and 
time, mean land tax rates have a positive and significant effect on the change in real house 
prices in Australian capital cities. PPR and FHO stamp duty rates also appear to have a 
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significant and positive correlation with the change in real house prices. Overall, the 
average effect of stamp duties on the growth of real house prices has proven to be positive. 
These results remain robust to subsampling of Sydney and Melbourne together, compared 
to the rest of Australia. 
1.3 Chapter 4: Resident Migration and Its Effect on House Prices in 
Australia 
The third essay assesses whether house prices are affected by the flow of domestic and 
international residents as they move into and out of Australian states and territories. 
Immigration policy can change over time regarding the number of individuals 
entering/relocating to a region and the destination from which they arrive. Given that the 
Commonwealth (Federal) Government has a great deal of control over these policies, this 
thesis has chosen to examine the 1986-2005 period as it offers a longer time series and 
incorporates periods in which various parties run the Federal Government. Also, this 
period is before the 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis and will, therefore, avoid the 
possibility of house price fluctuations being contaminated by this global economic 
upheaval. ABS quarterly historical house price index (HPI) are used between 1986q2 and 
2005q2 (Figure 1.2).  
 
Figure 1.2: Australian house prices 1986q2-2005q2 
Source: ABS (2016) Residential Property Price Indexes, Eight Capital Cities (Table 8)1 
                                                 
1 Note: the index is calculated on the reference base 2003-04 = 100.0  
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The data does not go beyond 2005q2 due to a decision by the ABS to change the index 
methodology (2016). The benefit of using data in a panel setup is that it allows the 
exploration of a time series that traverses numerous leadership changes in the Federal 
Government, both from the Labour and Liberal-National sides. While Australia is a 
vibrant democracy with numerous political parties, two political regimes effectively hold 
the majority of power in the Federal Government (Dalton, Farrell & McAllister 2011). 
Throughout the duration of this sample period, federal elections have been won by either 
the Australian Labour Party (ALP) or the Liberal-National coalition (Barber & Johnson 
2014). This period also incorporates immigration policy which has transitioned to a 
relatively more means tested immigration program, as opposed to the previous 
immigration policy, which showed a preference for white European immigrants over 
others (Ongley & Pearson 1995).  
In 1979, the incumbent government moved to the more qualitative selection policy based 
on three categories: humanitarian grounds, family reunion and skilled migrants. Under 
the ALP government in the 1980s, immigration tended to favour the family and 
humanitarian categories (Wright 2012). During the Liberal-National coalition 
government from 1996–2007, skilled immigration became preferred to promote the 
growth of the Australian economy (Wright 2014). 
To explore the impact of overseas and interstate migration a fixed effects analysis is 
employed. State specific fixed effects are included to account for any state demographic 
or economic factors which are not captured in the explanatory variables. Time fixed 
effects capture any change in quality or inflationary movements over the sample period. 
Migration information is collected from the ABS Australian Demographic Statistics cat. 
3101.0 (2015). Net overseas migration data is collected from border gates as individuals 
check their passports when entering and exiting the country after long term visits. 
Destination states are the states where the individuals are likely to spend most of their 
time. Net interstate migration gives us an estimate of the flow of individuals across state 
borders having been previously residing in another state or territory. These individuals 
are treated as domestic residents. Domestic migrant flows are further broken down to 
account for the total inflow (outflow) of residents from (to) other states or territories. 
The fixed effects model allows us to investigate the short-run relationship between the 
independent variables and house prices in Australian capital cities. Additionally, this 
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study also analyses the possibility of long-run cointegrating relationships between house 
prices and migration. The findings indicate only slight evidence to support the presence 
of such a relationship between house prices and net interstate arrivals. It is slightly 
stronger in the case of total interstate arrivals.  
The main findings suggest that domestic residents arriving from interstate are an 
important factor contributing to house prices in Australia. However, the net effect of 
individuals moving into and out of the country does not appear to have a significant effect 
on house prices. These results could be due to a lack of substantial wealth transfer across 
international borders. For instance, the income brought into Australia by immigrants may 
be mitigated by the income effect of households exiting that state to relocate themselves 
in other states or nations. Alternatively, property owners who relocate to a new state could 
have a preference for continued ownership of their existing home and use their equity to 
finance a new dwelling. Net interstate migration proved a slightly stronger indicator of 
house prices compared to net overseas migration. This result could be due to individuals 
moving into a state with a greater willingness to pay and more inelastic demand for 
housing in their preferred state compared to current residents of this area.  
The period of the sample used in this analysis should be noted when interpreting these 
results. This thesis does not consider migration patterns beyond 2005. Information 
reported by the ABS demonstrates that the proportion of Australian residents born in New 
Zealand, China, India and the Philippines has been steadily increasing since 2005 (2016). 
Increased migration from these regions could have a stronger contribution to house prices 
which is not captured in this analysis. The inclusion of controls for the incumbent 
government type, such as Labour or Liberal/National, does not appear to have a 
statistically significant effect on house prices in Australia. 
Overall, government actions in determining tax rates and revenue collection appear to 
have an effect on house prices in Australia through the decisions they make. Regulatory 
burden is assessed through revenue extracted from the market in the form of land tax, 
stamp duty and municipality rate revenues. In addition, there is a positive relationship 
with house prices when governments decide to increase taxation rates. This thesis also 
assesses whether migration flows have any bearing on house prices. While interstate 
arrivals do have an impact on house price growth, there is a lack of evidence to conclude 
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that this effect is due to immigration policy or government regimes. Further, net overseas 
migration does not appear to have a significant impact on house prices in this sample. 
The findings from the thesis indicate that governments should exercise caution when 
deciding to alter policy that may affect the housing market. Increasing the regulatory 
burden faced in the housing market puts upward pressure on house prices. In addition, 
policy changes that may impact on the growth of housing supply can cause volatility in 
house prices. Taxation rates are also positively correlated with house prices though the 
effect varies depending on whether the policy decision alters the mean, minimum or 
maximum rates. While net overseas migration did not appear to have a significant 
relationship in this study, the positive effect of interstate arrivals on house prices indicates 
that more needs to be done to understand the relationship between the inflow of 
immigrants and outflow of domestic residents and the effect on house prices in Australia. 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. The three research questions are analysed 
and presented in three subsequent chapters. This is followed by a brief concluding 
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Chapter 2: Government Revenue Extraction from Housing 
Markets in Australian Capital Cities: What Happens to 
Prices?  
2.1 Introduction 
2.1.1 Aim and motivation 
In general, the price of housing is determined by both demand and supply-side factors. 
Previous studies on house prices propose models that shed light on the plethora of 
variables that could potentially drive house prices. Empirically, drivers of house prices 
have been extensively studied. Many papers suggest that income, population, rent and 
interest rate contribute to the demand for housing (Abeysinghe & Gu 2016; Agnello & 
Sousa 2011; Ambrose, Eichholtz & Lindenthal 2013; Barari et al. 2014; Himmelberg, 
Mayer & Sinai 2005; Holly, Pesaran & Yamagata 2010; Kemme & Roy 2012; Kivedal 
2013; Meese & Wallace 2003; Muellbauer 2012; Sommer, Sullivan & Verbrugge 2013).2 
Little attention, particularly in the Australian literature, has been given to factors that 
influence supply-side dynamics of house prices. 
This chapter looks beyond the assumption that governments only interact with the 
housing market through taxation as a component of the user cost of capital. It assesses 
the direct impact of government through revenue extracted from the Australia housing 
market by state and local governments while accounting for changes to housing supply. 
This analysis will provide a better understanding of the regulatory effect of various levels 
of government on the dynamics of house price changes in Australia. To explore regulatory 
burden, this chapter introduces several government revenue variables. The empirical 
analysis is conducted using a two-pronged approach in a panel setup. First, we assess the 
effect of government regulation on house prices within a fixed effects model, controlling 
for numerous fundamentals of house prices. This tactic allows us to account for 
heterogeneity across regions and time, but it does not address potential endogeneity 
present in this model. To address potential endogeneity, the panel vector autoregressive 
                                                 
2 Mayer (2011) surveys the literature on factors influencing house price bubbles in the United States (US). 
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(PVAR) setup of Love and Zicchino (2006) is employed after identifying the key 
variables from the fixed effects analysis.  
In general, two types of state and local government revenues are collected through 
taxation levied in the housing market. The first type is the tax on immovable property, 
which includes land taxes and municipality rates. The second type is the tax on financial 
and capital transactions, which is levied when a property is passed from one homeowner 
to another like the financial institution transaction taxes, government borrowing 
guarantee levies, stamp duties on conveyances and other stamp duties. 
The sum of revenues generated by these taxes varies between states and territories. This 
essay examines several state-specific taxation revenues generated from the sale or 
occupation of a dwelling and the land on which it resides. In addition, it incorporates 
municipality revenues collected by local governments from owners of property in their 
relevant municipalities. This essay focuses on three key government revenues: 
municipality rate revenue, stamp duty revenue and land tax revenue. 
Figure 2.1 shows the three revenue categories that comprise the largest part of 
government income from housing taxation in Australia. Appendix E2 demonstrates how 
these revenues differ between states. Municipality rates and land tax revenue are both 
levied at the point of transaction. The rate that is levied for land tax revenue is controlled 
by the state government, while municipality rates are controlled by the local government. 
Stamp duty revenue is generated by the state and levied at the point of transaction. These 
distinctions have important implications for the interpretation of results. 
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Figure 2.1: Taxation revenue on property: all states and local government (ABS 
2013) 
Stamp duty revenue can be interpreted as the transaction cost of purchasing a property. 
Evidence from property transactions at a postcode level in Australia suggests that the 
incidence of this tax falls on the seller (Davidoff & Leigh 2013). A study examining the 
2007–2008 United Kingdom ‘stamp duty holiday’ supports this finding. Besley, Meads 
and Surico (2014) find that the buyer accrued 60 per cent of the surplus generated from 
this holiday. This chapter considers the regulatory effect of stamp duty on house prices 
in a panel context as one of the three key areas in which government revenue is generated 
from the housing market. 
Consider a household that wants to relocate. The homeowners may consider the burden 
of stamp duties and the difference between stamp duties across states in their decision-
making process of where to relocate. Davidoff and Leigh (2013) explore this selection 
process using subsampling of postcodes within 50 kilometres of a state border in 
Australia.3 Their results suggest that house price elasticity of stamp duty payable is 
substantially higher in those regions. Alternatively, households may incorporate the 
additional burden of government into the price of the dwelling as a component of the 
                                                 
3  Examples include Albury–Wodonga (NSW–Victoria), Queanbeyan–Canberra (NSW–Canberra) and 
Tweed Heads–Coolangatta (Queensland–NSW). 
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construction cost or transfer cost. As stamp duties are levied at the point of transaction, 
this imposition can create a significant burden for households to relocate. 
Excessive regulation and stamp duty burdens could result in a mismatch of dwelling 
characteristics with household types (e.g., the opportunity cost of stamp duties may be an 
additional bathroom). Conversely, the household may be forced to accept newly built 
accommodation with desired characteristics in a less desirable area (such as an outer area 
where travel time is costly). This could exert flow-on effects to the wider economy. For 
example, households may be incentivised to remain in under-employed positions if they 
cannot freely move between national labour markets. Workforce productivity could 
further be affected by increased travel times, a rise in the number of productive workers 
being pushed to outer city limits and household stress increasing due to the previously 
mentioned dwelling-household mismatch. 
Unlike stamp duties, land tax and municipality revenue are levied annually. Municipality 
rates are levied to provide services and maintain amenities of a given municipality. 
Therefore, this study examines the effect of local government revenue extraction from 
housing ownership within a given area. Fixed effects used in the regression analysis 
attempts control for differing amenity characteristics and infrastructure such as public 
transport. Municipality revenue differs from land tax revenue because municipality rates 
are levied at both owner-occupants and landlords. In contrast, land tax is generally levied 
to those who own property for a purpose other than residing in it as their principal place 
of residence (landlord). This can be interpreted as an investor’s response to government 
intervention in the housing market. It is possible for an investor’s response to a change in 
revenue taken from the housing market to be different to that of the owner-occupant. 
2.1.2 Background and contribution to literature 
Theories behind house price dynamics can be divided into two streams: asset pricing 
models, which focus on deviations of house prices from the fundamentals of the asset; 
and present value models, which test the implicit relationship between house prices and 
rents, such as the Q investment theory (Carrington & Madsen 2011; Jud & Winkler 2003; 
Madsen 2009) and the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) approach 
(Iacoviello 2005). The neoclassical investment model emphasises the user cost of capital 
in analysing the equilibrium value of imputed rental income. This approach describes the 
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homeowner’s marginal cost of purchasing additional housing services (Himmelberg, 
Mayer & Sinai 2005; Poterba 1984, 1991, 1992; Sinai & Gyourko 2004). The literature 
has strongly established the implications of demand effects on house prices. Supply-side 
effects are more ambiguous. 
This chapter builds on the current literature by accounting for the effect of housing supply 
through three avenues. Specifically, government revenue extracted from taxation of 
transfers or possession of housing stock is used as a proxy for the regulatory burden of 
government. In addition, a number of variables are incorporated in the analysis to account 
for housing growth in Australia (e.g., dwellings completed and dwellings approved). 
Lastly, the opportunity cost of developing and redeveloping dwellings is accounted for 
by incorporating a construction cost variable. These three avenues are assessed using a 
panel of Australian cities and their regions within, which has yet to be used in Australia. 
The literature shows that the effect of supply on house prices is dependent on its elasticity. 
The economic expectation is that, during housing booms, areas with inelastic housing 
supply will experience greater price increases. The effect of supply-constrained markets 
during downturns is considerably more ambiguous, as outlined in the theoretical and 
empirical findings of Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz (2008). If homeowners are influenced 
by previous house prices, inferring speculative demand, house price downturns are likely 
to be more severe where housing supply is inelastic (Malpezzi & Wachter 2005). During 
the sample period in this essay, Australian house prices exhibited fairly constant growth, 
although growth rates vary significantly between cities and between inner, middle and 
outer regions within cities. 
If housing supply is highly inelastic or fixed in the short term, this could lead to rational 
bubbles (Stevenson & Young 2014, p. 362). Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz (2008) note that 
developers can respond to an increase in demand more rapidly, thereby shortening the 
period of house price booms. However, they may instead choose to respond more slowly, 
thus prolonging periods of economic prosperity for development firms. This is yet to be 
extensively studied in the literature. Thus, this study controls for housing construction 
costs and a number of factors that influence dwelling construction. 
An assumption of imperfect elasticity in the housing market is supported by Kearl (1979), 
Poterba (1991), Schwab (1983) and Topel and Rosen (1988). At a regional level, Green, 
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Malpezzi and Mayo (2005) discuss the unusual properties of the supply curve in housing 
markets and find that supply elasticities vary significantly between metropolitan areas. 
The regulatory burden of government has great potential to influence the elasticity of 
supply. 
The use of panel data in this analysis allows for the effects of supply and demand to vary 
between capital cities and the regions within. However, elasticities of supply may affect 
house price growth and may vary between cities. The key insight of this essay is the 
improved understanding of the effect of an additional dollar taken from the housing 
market. This enables us to infer the marginal effect of regulation. 
Direct influences on supply may occur through the zoning of land and developmental 
regulations. In frictionless markets, prices for vacant land zoned for housing should not 
lag price changes in the housing market (Oikarinen 2014, p. 1689). Institutional 
constraints embedded in the planning system vary considerably between countries and 
regions. These may significantly influence housing market dynamics, particularly on the 
supply side (Glaeser & Ward 2009; Glaeser, Gyourko & Saiz 2008; Gyourko, Saiz & 
Summers 2008; Huang & Tang 2012). Significant inroads have been made in the US 
literature with the formation of the Wharton Residential Land Use Regulatory Index 
(Gyourko, Saiz & Summers 2008). This index captures the regulatory burden of 
government in the US through survey analysis conducted in numerous municipalities. 
Australia does not have such a sophisticated method of capturing the regulatory burden 
on Australian housing markets. Therefore, this study proposes the use of government 
revenue as an avenue to capture this effect, thus contributing to the discussion on supply-
side effects on house prices. 
The inclusion of government revenue variables captures some of the supply-side effects 
on house prices in Australia. It allows us to proxy for the value owner-occupants attribute 
to continued ownership of a dwelling and the land on which it resides.4 This infers the 
regulatory burden of government through the effect of an additional dollar taken from the 
                                                 
4 Government taxes may also affect housing demand if taxes on the sale and/or occupation of property 
divert a significant number of funds from the housing sector. 
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housing market. If the government added (removed) a regulatory burden that equated to 
a dollar in the construction process, how would it affect house prices? 
2.1.3 Empirical strategy and main findings 
This chapter analyses the regulatory burden of government on house prices in a panel 
setup. A sample of house prices taken over a ten-year period (1999–2011) is obtained 
from the Real Estate Institute of Australia (REIA). These data are available for all state 
and territory capital cities in Australia, and they are divided into inner, middle and outer 
bands relative to the central business district (CBD). The regulatory burden of 
government is inferred from the additional dollar extracted by governments through 
housing taxation. Specifically, this essay focuses on land tax, stamp duty and municipality 
rate revenue. 
These government revenue variables are included one at a time to examine the effect of 
each type of revenue on house prices. All government revenue variables are then 
modelled to understand the net effect of revenue extracted from housing markets in 
Australia. All models control for variables that have been shown to affect the 
determination of house prices in the wider literature. These control variables are obtained 
predominately from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), except for interest rates, 
which are collected from the World Bank. The benefit of this panel is that we can more 
accurately account for the heterogeneity between housing markets in Australian capital 
cities. To do so, we employ a fixed effects model. 
Not only do house prices vary between capital cities, but the growth of house prices also 
occurs at different rates between regions within capital cities. There are a number of 
reasons why an Australian property is more expensive in one location compared to 
another. One explanation is that preferences tend towards locations that have a greater 
availability of resources, vicinity to infrastructure and various other amenities. In 
addition, households may have preferences regarding characteristics of dwellings such as 
the number of bathrooms and bedrooms, the size of the dwelling and the number of 
available car spaces. 
Extensive literature on hedonic house price indexes accounts for various heterogeneous 
features that can affect the perceived quality of a dwelling—in particular, age and location 
(see Goodman & Thibodeau, 1995, 1998; Mills & Simenauer 1996; Stevenson 2004). 
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Although this study is not interested in estimating house prices as a function of individual 
dwelling characteristics, there is convincing evidence that a dwelling’s location has a 
significant bearing on the final house price (Helbich et al. 2014; Liao & Wang 2012).5 
Thus, regional fixed effects are included. 
The inclusion of regional fixed effects allows us to account for the different types of 
dwellings that could be located in particular regions, as well as the possibility that 
individuals prefer to live closer to a capital city’s CBD than its outer boundary. Thus, 
inner region house prices are expected to be more expensive than outer regions. At the 
same time, supply is heavily restricted in inner regions because land is extremely scarce. 
Individuals who want to own property in metropolitan areas may find outer suburbs 
increasingly appealing because of lower land prices and potentially fewer regulatory 
burdens. This could lead to faster growth rates in outer areas. However, increasing the 
supply of housing is fraught with difficulty, as enormous time lags are involved in the 
construction process. 
Due to geographical features such as vicinity to the CBD, a number of demographic 
characteristics and varying access to amenities, heterogeneity is apparent in house price 
growth between these regions. The implementation of panel analysis in this essay, which 
allows for regional fixed effects, addresses the issue of regional heterogeneity. However, 
it is possible that heterogeneity is also present over time. 
Once one controls for this quality adjustment and the combined effects of age-related 
depreciation and required maintenance, the dwelling itself may hold considerably less 
value. As noted by Wilhelmsson (2008), the effect of depreciation differs depending on 
whether the property is well maintained. Harding, Rosenthal and Sirmans (2007) use data 
from the American Housing Survey to show that house price appreciation decreases by 
2–3 per cent per year when age-related depreciation is controlled for. Despite this, as 
indicated in Wilhelmsson (2008), older properties can experience appreciation even when 
the quality of the structure diminishes over time (the ‘Vintage Effect’). Nonetheless, this 
                                                 
5 See Hill (2013) for an in-depth evaluation of the literature on hedonic house price indexes. Hill indicates 
that the benefits of using hedonic indexes outweighs the disadvantages. In a microeconomic context, this 
may be true. However, illustrating the effect of government policy on house price, the use of real data, 
controlling for heterogeneity between markets, yields more relevant results. 
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study allows for increased quality in dwellings and developments in style with annual 
time fixed effects. The model is best specified when including both time and regional 
fixed effects. 
Findings suggest that land taxation revenue and stamp duty revenue have a significant 
and positive effect on changes in real house prices. In contrast, municipality revenue has 
a negative effect on house prices in Australian capital cities. Further, supporting the 
findings of existing studies, both interest rates and dwellings completed have a positive 
effect on house prices. Although this study’s panel fixed effects model provides an insight 
into the factors that determine house prices in Australian capital cities, it does not allow 
for potential endogeneity. 
An issue with the above model is that house prices and government revenue are jointly 
determined. To account for this issue, this study uses a PVAR model. Using the key 
variables indicated in the fixed effects analysis, this study applies Love and Zicchino’s 
(2006) approach to assess the effect of a vector of variables on a delayed shock of 
themselves. 
The results indicate that stamp duty and municipality rate revenue both have an initial 
positive effect on house prices. Municipality revenue takes a long time to decay, while 
the initial positive shock to house prices induced by a shock to stamp duty revenue is 
eroded substantially by the second period. This suggests that the additional burden of 
government on owner-occupants has a positive effect on house prices in Australia. Shocks 
to land tax revenue have a very volatile effect on house prices. Parallels can be drawn 
with the findings of van Duijn, Rouwendal and Boersema (2016), who suggest that house 
prices may be negatively affected during the redevelopment of land. The authors go on 
to note that house price growth is observed in surrounding dwellings once redevelopment 
conducted in close proximity has been completed. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the data, specifies the 
econometric model and describes the estimation strategy; Section 2.3 contains a detailed 
discussion of the empirical results; and Section 2.4 concludes. 
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2.2 Data and Methodology 
2.2.1 Data 
This chapter exploits a novel longitudinal panel dataset. The dependent variable, house 
prices for the eight Australian capital cities, was obtained from the REIA (2013). These 
prices are further disaggregated into inner, middle and outer regions. House prices have 
been deflated by the consumer price index and first differences taken. Real government 
revenue generated from the housing sector forms the key variable of interest. These data 
are obtained from ABS Cat. No. 5506 Taxation Revenue (ABS 2014). Particular attention 
is given to stamp duty revenue, municipality rate revenue, and land tax revenue. This 
study assesses the effect of government revenue on house prices in a panel setup while 
controlling for a number of key fundamentals of house prices. A list of the data used in 
this essay and their source is available in Appendix F2. 
Housing markets are quite complex, and a number of different factors contribute to house 
prices to a varying degree, depending on which housing market is the focus. Hence, house 
price growth varies not only between cities but also within cities. Given the apparent 
heterogeneity between housing markets, it is prudent first to establish the variables of 
greatest importance to house prices in Australia using a fixed effects model. 
This study introduces regional fixed effects to address the above issue. In addition, given 
that housing quality may vary between years, the study also specifies a model with both 
regional and year fixed effects. 
The results of the fixed effects analysis indicate that the three government revenue 
variables (municipality rate revenue, land tax revenue and stamp duty revenue) all 
contribute to house prices in Australian capital cities. While these results are promising, 
they do not allow for the apparent endogenous relationship between house prices and 
government revenue. Therefore, this study specifies a PVAR model using the variables 
identified as key contributors to house prices through the fixed effects analysis. 
Changes in housing stock are accounted for as a key supply-side determinant of house 
prices. Housing stock has been identified as one of the fundamental variables in the 
determination of house prices in the economic literature. There are a number of ways to 
account for housing stock. Ideally, this study would examine the total stock of housing in 
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the Australian housing market, but this variable is not available in the Australian context. 
However, this study can account for the change in housing stock using the variables 
dwellings completed, dwellings approved, a ratio of the two and dwellings commenced. 
Each variable is found in ABS Cat. No. 8752 Building Activity (ABS 2016). In addition 
to building activity, this study includes construction costs, which is considered a 
fundamental factor that influences supply. 
One of the key limitations in modelling house prices from the supply-side viewpoint is 
the non-availability of land price data in Australia (a key supply-side variable). Some 
ground has been made in this area through the works of Abelson (1997), Ball et al. (2014) 
and Costello (2014); however, much more needs to be done to assess the effect of land 
prices on house prices in a panel setup. Although this study does not include land prices 
in the model, components of government revenue, such as revenue extracted via land tax, 
capture the partial effects of this aspect of prices. As government revenue increases, a 
proportion of this revenue increase is incorporated into house prices and may reflect a 
homeowners’s willingness to occupy a dwelling in this area versus relocating, holding 
the value of the construction constant. There is some debate in the Australian literature 
regarding the inclusion of dwellings costs in the modelling of house prices. 
Abelson et al. (2005) argue that prices of new homes in the short-run are determined by 
the observed contemporaneous existing house prices; therefore, the inclusion of the cost 
of new housing is a misspecification. Additionally, ‘the cost of new houses can affect the 
price of existing housing only if new house supply significantly affects the size of house 
stock’ (Abelson et al. 2005, p. S98). If this conjecture holds, the additional costs to 
construction erode the current land value of new dwellings. However, new developments 
can be affected by both the cost of existing housing and construction costs (Bodman & 
Crosby 2004; Bourassa & Hendershott 1995). For reasons pertaining to the latter 
argument this study opts for the inclusion of construction costs on the ground that it 
captures maintenance and development attributes of housing supply. 
At any time, a household that wants to relocate must weigh up the opportunity cost of 
acquiring an existing dwelling versus redeveloping it to match the qualities they want; 
alternatively, they may acquire a new dwelling that is constructed to their desires. In this 
sense, the redevelopment of existing property can be considered new housing. Either way, 
the development of new housing stock is heavily reliant on construction costs. Ignoring 
 26 
this supply variable and only including new housing stock may bias the supply-side effect 
on the market. For this reason, numerous international studies argue for the inclusion of 
construction costs in the estimation of house prices (Goodman & Thibodeau 2008; 
Oikarinen 2014; Wang & Zhang 2014; Wu, Gyourko & Deng 2016). Additionally, the 
impact of housing supply on price may be due to the burden of government who regulate 
the development or redevelopment of housing. 
The inclusion of government revenue in the analysis of house prices can go some way to 
filling this gap in the Australian literature. Thus, this study proposes the introduction of 
a vector of government revenue variables. The relationship between government revenue 
and house prices has yet to be considered in the Australian context, and it is yet to be fully 
understood in the wider community. Ding, Li and Kang (2012) use national and regional 
panel data analysis to explore the effects of local government land leasing revenue on 
house prices. They find a positive correlation between local government land leasing and 
house prices. Regional and time differences are apparent in their analysis. Regional 
differences are mainly reflected in differences in regional economic development, 
whereas time differences are correlated with different government policies at different 
times. 
A number of additional variables have been identified in the economic literature as 
fundamental to house prices. For instance, the construction cost of housing accounts for 
the cost of building and maintaining a property. This supply-side effect is accounted for 
in our empirical model through the producer price index (PPI) of housing. The PPI 
captures changes to construction costs through appreciation or depreciation in the costs 
of materials used in the production of housing stock. In addition, the models in this study 
include the variables of population growth, income and interest rate, which are often 
identified in the literature as factors that drive housing. 
Demand-side influences are believed to influence Australian housing markets strongly. 
In their error correction model, Fry, Martin and Voukelatos (2010) find that demand 
factors drove the overvaluation of house prices before 2006. In the post-2006 sample, 
they attribute the overvaluation of house prices to macroeconomic determinants and find 
that wealth effects—not monetary policy—drive these results. This finding aligns with 
Wadud, Bashar and Ahmed (2012), but contrasts Abelson (1994). 
 27 
The population of each region is calculated from Regional Population Growth (ABS 
2015). This indicates the number of people in a particular region that require a roof over 
their head. The greater the population, the greater the need for dwellings. Income is 
accounted for at the state level through the gross state product. This indicates the total 
income available for each state. As income rises, the willingness of individuals to pay 
also rises, thus increasing house prices in a particular state. National real interest rates are 
obtained from the World Bank. 
Interest rates represent the opportunity cost of borrowing money. In a competitive market 
with low barriers to enter and exit, an increase in the interest rate enhances the opportunity 
cost of holding debt. Thus, it becomes costlier for homeowners to hold these assets when 
financed through debt. Hence, as interest rates rise, some homeowners may want to leave 
the market, thereby increasing the number of dwellings available. 
The next section outlines the methodology used to identify the variables of interest in the 
Australian housing market. First, it controls for the interaction between regions in the 
housing market with the use of fixed effects. Second, it further explores the 
contemporaneous and lagged effects that the variables have on one another with the use 
of a PVAR model. 
2.2.2 Methodology 
Panel data analysis is at the forefront of house price analysis, a number of scholars 
examining the interactions of housing markets across regions. For example, Simo-
Kengne, Gupta and Bittencourt (2013) examine the endogenous relationship between 
house prices and consumption in a provincial-level PVAR setting. Andrews and Caldera 
Sanchez (2011) and Adams and Fuss (2010) contribute further to the literature by 
conducting studies across international borders. Mikhed and Zemčík (2009) test 
fundamental variables (real house rent, mortgage rate, personal income, building cost, 
stock market wealth and population) to examine the presence of asset bubbles in the US 
before and after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. They investigate the presence of such 
bubbles in 22 metropolitan statistical areas from 1980:q2 to 2008:q2 using univariate and 
panel unit root and cointegration tests. Evidence suggests that asset bubbles were present 
before 2006. Since the global downturn, prices have eased and are more representative of 
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fundamentals. Panel data analysis of house prices is yet to make significant inroads in the 
Australian literature. 
Given the nature of Australian development, the most populous areas are primarily 
located in the capital cites of the six states and two territories. Australia has a relatively 
less dense population compared to many other industrialised nations analysed in panel 
studies—particularly those in Europe. Most of the Australian population is located in 
capital cities, which are separated by large distances. The distance between capital cities 
is a key differentiating feature of Australian housing markets. It also contributes to 
significant costs if individuals want to relocate between cities. A panel setup has the 
potential to allow for heterogeneous characteristics between cities, as well as the regions 
that exist within them. This study examines these transaction costs further through the 
introduction of government revenue, as discussed below. The clustering of metropolitan 
areas is indicative of cross-sectional interactions between housing markets not only across 
states but also between the zones indicated above. 
Examining house prices across Australian capital cities shows that house prices are most 
expensive in inner regions compared to outer regions. This could be due to a number of 
factors, including vicinity to business activities and employment in the CBD. Older, inner 
suburbs are also inclined to be more established than newer areas; thus, they tend to have 
well-established infrastructure, which coincides with an increase in opportunities to 
participate in social activities, attend cultural and sporting events, and take advantage of 
many other attractions of the more central areas of Australian capital cities. Each of these 
reasons anecdotally provides evidence of the observed higher median house prices in the 
inner zones of all capital cities across our sample. However, as inner zones are already 
well established, there is potential for faster price growth in outer regions. This 
observation is supported by van Dijk et al. (2011), who find that classes of regions in the 
Netherlands that contain rural areas close to cities exhibit faster growth in house prices 
compared to the more developed urban areas and remote rural areas. 
Drawing upon the literature of fundamentals of house prices, this study introduces two 
complementary models to better understand the variables underpinning house prices in 
Australia. First, real house prices are modelled using regional fixed effects to account for 
varying regions in Australian capital cities. Each capital city is broken down into three 
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regions (inner, middle and outer), which enables us to use a total of 236 cross-sections 
over 12 years, which constitutes the longitudinal or ‘panel’ data. The benefit of using this 
panel is that it allows for considerably more information to be attained, as well as 
accounting for unobserved individual differences, heterogeneity, that is apparent between 
city regions and across states. The study then implements a PVAR to assess the extent to 
which shocks to housing variables affect house prices, thus capturing dynamic responses 
that are not identified in the first stage of the analysis. The key benefit of the PVAR is 
that it accounts for the endogeneity issue where the fixed effects model cannot. Before 
proceeding to the fixed effects model stationarity of variables is determined through unit 
root testing. 
2.2.2.1 Unit root testing 
This study uses panel unit root testing to determine the stationarity of variables before 
introducing these into the specified models. Harris-Tzavallis (1999) test (ρ) for unit root 
has the null hypothesis that panels contain unit root and the alternative that panels are 
stationary. The Hadri (2000) Lagrange Multiplier test (z) takes the null hypothesis that 
the data are stationary versus the alternative that at least one panel contains a unit root. 
Table 2.1: Panel unit root test for stationarity 
 Level First Difference 
Test ߩ ݖ ߩ ݖ 
Real House Prices 0.414 (8.259)*** −0.170 (0.001) 
 (−0.784)  (−17.764)***  
Real Other Dwelling price 0.475 (9.216)*** −0.021 (1.226) 
 (0.166)  (−14.895)***  
Total Dwellings Approved 0.480 (7.988)*** −0.169 (−2.117) 
 (−6.020)***  (−17.751)***  
Dwelling Completed 0.505 (14.783)*** −0.429 (−2.162) 
 (−5.516)***  (−24.983)***  
Ratio of Dwellings Completed 
to Approved 
−0.150 (−1.592)   
 (−20.934)***    
Real Land Tax Revenue 0.3055 (9.462)*** −0.246 (−1.169) 
 (−2.478)**  (−11.082)  
Real Municipality Rate 
Revenue 
0.534 (11.630)*** 0.603 (7.382)*** 
 (1.087)  (2.158)  
     
 Level First Difference 
                                                 
6 The outer region of Darwin has been omitted due to a lack of information. 
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Test ߩ ݖ ߩ ݖ 
Real Other Tax on Housing 
Revenue 
0.348 (7.344)*** 0.010 (0.938) 
 (−1.815)**  (−7.082)***  
Real Tax on Financial 
Transaction Revenue 
0.667 (19.999)*** 0.100 (4.432)*** 
 (−2.140)**  (−12.561)***  
Real Government Guarantee 
Revenue 
0.9084 (18.959)*** −0.140 (−0.354) 
 (2.900)  (−17.188)***  
Real Conveyance Revenue 0.4737 (10.447)*** −0.286 (−1.794) 
 (−6.161)***  (−20.004)***  
Real Other Stamp Duty 
Revenue 
0.4252 (11.706)*** −0.208 (−2.742) 
 (−0.610)  (−18.497)***  
Regional Population 1.0089 (32.068)*** 0.000 (1.710)** 
 (4.890)  (−14.175)***  
Real Gross State Product 0.920 (25.609)*** 0.1409 (1.738)** 
 (3.133)  (−11.761)***  
Housing Producer Price Index 0.500 (14.625)*** −0.092 (−1.098) 
 (0.553)  (−16.263)***  
Real Interest Rates −0.548 (−4.199)   
 (−15.790)***    
Unemployment (Persons) 0.592 (13.591)*** 0.010 (1.074) 
 (1.989)  (−14.280)***  
Number of Panels 24 24 24 24 
Number of Periods 13 13 12 12 
Notes: ߩ represents the Harris-Tzavallis test for unit root has the null hypothesis that panels contain 
unit root and the alternative that panels are stationary. These include trends where appropriate and all 
allow for small panel adjustment to the test statistic. The Hadri LM test (z) has the null hypothesis that 
all panels are stationary with the alternative that some panels contain unit roots. Test statistics rho are 
reported, the parenthesis contain z values of the respective test. Significance levels are determined by 
p-values and are indicated by asterisk *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Driven by the results in Table 2.1 this study proposes interest rates and the ratio of 
dwellings completed to dwellings approved to be included in level terms for the fixed 
effects analysis. All other variables are included in first differences. 
2.2.2.2 Panel fixed effects 
The initial panel analysis uses three different modelling specifications. First, it controls 
for a number of variables clearly identified in the literature. This provides a baseline of 
the house price expectations. It then introduces the housing stock variables. This provides 
an opportunity to assess the viability of each variable to control for housing supply 
changes. Finally, it introduces government revenue. 
Δܴܪ ௜ܲ௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܪ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ߚଶܴ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷܥ௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧  (2.1) 
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Equation 2.1 describes the pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model, where change in 
real house prices (∆RHP) is regressed on a vector of housing stock (HS), government 
taxation revenue (R) and a set of control variables (C); and u represents the error term of 
the regression. This model makes the usual assumptions of pooled least squares of a zero 
mean, errors terms are uncorrelated and the errors are uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables. It controls for heteroscedasticity using robust standard errors clustered by 
region. 
The vector HS considers change in dwellings completed and change in dwellings 
approved. It also explores the ratio of dwellings completed to dwellings approved. This 
did not yield any significant results with very small coefficients, and it was omitted from 
the analysis. 
Government taxation revenue, R, comprises of numerous tax revenue variables. One of 
these revenues, municipality rate revenue, is generated by the local government and is 
levied to all homeowners. The remaining taxation revenue variables contribute to state 
government revenue, which can be further broken down to those generated from the sale 
or occupation of dwellings. Land tax revenue is levied to homeowners who are most 
likely landlords. This is because owner-occupants in most cases will be exempt from land 
tax rates if they reside in a dwelling as their permanent place of residence (PPR). Stamp 
duty on housing transactions, other stamp duties, financial transaction revenues, revenue 
generated through government guarantees and other revenue are all generated through the 
transaction of housing stock. All taxation revenue variables are modelled in first 
difference. 
Lastly, a vector of control variables, C, is included. Most of these control for demand 
influences on house prices, except for housing PPI, which accounts for the supply-side 
construction costs of building and maintaining properties. The demand variables included 
in this vector of controls are change in the population of regions, change in income, real 
interest rates and change in the unemployment rate of capital cities. 
Examining the Australian housing market, each capital city is shown to be intrinsically 
different in the structure of its housing market. These regions are of different sizes and 
geographical locations and comprise different ethnic groups—all of which contribute to 
varying characteristics and requirements of housing dwellings. Housing markets around 
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Australia comprise differing proportions of the above characteristics. This is reflected in 
Figure 2.2, which provides evidence of the heterogeneous differences between regions. 
One way to control for this is to model hedonic house prices, which can include housing, 
neighbourhood and amenity characteristics (Abelson, Joyeux & Mahuteau 2013; Hill & 
Syed 2016). As this study is not interested in these characteristics specifically, it 
implements a fixed effects model of median house prices. 
 
Figure 2.2: Real house price ($’000) heterogeneity across regions 
A number of idiosyncratic features of these regions could affect house prices. For 
instance, houses that are located closer to the CBD may attract a premium, as households 
like to be closer to work. In contrast, excess noise may be costly to them. Likewise, types 
of houses may vary between regions, but these characteristics cannot be observed. Thus, 
it is appropriate to model house prices in Australian capital cities while controlling for 
cross-sectional heterogeneity using a fixed-effect dummy ߙ௜௥௘௚௜௢௡௦, as noted in Equation 
2.2: 
Δܴܪ ௜ܲ௧ ൌ 	ߚଵܪ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ߚଶܴ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷܥ௜௧ ൅ ߙ௜௥௘௚௜௢௡௦ ൅ ݑ௜௧ (2.2) 
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Figure 2.3: Real house price ($’000) heterogeneity across time 
In addition to the presence of cross-sectional heterogeneity, time-varying heterogeneity 
may be present in the data (see Figure 2.3). Time dummies, ߛ௧௬௘௔௥௦, have been included 
to capture any time varying heterogeneity such quality changes over time (Equation 2.3). 
Discussion of results will primarily focus on this specification. Equations 2.1–2.3 enable 
the identification of key variables contributing to house prices in Australia, controlling 
for time and regional heterogeneity. However, they do not account for the endogeneity 
present in the house price model. 
Δܴܪ ௜ܲ௧ ൌ 	ߚଵ௜௧ܪ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ߚଶ௜௧ܴ௜௧ ൅ ߚଷ௜௧ܥ௜௧ ൅ ߙ௜௥௘௚௜௢௡௦ ൅ ߛ௧௬௘௔௥௦ ൅ ݑ௜௧  (2.3) 
2.2.2.3 Addressing endogeneity 
A key limitation of the fixed effects analysis is that it does not consider potential 
endogeneity arising when right-hand-side regressors are correlated with the error term. 
This could occur due to the omission of relevant variables, measurement error, sample 
selectivity or simultaneous causality. This thesis has attempted to obtain data from 
accurate and reliable sources like the ABS and REIA to minimise the risk measurement 
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error. However, the presence of measurement error can never be fully ruled out given the 
data generating process is unknown.  
It is possible that house prices may be correlated with the residual due to important 
omitted variables excluded from the analyses. However, the above model includes a 
number of control variables that have been extensively studied in the wider literature and 
attributed as determinants of house prices. The inclusion of economic controls attempts 
to circumnavigate omitted variable bias. 
An additional and potentially more troublesome issue in this model is the possibility that 
one or more explanatory variable determines house prices and are simultaneously 
determined by house prices. This is most probably the case with government revenue, 
which is dependent on the value of property. While the fixed effects model does not 
account for this issue, it provides the impetus for the variables to be used in the ensuing 
panel VAR (PVAR) analysis. The PVAR addresses the endogeneity problem mentioned 
above.  
2.2.2.4 Panel vector autoregression model 
To investigate this further, this study identifies the transmission of housing shocks using 
the PVAR approach developed by Love and Zicchino (2006). The benefit of this model 
is that it accounts for the idiosyncratic nature of regional housing markets by introducing 
fixed effects	ሺܴ݁݃݅݋݊௜ ), isolating the response of real house price changes to market 
shocks and allowing for unobservable regional housing market heterogeneity. This is 
expressed as: 
ݕ௜,௧ ൌ ܣሺܮሻݕ௜,௧ ൅ ܴ݁݃݅݋݊௜ ൅ ߳௜௧, (2.4) 
where ܣሺܮሻ is the lagged operator and ݕ௜௧  is a vector of macroeconomic and housing 
market variables. The forward mean is removed using the Helmert procedure following 
Love and Zicchino (2006). This avoids obtaining biased coefficients that may arise due 
to correlation between the fixed effects and regressors. Further, it allows us to preserve 
the orthogonality between the transformed variables and the lagged regressors, making it 
possible to use the lagged regressors as instruments to estimate Equation 2.4 by system 
generalised method of moments (GMM) (Arellano & Bover 1995). 
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The PVAR model selects the lag length by minimising AIC and BIC criteria. The 
automatic selection criteria chose the lag length of one period, however additional lag 
lengths were explored in preliminary analysis. While the estimates appear consistent 
while using up to three lags, increasing the number of lags diminished the accuracy of 
results which could attributed  to the small time period of 1999-2011. Further, given the 
sample is over 10 periods, the time dimension of the data has limited the number of lags 
that can be selected. Due to these factors, the study proceeds with one lag in the PVAR 
approach. 
Cholesky decomposition is implemented to identify orthogonal shocks in variables of 
interest and examine their effects on the remaining variables while holding all else 
constant. Impulse response functions (IRFs) are used to analyse the response of one 
variable to an orthogonal shock of another variable. The confidence intervals for these 
IRFs are generated using Monte Carlo simulations to identify the response to one shock 
at a time while holding other shocks constant. Variables that enter Equation 2.4 first are 
assumed to be the most exogenous and therefore affect subsequent variables both 
contemporaneously and with a lag, while variables that are ordered later are less 
exogenous and affect previous variables only with a lag. The ordering of variables in this 
study is conducted in decreasing order of exogeneity: real interest rates, land tax revenue, 
municipality rate revenue, stamp duty revenue, dwellings completed and real house 
prices. 
2.3 Results and discussion 
2.3.1 Fixed effects model 
The results show the three panel models specified in the previous sections. Pooled OLS 
is included as a benchmark only since the coefficients are biased and not trustworthy. 
Time and regional fixed effects are denoted by Region FE and Year FE respectively. The 
dependent variable is the change in real house prices in thousand dollars. 
Table 2.2 reports the results, where change in real house prices is regressed on dwellings 
completed, a vector of government taxation revenue variables and a vector of control 
variables. As shown, specification (2.2) outperforms specification (2.1) when regional 
fixed effects are introduced, allowing for any unobserved heterogeneity across regions. 
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When introducing time fixed effects alongside regional fixed effects in (2.3), the within 
R-squared improves again. 
Table 2.2 also shows that changes in real land taxation revenue are positive and 
statistically significant across each of the three models. In this instance, land tax revenue 
reflects land prices, assuming that land tax rates are relatively stable. If this assumption 
holds, land tax revenue reflects the positive relationship that land prices have with house 
prices through the positive and statistically significant coefficient of land tax revenue. 
Specification (2.3) shows that a one-dollar increase in growth of land tax revenue 
corresponds with an eight-cent increase in the growth of house prices. 
Further, changes in stamp duty revenue positively contribute to changes in real house 
prices. This state-level taxation is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level and is 
positively correlated with the dependent variable across each of the three models in Table 
2.2. Real stamp duty revenue has a direct relationship with transaction costs of relocating. 
As the cost of relocating rises, a proportion of this cost is capitalised into the growth of 
real house prices in a given state. This finding contrasts with that of Davidoff and Leigh 
(2013), who find that conveyance rates have a negative effect on house prices. 
Changes in real municipality revenue have a negative effect on real house prices. This 
variable represents the cost of owning a dwelling in a particular region. Municipality rates 
vary from region to region, although in each instance the charge to owners is used to fund 
the cost of operating various services and amenities in the area, such as waste removal 
and street sweeping. These results indicate that changes in real municipality rate revenue 
have a greater effect on changes to real house prices once regional fixed effects are 
included. This could indicate the presence of an endogeneity issue, where municipality 
rates are jointly determined by house prices. This is explored further in the next section. 
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Table 2.2: Change in real house price and select government variables 
 Real House Price 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Housing Stock    
Dwellings Completed 0.00739 0.00742 0.00722 
 (0.00106)*** (0.00111)*** (0.00154)*** 
Government Revenue    
Real Land Tax Revenue 0.120 0.121 0.0756 
 (0.0247)*** (0.0243)*** (0.0286)*** 
Real Municipality Rate Revenue −0.100 −0.151 −0.230 
 (0.0496)** (0.0688)** (0.0822)*** 
Real Conveyance Revenue 0.0290 0.0388 0.0282 
 (0.00704)*** (0.00875)*** (0.0109)*** 
Controls    
Regional Population −4.96e−05 0.000139 2.99e−05 
 (0.000111) (0.000170) (0.000159) 
Real Gross State Product 0.000152 0.000210 −0.000216 
 (0.000612) (0.00106) (0.00140) 
Housing Producer Price Index −1.789 −1.689 6.737 
 (1.551) (1.556) (3.360)** 
Interest Rates 9.061 12.09 22.43 
 (1.585)*** (2.077)*** (3.666)*** 
Unemployment (Persons) −0.516 1.881 −2.300 
 (3.442) (4.495) (4.241) 
Constant −12.37 −96.30 −189.7 
 (8.853) (26.38)*** (133.0) 
    
Observations 276 276 276 
R-squared 0.367 0.400 0.520 
Number of Regions 23 23 23 
Region FE NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES 
Notes:  identifies a variable in first differences. Real house price represents the dependent variable, changes 
in real house prices. FE stands for fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. R-squared is reported as the within R-squared results from the fixed 
effects model. This is the measurement of correlations squared where	ݕ෤෠ ൌ ሺݕො௜௧ െ ݕത෠௜ሻ ൌ ሺݔ௜௧ െ ̅ݔ௜ሻߚመ . 
Dwellings completed is also positively correlated with real house prices and is statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level. These findings are confirmed in Table 2.4, which 
regresses dwellings completed with only controls. As dwellings completed is the growth 
of housing supply in Australia, the change in dwellings completed is considered an 
acceleration of housing stock in Australia. The results indicate that as housing stock 
accelerates by one unit, a positive change of 0.008 is observed in real house prices. The 
finding contradicts the idea that prices could fall as supply increases. 
A possible explanation for this finding is that construction of new dwellings does not 
commence until a developer has a strong signal (and financial support) that occupants are 
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waiting to fill the dwellings. It is often observed that developers do not commence 
construction until a certain proportion of their development is pre-sold. Thus, an increase 
in supply is always accompanied by an increase in demand. If this is the case for most of 
the sample, then this model may have difficulty in separating out the supply-side factors 
from the demand-side factors, even though the economic intuition is sound. 
One further issue arising from this analysis of house prices is the positive effect of interest 
rates. The findings indicate that interest rates have a strong and positive correlation with 
changes in real house prices. A decrease in interest rates would have a dampening effect 
on house prices. Consider that house prices are an asset and behave akin to the stock 
market. If interest rates increased, this would indicate a rise in the opportunity cost of 
borrowing money and holding debt. Thus, a proportion of individuals in this market may 
assess this burden as too costly to hold debt, resulting in offloading their holdings, which 
would lead to a fall in asset prices. This is also partially true in the housing market, as a 
rise in real interest rates will constrain a considerable proportion of homeowners who 
finance the ownership of their dwelling through debt. However, it is also possible that, 
due to the illiquid nature of houses, the market cannot clear easily. Not only is it difficult 
to sell a house quickly, but there are also additional opportunity costs (exogenous to stamp 
duties) of relocating, such as finding a new job, finding new schools for children and 
developing new social networks, as well as additional time and money required to locate 
a suitable dwelling. 
In addition to these transaction costs, a trade-off exists between the mortgage one pays 
and the imputed rent that is avoided from owning and occupying a dwelling. Hence, a 
positive change in interest rates must be large enough to make renting a more appealing 
option. Although this positive correlation is contrary to the theoretical explanation, it is 
consistent across each of our models and is corroborated by a number of contemporary 
studies, including Dilan (2014) for Australia, Shi, Jou and Tripe (2014) for New Zealand, 
and Tse, Rodgers and Niklewski (2014) for the UK. To reinforce this study’s results, key 
variables identified above are regressed individually. 
Table 2.3 shows the results when all government revenue variables are used as regressors. 
As shown, the key government variable of interest remains significant and with consistent 
signs. Further, the inclusion of these additional revenue streams does not significantly 
affect the controls. Thus, our a priori assumption that stamp duty, land tax and 
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municipality rate revenues would be of most interest out of the revenue variables is 
confirmed. We further investigate the strength of this specification through the individual 
analysis of variables. 
Table 2.3: Change in house prices on all variables 
 Real House Price 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Housing Stock    
Dwellings Completed 0.00783 0.00824 0.00842 
 (0.00130)*** (0.00130)*** (0.00162)*** 
Government Revenue    
Real Land Tax Revenue 0.124 0.131 0.0818 
 (0.0246)*** (0.0222)*** (0.0278)*** 
Real Municipality Rate Revenue −0.108 −0.149 −0.199 
 (0.0481)** (0.0639)** (0.0793)** 
Real Other Tax on Housing Revenue −0.0389 −0.149 −0.286 
 (0.106) (0.119) (0.126)** 
Real Tax on Financial Transaction 
Revenue 
0.0198 0.00565 −0.0568 
 (0.0238) (0.0282) (0.0256)** 
Real Government Guarantee Revenue −0.0637 −0.0199 −0.00157 
 (0.0550) (0.0686) (0.0787) 
Real Conveyance Revenue 0.0335 0.0438 0.0244 
 (0.00704)*** (0.00761)*** (0.00989)** 
Real Other Stamp Duty Revenue −0.0427 −0.0477 0.0179 
 (0.0372) (0.0377) (0.0425) 
Controls    
Regional Population −8.86e−05 −4.67e−06 −0.000127 
 (0.000134) (0.000209) (0.000166) 
Real Gross State Product 0.000226 3.47e−05 −0.000170 
 (0.000632) (0.00106) (0.00135) 
Housing Producer Price Index −1.515 −1.375 5.692 
 (1.549) (1.581) (3.325)* 
Interest Rates 9.406 12.70 22.07 
 (1.775)*** (2.149)*** (3.497)*** 
Unemployment (Persons) −0.0344 2.110 −2.675 
 (3.739) (4.702) (4.454) 
Constant −14.02 −98.90 −103.5 
 (9.635) (27.29)*** (132.9) 
    
Observations 276 276 276 
R-squared 0.372 0.408 0.535 
Number of Regions 23 23 23 
Region FE NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES 
Notes:  identifies a variable in first differences. Real house price represents the dependent variable, changes 
in real house prices. FE stands for fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. R-squared is reported as the within R-squared results from the fixed 
effects model. This is the measurement of correlations squared where	ݕ෤෠ ൌ ሺݕො௜௧ െ ݕത෠௜ሻ ൌ ሺݔ௜௧ െ ̅ݔ௜ሻߚመ . 
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Table 2.4 shows that dwellings completed is consistently positive, indicating that the rate 
at which housing supply changes in Australia has a significant bearing on changes in 
house prices. 
Table 2.4: Change in house prices and dwellings completed 
 Real House Price 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dwellings Completed 0.00672 0.00728 0.00733 
 (0.00120)*** (0.00123)*** (0.00156)*** 
Controls    
Regional Population 3.17e−05 0.000269 0.000257 
 (0.000131) (0.000125)** (0.000106)** 
Real Gross State Product −0.000124 −0.00145 −0.00223 
 (0.000504) (0.00116) (0.00133)* 
Housing Producer Price Index −1.954 −1.927 8.156 
 (1.496) (1.584) (3.957)** 
Interest Rates 9.803 10.96 21.61 
 (1.670)*** (1.731)*** (3.680)*** 
Unemployment (Persons) 1.410 0.970 −1.495 
 (3.480) (4.256) (3.761) 
Constant −13.36 −47.56 −170.2 
 (8.778) (17.31)*** (125.5) 
    
Observations 276 276 276 
R-squared 0.283 0.295 0.465 
Number of Regions 23 23 23 
Region FE NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES 
Notes:  identifies a variable in first differences. Real house price represents the dependent variable, changes 
in real house prices. FE stands for fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. R-squared is reported as the within R-squared results from the fixed 
effects model. This is the measurement of correlations squared where	ݕ෤෠ ൌ ሺݕො௜௧ െ ݕത෠௜ሻ ൌ ሺݔ௜௧ െ ̅ݔ௜ሻߚመ . 
Appendix A2 reports tables where each of the government revenue variables of interest 
modelled individually. Table A2.1 shows that changes in real land taxation revenue are 
strongly significant across each model, although the value of the coefficient decreases in 
column (3) to 0.055. Table A2.2 shows that changes in real conveyance revenue lose 
some significance in column (3), but remain consistent across each model. Changes in 
real municipality rate revenue were not as significant when modelled individually in 
Table A2.3 as compared to Table 2.3. The sign remains consistently negative, however 
the result is only statistically significant when regional and fixed effects are controlled 
for. Additionally, the magnitude of the coefficient is much larger at −0.22. This could be 
an indication of the endogeneity issue discussed above and can be further explored in the 
PVAR results below.  Overall, the model performs considerably better once time and 
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regional fixed effects are included. This indicates that regional influences are important 
when considering the growth of house prices in Australian capital cities. 
The fixed effects analysis provides insights into the effect of government revenue on 
house prices in Australia. In addition, it confirms that a number of variables that we 
consider fundamental to house prices are important to the growth of house prices. 
However, there is evidence to suggest that some of these variables may be jointly 
determined by house prices. Further, there are indications that the supply-side effects are 
unable to be teased out from demand effects in this analysis. Thus, it is prudent to conduct 
further analysis into these relationships. The next section reports the results of the PVAR 
specification. 
2.3.2 Results from PVAR analysis 
The previous section discussed that endogeneity and contemporaneous correlation may 
be at hand in the fixed effects models. This could be due to a number of reasons. 
Government revenue is generated from housing sales or the value of a dwelling that is 
owned. Therefore, not only does government revenue affect house prices, but house 
prices also determine government revenue. A couple of variables demonstrate differing 
effects once time fixed effects are included—namely, municipality rate revenue and PPI. 
These factors may indicate the presence of endogeneity. This section reports IRFs 
generated using PVAR following Love and Zicchino (2006). 
Figure 2.4 depicts the IRFs of key variables to a one-period lag shock to house prices. 
House prices are of importance to stamp duties and municipality rates in the middle-right 
and middle-left panels respectively. Interestingly, a shock of house prices has a negative 
effect on stamp duties at one period. However, the effect of this shock flattens over five 
periods. This contrasts with municipality rate revenue. The shock to municipality rate 
revenue is positive at one period, albeit very small. Volatility is present for a number of 
periods after this point until it dampens considerably around five periods. 
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Figure 2.4: One-period lagged response of change in key variables to a shock in 
change of house price 
Notes: Errors are a 5 per cent on each side, generated by Monte Carlo with 1000 reps. 
Land taxation revenue, top-right panel, also demonstrates positive growth at one period 
in response to a shock in the growth of house prices. However, the error bands 
surrounding this result are quite large. This effect turns negative at around two periods. 
Real interest rates appear to fall with a positive shock to house prices. Given the Reserve 
Bank of Australia’s reluctance to engage in macroprudential policy—like monitoring 
indicators for credit and asset prices, liquidity, lending standards and housing market 
 43 
imbalance to manage financial systemic risk7 (RBNZ 2017; Lim et al. 2011)—over this 
period (Ellis 2012), this response is likely due to monetary policy transmission in 
response to economic events exogenous to the housing market. 
Two things are of particular interest in the bottom two panels of Figure 2.4. First, house 
prices appear to have an instantaneous large negative shock due to lagged house price 
shock, which flattens quickly. This could be reflective of the market supply of existing 
dwellings. As house prices rise, the equity that homeowners hold also rises. Thus, a short 
increase in house prices could cause households who were considering selling to hold off 
until the next period. 
Second, the marked contrast of dwellings completed (bottom-left panel in Figure 2.4) 
with an initially large positive effect after a house price shock. This positive growth 
becomes negative after two periods. Volatility in dwellings completed continues for 
approximately four periods in the future. The volatility and the movement of these shocks 
show that there may be pent-up demand for future dwelling stock. This may be due to a 
shortage of housing. Additionally, developers releasing parcels of land in blocks rather 
than over extended periods could be driving these results. 
The PVAR results in Figure 2.5 examine how changes in house prices are affected by a 
one-standard-deviation lagged shock of key variables used in the fixed effects analysis. 
Lagged shock to stamp duty on conveyance revenue (middle-right panel of Figure 2.5) 
appears to be positively associated with house prices growth. Lagged changes to real 
stamp duty revenue has a large spike in the first period of around 20 before a large 
correction to approximate 2 at period two. It then stabilises around 0 over time. 
                                                 
7 After identifying systemic risk using macroprudential indicators, the RBNZ deploy macroprudential 
instruments such as the countercyclical capital buffer, adjustments to the core funding ratio, adjustments to 
sectoral capital requirements or quantitative restrictions on the share of high loan-to-value ratio loans to the 
residential property sector to decrease systemic risk in the economy (RBNZ 2013). 
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Figure 2.5: One-period lag response of change in real house price to a shock in key 
variables of interest 
Notes: Errors are a 5% on each side, generated by Monte Carlo with 1000 reps. 
Land tax revenue (top-right panel of Figure 2.5) is positive during most of the impulse 
response function. However, there is a great deal of volatility in earlier periods. House 
prices are initially negative at one period following a shock to land tax revenue, this effect 
turns positive by period two. With continued volatility over the next two periods the effect 
dampens out over time. 
Municipality rate revenue shocks also demonstrate a positive relationship with change in 
real house prices. This shock dampens out gradually over time. 
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A shock to real interest rates (top-left panel of Figure 2.5) has a decreasing positive effect 
on house prices over a long period. Interestingly, there is a dramatic positive relationship 
in the middle of this otherwise gradual slope. This could feed into the result observed in 
the fixed effects model. In the long-run, housing markets respond to interest rates in a 
rational way. However, short-run deviations in mortgage rates could be capitalised into 
house prices. The change in housing stock also appears to follow a similar pattern 
considering the PVAR results for dwellings completed. 
Dwellings completed (bottom-left panel of Figure 2.5) shows a moderately negative 
effect transmitted over two periods before a slight positive correction occurs. This gives 
credit to the possibility that developers can profit off inelastic housing markets, 
contributing to growth in house prices. This demonstrates the importance of getting the 
incentives right in the housing market as a society can bear a great cost if these incentives 
are misaligned. Malpezzi and Mayo (1999) highlight this in their study of housing supply 
in Malaysia. 
Appendix D2, Figure D2.1, postulates a different order and the inclusion of control 
variables used in the fixed effects analysis. Only land tax, as the largest impacting 
government revenue variable identified in the fixed effects analysis, was included in this 
model. We use the ordering of house prices, interest rates, dwellings completed, real gross 
state product, PPI, unemployment, land tax and population. The figure reports the impulse 
responses for each variable. The findings indicate that a shock to dwellings completed, 
real gross state product, PPI, unemployment rate and population all have a positive effect 
on house prices. Interest rates also have a short positive effect on house prices, although 
this turns negative after one period before tapering out. Land tax has an immediate 
negative effect in this instance. Given the volatility of land tax shown in the above Figure 
2.5, this result is not completely surprising. It may be likely that, given land tax is 
predominately levied at landlords, the increased cost of owning investment dwellings 
causes investors leave the market. This gives way for owner occupants to enter, which 
may contribute to the positive effect on prices that is observed in the above results. 
Overall it appears that government revenue has a positive relationship with house prices 
in Australia. This supports the hypothesis that the revenue extracted from housing 
markets in Australia increase house prices similar to how additional regulatory burden 
would affect house prices through delays and increase costs. These findings are broadly 
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aligned with the wider literature. The more government impacts on the housing markets, 
the harder it is for households to allocate themselves efficiently. This arises through 
increased transaction costs for homeowners and developers incurring greater regulatory 
burden making it relatively more difficult to match changing market dynamics (Glaeser, 
Gyourko & Saks 2005; Huang & Tang 2012). 
2.3.3 Robustness checks 
To check the robustness of the results, the sample is split into two subsamples. The 
empirical methodology is repeated for Melbourne and Sydney, and then for all other states 
and territories using fixed effects and PVAR analysis. Appendix B2 reports subsampling 
results for the fixed effects model. Appendix D2 reports alternate specifications for the 
PVAR and subsampling of the model reported in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. 
Table B2.1 replicates our findings in Table 2.3 for regions within Melbourne and Sydney. 
Table B2.2 then assesses the impact of the key variables on house prices for regions 
within all capital cities except Melbourne and Sydney. The results appear most consistent 
in the non-Melbourne and Sydney subsample depicted in Table B2.2. The coefficients 
are aligned with results observed in Table 2.3, however the magnitudes are slightly 
smaller. This is to be expected given the smaller sample and the absence of the two largest 
housing markets (Melbourne and Sydney). Issues arise when considering Table B2.1. 
Results seem consistent with the full sample in columns 1 and 2. However, the inclusion 
of time fixed effects in column 3 loses the statistical significance for all coefficients 
except for interest rates. This could be due to a lack of observations in the sample. 
Subsampling conducted in Appendix D2 indicates that the results are being driven 
predominately by housing markets in Melbourne and Sydney. IRFs in Figure D2.2 appear 
to resemble similar paths compared to Figures 2.4 and 2.5. However, the results do not 
support such a strong positive relationship. Shocks to real stamp duty revenue are initially 
very large and positive, though become negative by one period. Shocks to municipality 
revenue and land tax revenue have quite a volatile effect on house prices growth. This 
may indicate that changes in government activity in the housing market may induce 
uncertainty.  
Subsampling of cities other than Melbourne and Sydney do not appear to be as robust as 
the whole sample. The error bands in Figure D2.3 diverge rather quickly. A small positive 
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effect of stamp duty revenue shock on house price growth can be observed along with the 
negative relationship with shocks to dwellings completed. Shocks to real interest rates 
also have a negative relationship with growth in house prices. Other results appear to be 
quite small and not very significant. These results would benefit from more frequent data. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter contributes an improved understanding of how government impact on house 
prices in Australian capital cities. Building on the current literature, this chapter 
investigates the effect of government regulation through the transmission of government 
revenue extracted from housing markets in Australia. 
By incorporating government revenue into the house price model, we can account for 
some of the value that owner-occupants attribute to the acquisition and continued 
residence of dwellings. To explore house prices in Australian capital cities, we use panel 
analysis with the dependent variable change in real house prices. This is then broken 
down into three regions that exist within their boundaries—inner, middle and outer—
equating to 23 metropolitan regions in Australia’s capital cities. 
The methodology in this study applies a fixed effects model allowing for regional and 
time-varying heterogeneity. Controlling for the regional and time fixed effects apparent 
in the data, we establish a house price model that incorporates key supply variables, a 
vector of government revenue and a set of controls as evident in the current literature. 
The results indicate that dwellings completed are the best indicator of the rate at which 
housing supply changes in Australian capital cities. We also found three key government 
revenue variables that contribute to changes in house prices. 
Land tax and stamp duty conveyance revenue both have a strong and statistically 
significant correlations with house prices, indicating that a proportion of the positive 
change to the cost of occupying the land on which a dwelling resides and the opportunity 
cost of purchasing a property within a given region will be passed on to the value of the 
property. Municipality rates also contributed significantly to house prices, albeit in a 
negative fashion. While the fixed effects analysis provides an indication of the key 
determinants of house prices in the Australian panel, the coefficients may be biased due 
to the joint determination of house prices and government revenue. The model informs 
us of key variables affecting housing markets. While the results from the fixed effects 
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analysis are interesting, the true benefit was the indication of key variables to be used in 
the PVAR analysis. 
To address the issue of endogeneity, this essay employs the PVAR of Love and Zicchino 
(2006). This enables a more accurate estimate of the effect of government revenue on 
house prices. It indicates that both stamp duty and municipality rate revenue have an 
initial positive effect on house prices. In contrast, the effect of a shock to land tax revenue 
is initially negative, and the effect is volatile over a number of periods. A lot of volatility 
is apparent in the IRFs. This could indicate that government interaction in housing 
markets can induce a degree of uncertainty as homeowners respond to such changes. 
This study aligns itself with the wider literature which indicates that government 
regulation can inhibit the growth of housing supply through constructions delays or 
incentives not to invest (Glaeser, Gyourko & Saiz 2008; Hilber & Turner 2014; Saiz 
2010). This may be due to large opportunity costs to redevelop existing land for 
residential purposes. 
The PVAR results address endogeneity, specifically the joint determination variables that 
are evident in the static model. These strengthen our original findings and explore the 
lagged effect of a shock to the key variables of interest. Land taxation revenue shocks and 
conveyance revenue shocks both have a significant initial effect before dampening over 
time, while dwellings completed are very volatile in the PVAR model. This could be due 
to the pent-up demand underpinning the housing market. 
The use of government revenue allows us to assess the burden of an additional dollar 
extracted from the housing market. From this, we inferred that a regulatory burden would 
arise due to the additional costs incurred from complying with regulation. The results 
indicate that government burden, which affects owner-occupants, is largely reflected in 
house prices. Governments should be careful when considering regulatory constraints that 
will affect the redevelopment of existing zones, new development and restrict the 
movement of current homeowners. The results indicate that this regulatory burden can 
introduce uncertainty into the market. This has the potential for flow-on effects to owner-
occupant housing, and incentivise residents to be less mobile. 
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This chapter has provided a better understanding of the regulatory effect of government 
on the housing market in Australia, yet more needs to be done to isolate key components. 
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Appendix A2: Government revenue fixed effects analysis 
Table A2.1: Real land tax revenue 
 Real House Price 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Real Land Tax Revenue 0.0848 0.0864 0.0548 
 (0.0229)*** (0.0258)*** (0.0245)** 
Housing Supply    
Dwellings Completed 0.00764 0.00815 0.00777 
 (0.00116)*** (0.00117)*** (0.00157)*** 
Controls    
Regional Population 6.42e−05 0.000369 0.000314 
 (0.000154) (0.000128)*** (0.000122)** 
Real Gross State Product −0.000725 −0.00183 −0.00237 
 (0.000532) (0.00106)* (0.00131)* 
Housing Producer Price 
index 
−2.942 −2.943 7.674 
 (1.652)* (1.726)* (3.838)** 
Interest Rates 8.743 9.497 20.93 
 (1.686)*** (1.732)*** (3.655)*** 
Unemployment (Persons) 2.248 1.065 −1.242 
 (3.494) (4.214) (3.727) 
Constant −6.717 −29.51 −159.3 
 (9.373) (18.44) (127.2) 
    
Observations 276 276 276 
R-squared 0.310 0.318 0.472 
Number of Regions 23 23 23 
Region FE NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES 
Notes:  identifies a variable in first differences. rhp represents our dependent variable, changes in real 
house prices. FE stands for fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. R-squared is reported as the within R-squared results from our fixed effects model, this is the 
measurement of correlations squared where	ݕ෤෠ ൌ ሺݕො௜௧ െ ݕത෠௜ሻ ൌ ሺݔ௜௧ െ ̅ݔ௜ሻߚመ  
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Table A2.2: Real stamp duty conveyance revenue 
 Real House Price 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Real Conveyance Revenue 0.0202 0.0280 0.0209 
 (0.00683)*** (0.00804)*** (0.0107)* 
Housing Supply    
Dwellings Completed 0.00615 0.00639 0.00694 
 (0.00113)*** (0.00115)*** (0.00156)*** 
Controls    
Regional Population −0.00000 0.000126 0.000106 
 (0.000120) (0.000138) (0.000148) 
Real Gross State Product 0.000175 −0.000243 −0.00126 
 (0.000532) (0.00117) (0.00157) 
Housing Producer Price 
index 
−0.701 −0.685 8.024 
 (1.397) (1.448) (3.670)** 
Interest Rates 10.60 13.42 22.48 
 (1.695)*** (2.175)*** (3.825)*** 
Unemployment (Persons) −0.893 1.349 −2.234 
 (3.545) (4.302) (4.024) 
Constant −21.55 −100.8 −299.9 
 (9.143)** (25.91)*** (141.0)** 
    
Observations 276 276 276 
R-squared 0.315 0.345 0.483 
Number of Regions 23 23 23 
Region FE NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES 
Notes:  identifies a variable in first differences. rhp represents our dependent variable, changes in real 
house prices. FE stands for fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 
0.05, * p < 0.1. R-squared is reported as the within R-squared results from our fixed effects model, this 




Table A2.3: Real municipality rate revenue 
 Real House Price 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Real Municipality 
Rate Revenue 
−0.0380 −0.0464 −0.216 
 (0.0525) (0.0675) (0.0814)*** 
Housing Supply    
Dwellings Completed 0.00678 0.00733 0.00716 
 (0.00113)*** (0.00118)*** (0.00148)*** 
Controls    
Regional Population 3.24e−05 0.000247 0.000160 
 (0.000120) (0.000139)* (0.000111) 
Real Gross State 
Product 
0.000139 −0.00129 −0.00140 
 (0.000655) (0.00119) (0.00124) 
Housing Producer 
Price index 
−2.043 −1.945 7.615 
 (1.492) (1.591) (3.838)** 
Interest Rates 9.654 10.90 22.15 
 (1.557)*** (1.678)*** (3.564)*** 
Unemployment 
(Persons) 
1.481 1.047 −1.642 
 (3.515) (4.356) (4.040) 
Constant −12.10 −47.64 −38.05 
 (8.069) (17.85)*** (136.5) 
    
Observations 276 276 276 
R-squared 0.283 0.296 0.484 
Number of Regions 23 23 23 
Region FE NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES 
Notes:  identifies a variable in first differences. rhp represents our dependent 
variable, changes in real house prices. FE stands for fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. R-squared is reported 
as the within R-squared results from our fixed effects model, this is the 




Appendix B2: Fixed effects analysis - subsampling 
Table B2.1: Main findings subsample: Melbourne and Sydney 
 Real House Price 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Housing Stock    
Dwellings Completed 0.00814 0.00810 0.0111 
 (0.00211)*** (0.00183)*** (0.0205) 
Government Revenue    
Real Land Tax Revenue 0.0971 0.0938 0.0579 
 (0.0287)*** (0.0308)*** (0.301) 
Real Municipality Rate Revenue −0.184 −0.208 0.169 
 (0.102)* (0.118)* (0.579) 
Real Other Tax on Housing Revenue −0.272 −0.513 −0.811 
 (0.277) (0.329) (0.882) 
Real Tax on Financial Transaction Revenue 0.00963 −0.00445 −0.104 
 (0.0294) (0.0265) (0.106) 
Real Government Guarantee Revenue 0.0145 0.0930 0.0457 
 (0.0732) (0.0392)** (0.338) 
Real Conveyance Revenue 0.0420 0.0551 0.0303 
 (0.0178)** (0.0266)** (0.0457) 
Real Other Stamp Duty Revenue 0.0525 0.0327 0.139 
 (0.0170)*** (0.0282) (0.0814)* 
Controls    
Regional Population −8.44e−05 0.000145 −9.83e−05 
 (0.000144) (0.000289) (0.000204) 
Real Gross State Product 0.00130 0.000570 0.00334 
 (0.00293) (0.00329) (0.00640) 
Housing Producer Price index −12.58 −8.500 17.19 
 (4.846)*** (4.717)* (17.84) 
Interest Rates 4.935 10.95 31.50 
 (4.877) (7.661) (17.42)* 
Unemployment (Persons) −7.486 −14.63 −23.34 
 (7.085) (10.19) (11.82)** 
Constant 31.95 0 0 
 (27.44) (0) (0) 
    
Observations 72 72 72 
R-squared 0.573 0.595 0.736 
Number of Regions 6 6 6 
Region FE NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES 
Notes:  identifies a variable in first differences. rhp represents our dependent variable, changes in real 
house prices. FE stands for fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. R-squared is reported as the within R-squared results from our fixed effects model, this is the 




Table B2.2: Main findings subsample: cities other than Melbourne and Sydney 
 Real House Price 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Housing Stock    
Dwellings Completed 0.00683 0.00629 0.00788 
 (0.00197)*** (0.00253)** (0.00244)*** 
Government Revenue    
Real Land Tax Revenue 0.302 0.360 0.303 
 (0.0848)*** (0.101)*** (0.106)*** 
Real Municipality Rate Revenue −0.405 −0.481 −0.438 
 (0.0938)*** (0.103)*** (0.122)*** 
Real Other Tax on Housing Revenue 0.0684 0.0654 −0.312 
 (0.126) (0.109) (0.170)* 
Real Tax on Financial Transaction Revenue 0.0552 −0.0150 −0.0861 
 (0.0701) (0.0678) (0.0735) 
Real Government Guarantee Revenue 0.500 0.578 0.219 
 (0.135)*** (0.229)** (0.249) 
Real Conveyance Revenue 0.0357 0.0463 0.0263 
 (0.00763)*** (0.00905)*** (0.00965)*** 
Real Other Stamp Duty Revenue −0.0550 −0.0361 −0.0801 
 (0.0826) (0.0875) (0.0760) 
Controls    
Regional Population 0.000126 0.00201 0.00144 
 (0.000312) (0.00112)* (0.00120) 
Real Gross State Product 0.00165 0.00221 −0.000122 
 (0.000920)* (0.00191) (0.00222) 
Housing Producer Price index 0.281 −0.221 4.261 
 (1.766) (1.740) (4.030) 
Interest Rates 11.80 14.48 19.62 
 (1.436)*** (2.205)*** (5.458)*** 
Unemployment (Persons) 2.808 4.559 −1.095 
 (5.024) (6.324) (6.819) 
Constant −29.84 −105.2 525.7 
 (9.276)*** (27.69)*** (365.4) 
    
Observations 204 204 204 
R-squared 0.396 0.422 0.574 
Number of Regions 17 17 17 
Region FE NO YES YES 
Year FE NO NO YES 
Notes:  identifies a variable in first differences. rhp represents our dependent variable, changes in real 
house prices. FE stands for fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. R-squared is reported as the within R-squared results from our fixed effects model, this is the 




Appendix C2: Full PVAR from Figures 2.4 and 2.5 
 
Notes: errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 reps. d represents a variable in first difference. rhp is real house prices. r_it is real interest rate. rlandtax is 
real land tax revenue. r_rates is real municipality revenue. rconvey is real stamp duty revenue. dwelcomp is dwellings completed. 
Figure C2.1: Full PVAR of key variables of interest
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Appendix D2: Alternate PVAR modelling and subsampling 
 
Notes: errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 reps. d represents a variable in first difference. rhp is real house prices. r_it is real interest rate. rlandtax is 
real land tax revenue. r_rates is real municipality revenue. rconvey is real stamp duty revenue. dwelcomp is dwellings completed. 
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Notes: errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 reps. d represents a variable in first difference. rhp is real house prices. r_it is real interest rate. rlandtax is 
real land tax revenue. r_rates is real municipality revenue. rconvey is real stamp duty revenue. dwelcomp is dwellings completed. 




Notes: Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo with 1000 reps. d represents a variable in first difference. rhp is real house prices. r_it is real interest rate. rlandtax is 
real land tax revenue. r_rates is real municipality revenue. rconvey is real stamp duty revenue. dwellcomp is dwellings completed. 
Figure D2.3: PVAR real house prices and controls (cities other than Melbourne and Sydney)
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Appendix E2: Government revenue over sample period: Australian 
states and territories 
 
Figure E2.1: Property taxation revenue NSW 
Source: (ABS 2014) 
 
Figure E2.2: Property taxation revenue Victoria 
Source: (ABS 2014) 
  67
 
Figure E2.3: Property taxation revenue Queensland 
Source: (ABS 2014) 
 
Figure E2.4: Property taxation revenue South Australia 
Source: (ABS 2014) 
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Figure E2.5: Property taxation revenue Western Australia 
Source: (ABS 2014) 
 
Figure E2.6: Property taxation revenue Tasmania 
Source: (ABS 2014) 
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Figure E2.7: Property taxation revenue Northern Territory 
Source: (ABS 2014) 
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Appendix F2: Data sources 
Table F2.1: List of data sources 
Variable Database Table Code 











Population ABS 3210.0 
Gross State Product ABS 5220.0 
Real Interest Rates World Bank FR.INR.RINR 
Median house price 
index of established 
houses constructed 
from median house 
















Chapter 3: Do Land Taxes and Stamp Duties Contribute to 
House Prices in Australian Capital Cities? 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Aim and motivation 
This chapter investigates the potential relationship between government tax rates and 
house prices in Australian capital cities. These taxes are levied by governments at the 
state and local levels and form a considerable portion of government revenue. Few 
researchers have investigated the relationship between a government’s decision to change 
the tax rate and the effect on house prices. For example, Berry (2001) examines the effect 
of stamp duties on house prices in Dublin, Ireland, while Davidoff and Leigh (2013) 
analyse the effect of stamp duties payable on properties at the postcode level in Australia. 
This chapter analyses whether a government’s decision to change taxation rates affects 
house prices in Australia. To do this, three types of stamp duty rates and land tax rates 
are collected from state revenue offices and legal archives. Policy changes are identified 
using structural break analysis. These policy changes are then interacted with the rate 
series to inform us of the effect of government decisions to alter housing tax rates. The 
dependent variable, provided by the Real Estate Institute of Australia (REIA), reports 
Australian median house prices by capital city, separated into inner, middle and outer 
regions, over the period 1999–2011. This is an important contribution, as tax rates may 
affect regions disproportionately. Analysis of these panel data will provide a better 
understanding of the effect of government taxation on house prices. 
Davidoff and Leigh (2013) contribute to research in this area by analysing the effect of 
land transfer tax—also known as ‘stamp duty’—on house prices in Australia. They 
examine the effect of the stamp duty bill calculated for a property equal to the geometric 
mean value within a postcode. Taking this mean value at the beginning of their sample, 
the authors create an instrument variable by calculating the stamp duty bill of a property 
that has seen price growth at the national average. Using this instrument controls for a 
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degree of endogeneity and assesses its effect on house prices and the number of property 
transfers. The authors estimate price and quantity elasticities of stamp duties for a panel 
of properties sold in Australia from the mid-1990s to 2005 at the postcode level. While 
this method controls for some of the endogenous issues of house prices and stamp duty 
bills, it assumes that house prices grow at the national average. Davidoff and Leigh’s 
(2013) findings suggest that the incidence of taxation falls on the seller of the dwelling. 
This finding is echoed by Kopczuk and Munroe (2014), who analyse the 1 per cent 
‘mansion tax’ in New York and New Jersey. 
Both findings are in deference to Benjamin et al. (1993) who find that sale price fell in 
response to Philadelphia’s 1988 transfer tax increase. While Huffman et al. 1988 report 
that the burden of development impact taxes falls occupants.  
Given the difference in house price growth in Australian capital cities, it is not a 
reasonable to assume that prices grow at the national average as in Davidoff and Leigh 
(2013). Therefore, this study sheds light on alternative channels to estimate the impact of 
tax rates on house prices in Australia. In particular, it uses a number of average tax rate 
calculations that can be used to indicate decisions to change tax rates. Various taxation 
rates are also accounted for, including rates levied to permanent place of residence (PPR) 
homeowners, first homeowners (FHO) and non-PPR or investor (INV) rates. 
3.1.2 Background and contribution to literature 
The contributions of this essay to the academic literature are threefold. First, it 
investigates the effect of taxation on house prices in Australia and focuses on a number 
of different taxation policies. Thus, for the first time in the Australian context, this paper 
assembles and exploits a unique dataset of land tax rates, as well as three stamp duty rate 
series, collected from state revenue offices and legal archives. Second, changes in tax 
policy decisions are obtained by identifying structural breaks in the tax series and 
deciphering the real effect of policy decisions through the interaction of breaks in the 
policy series. Third, the analysis employs a panel dataset that accounts for individual 
heterogeneity between capital cities and between a number of regions within them. 
House prices in Australian capital cities have experienced rapid growth in recent years, 
raising the question: What is contributing to this growth? Many economists have explored 
this question by comparing observed house prices with how easily they are explained by 
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changes in fundamentals. This chapter also analyses Australian house prices relative to 
economic fundamentals. The premise behind this approach is that affordability and 
population determine house prices while accommodating for the elasticity of housing 
supply. This ideology was founded in the urban sphere of the house price debate; it was 
developed by Alonso (1964) and extended by Rosen (1979), who employed a variant of 
hedonic price to estimate wage differentials. Further, Roback (1982) explored the 
relationship between wages and rents and the market-based measure of the quality of life. 
Research that has built on these models and those of Poterba (1991) introduce taxation 
through the user cost of capital. This paper seeks to better understand how taxation 
policies affect house prices by assessing the effect of taxation policies levied at different 
agents in the housing market while controlling for a number of key demand-side and 
supply-side variables identified in the literature. 
Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai (2013) examine the variation in house price appreciation 
between metropolitan cities in the United States (US). They attribute the long-run 
skewness of house price appreciation to a combination of inelastic land supply in some 
prominent locations and an increase in the number of wealthy households that want to 
live in these locations. Their study motivates the use of supply constraints and income 
growth data as controls when estimating house prices. Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill 
(2010) make similar predictions in their spatial dynamic general equilibrium model. 
When modelling house prices, it is important to include relevant control variables to 
minimise omitted-variable bias and allow for external influences on house prices outside 
of the tax variables in question. Glaeser and Gyourko (2007) motivate the inclusion of a 
number of these controls. In the spirit of Alonso (1964), Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), 
the authors attempt to replicate stylised facts of the housing market. The model uses key 
economic fundamentals, including local income, population and interest rates, while 
allowing for differences in supply elasticity and construction costs across metropolitan 
areas. The paper has success and shortcomings in its predictions, although it indicates that 
housing markets are largely local. This finding has motivated this essay to use house 
prices at a regional level. These findings support our use of house price data for Australian 
capital cities and provide an impetus for the selection of control variables. The next 
section provides an empirical understanding of house prices in the Australian context. 
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3.1.3 Empirical strategy and main findings 
A panel fixed effects methodology is employed to allow for individual heterogeneity 
between the regions in the sample. In addition, changes in the taxations series are 
accounted for with Bai (1997) sequential structural break analysis. These breakpoints are 
then interacted with the taxation variable to obtain an accurate picture of the effect of 
taxation on house prices in Australia. 
Land tax has a positive effect on house prices in Australian capital cities, with a 1 per 
cent increase in land tax yielding an increase in the growth of house prices of 9.6 per cent. 
The effect of changes to stamp duties differs depending on whether the duty is levied on 
a property that is occupied by a household using it as their PPR. For instance, an increase 
in the stamp duty rate levied at FHOs increases the growth of real house prices by 3.1 per 
cent, while PPR households increase house prices by 4.24 per cent. In contrast, if the 
government increases the stamp duty rate levied on households who purchase a non-PPR 
home, the growth of real house prices decreases by 2.75 per cent. 
Interestingly, both PPR and FHO stamp duties have a positive effect on house prices. This 
could be due to an underpinning strong inelastic demand, which may be due in part to 
large transaction costs and few substitutable goods. Without readily substitutable goods, 
households will absorb the increased transaction burden in the price of the property. There 
are numerous explicit costs involved in moving from one dwelling to another, including 
removalists and agent fees. Stamp duty rates represent another explicit transaction cost. 
The results indicate that this cost is capitalised in the value of the property. In contrast, 
investors have numerous alternatives to allocate their capital. 
Given the structure of taxation policy in Australia, non-PPR homeowners are considered 
housing investors in this chapter. Land taxes are levied annually and are an ongoing cost 
of owning an investment property. As discussed above, stamp duties levied on non-PPR 
properties are levied at the point of transaction. It is possible that an increase in the 
transaction cost of purchasing an investment property acts as a market-clearing 
mechanism, thereby decreasing prices. Alternatively, if the asset is very illiquid, increases 
in tax rates may be passed on through an increase in the expected value of the dwelling. 
This chapter sheds light on this issue. 
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The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the data. Section 3.3 
specifies the econometric model and describes the estimation strategy. Section 3.4 
contains a detailed discussion of the empirical results. Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Data 
Analysis of house prices is yet to be fully explored with the aid of panel methodologies. 
There are many benefits to using panel data; for example, they provide more information 
while simultaneously allowing for individual heterogeneity between markets within a 
country. House price growth in Australia varies substantially between and within cities. 
Although this literature is developing, little has been done to understand Australian house 
prices in a panel setup. 
Hanewald and Sherris (2013) compare numerous postcode-level, time-varying house 
price models in Sydney, while Parkinson et al. (2009) use panel data of British and 
Australian houses to show that borrowing constraints are important contributors to house 
prices. Windsor, La Cava and Hansen (2015) use census panel data between 2002 and 
2012 to demonstrate that homeowners have a positive bias of around 1 per cent when 
estimating home values. Windsor, Jaaskela and Finlay (2015) apply panel analysis to 
explore how house price changes affect house wealth for different types of homeowners. 
It appears that no researchers have applied panel analysis to city-level data in Australia—
nor have they accounted for the varying extent to which house price growth is 
disproportionately affected by determinants between regions within cities. Therefore, this 
section outlines the data used in the panel analysis of house prices in Australian capital 
cities. 
3.2.1 House price 
The dependent variable is the change in real median house price. Median house price data 
from 1999 to 2011 are provided by the REIA and reported in nominal terms, which are 
converted to real house prices by deflating prices with the consumer price index. Median 
house prices are reported for inner, middle and outer regions for each Australian capital 
city. The inner zone covers an approximately 6 km radius from the central business 
district (CBD). The middle and outer zones are located approximately 6–20 km from the 
city, and 20 km to the outer boundary of the city, respectively. This results in a total of 
23 regions within Australia. 
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3.2.2 Government taxation 
This chapter uses novel data to analyse the effect of state-specific taxes levied on house 
values in Australia. Specifically, it examines two types of taxes levied on homeowners: 
land tax and stamp duties. Land tax is an annual fixed cost of owning a property and is 
levied at the end of the financial year as a proportion of the assessed value of the property. 
In contrast, stamp duties are a transaction cost of purchasing a property. The duty levied 
is proportionate to the value of the property at the point of transaction, and it varies 
depending on the type of household purchasing the property. If the purchaser is a first 
homeowner and it is their PPR, they are often eligible for a discount on the rate levied at 
the point of transaction. This is the lowest stamp duty rate payable. Owners who purchase 
a property that is their PPR, but not their first home, are eligible for a smaller rate discount. 
Households who purchase a property that is not their PPR are subject to the highest rate. 
According to ofﬁcial taxation statistics (ABS, 2017), revenue from property taxation as a 
proportion of total taxation revenue has fluctuated around 48 per cent during the time 
period covered in the empirical analysis (1999-2011). Since 2005-06 financial year 
taxation revenue as a proportion of total state revenue has increased from 48 per cent to 
49 per cent of total state government revenue in 2013-14. Of these property taxation, land 
tax represents on average 8 per cent of all state taxation revenue while stamp duties 
represent 19 per cent. This suggests that stamp duty comprises a considerably larger share 
of revenue for Australian states. These figures are considerably larger than the ones 
reported in the existing literature. Stamp duty contributes 3 per cent of total revenue in 
New Hampshire and Florida, 4 per cent for the District of Columbia and 5 per cent for 
New York (Dachis et al. 2012). 
The amount of tax levied on a property depends on its value. For stamp duties, this is 
assessed at the point of sale, while land taxes are assessed periodically within each state. 
The rate at which a property is taxed depends on what range the property value falls 
within. Table 3.1 depicts the current scale of land taxation rates for Victoria, which has 
been in place since 2009 (State Revenue Office Victoria 2016b). 
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Table 3.1: Land taxation rates Victoria, 2009–2016 
Dutiable value range Duty payable 
Less than $85,000 Nil 
$85,001 to less than $200,000 $85 plus 0.1% for each dollar over $85,000 
$200,001 to less than $540,000 $200 plus 0.2% for each dollar over $200,000 
$540,001 to less than $675,000 $880 plus 0.5% for each dollar over $540,000 
$675,001 to less than $810,000 $1,555 plus 1.0% for each dollar over $675,000 
$810,001 to less than $1,080,000 $2,905 plus 1.75% for each dollar over 
$810,000 
$1,080,001 to less than $1,620,000 $7,630 plus 2.75% for each dollar over 
$1,080,000 
$1,620,001 to less than $2,700,000 $22,480 plus 3.0% for each dollar over 
$1,620,000 
$2,700,001 and over  $54,880 plus 5.0% for each dollar over 
$2,700,000 
There are often many housing taxation brackets. The rates that are levied differ depending 
on the housing value and the bracket that the value falls within. We refrain from matching 
median house prices with median taxation and duty rates to avoid the rates being 
endogenously determined by the dependent variable, as rates vary with the value and the 
property, bracket creep can occur. However, the rates that are levied are fundamentally a 
political decision, and we want to capture the effect of this decision. 
Property value brackets work on a sliding scale and are cumulative. The rate at which 
homeowners are levied may be different to the reported rate of the value bracket a 
dwelling is valued within. This rate does not consider the lower rates levied on the 
proportion of the property value that fell within lower brackets. Therefore, this study 
calculates the rate of tax that would be levied on a dwelling that falls at the midpoint of 
each bracket and reports this in terms of the percentage of tax paid on the total property 
value. As the highest bracket has no upper limit, we double the lower limit of that bracket 
and calculate the tax paid on the property valued at the midpoint of this range. A number 
of different descriptive statistics of these rates are used to capture these policy decisions. 
Appendix E3 outlines the method used in the calculation of these tax rate variables. 
Consider the example of land taxation policy for Victoria in 2001 (see Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1 shows that if the value of a property is assessed below $85,001, an individual 
will pay no tax on the property. However, once the value of the property exceeds $85,000, 
the individual will incur a tax rate of 0.1 per cent for every dollar between $85,000 and 
$200,000, plus an additional $85. Thus, one cannot simply assess this tax rate as 0.1 per 
cent; instead, one must consider the additional $85 levied against the owner. The 
following method is implemented to calculate meaningful land tax and stamp duty rates. 
The dollar value of tax levied against a property that would fall in the middle of the lower 
and upper bounds of each bracket is calculated and reported as a percentage of the value 
of the property to be levied in accordance with the relevant act of each state.8  This 
includes the value of tax paid in all preceding housing valuation brackets. Thus, in the 
example above, the value of tax levied against a property valued at $370,000 is calculated 
for the third bracket. The total amount of tax paid on a property valued at this amount in 
2001 would be $200 plus the amount of the property value that falls within the third 
bracket ($170,000) multiplied by 0.002. This equates to $540 or 0.15 per cent of the 
property valued at $370,000. This rate is significantly different from the 0.2 per cent of 
each dollar over $200,000 stated in the taxation schedule. 
In the instance of the highest housing valuation bracket, no upper limit is specified. Here 
an upper limit is assumed to be double the lower limit. In the above example, this would 
be $5,400,000, which does not significantly skew the data. Examining house prices in 
Australian capital cities, it is plausible that the value of property could exceed this value. 
Additionally, as the rate calculated is proportionate to the value of the property, this 
method is sound. Therefore, the amount of tax levied against a property valued at 
$4,050,000 is calculated. Taking into consideration the $53,905 that would be levied on 
a property valued at the upper limit of the previous bracket, as well as the rate of 5 per 
cent to be levied on each dollar that exceeds $2,700,000, the tax levied against a property 
valued at $4,050,000 is $121,405 (2.97 per cent) (NSW Government 2016). 
This method accurately accounts for the sliding scales of the taxation brackets. Not doing 
so would increase the land tax rates and potentially skew the results. A number of 
different measures of these taxation rates are analysed for each period. An earlier 
assessment of the data explored two averages of the taxation rates: mean and median. The 
                                                 
8 See Appendix D3 for a list of sources where stamp duty and land tax rate information are available. 
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median rates were not dissimilar from the mean rates, so it was decided to proceed with 
the later. Maximum, minimum, the range between highest and lowest rates, and standard 
deviation in rates are also explored for each period. 
Stamp duties are levied differently depending on the type of homeowner purchasing the 
dwelling. Owner occupants receive a discounted stamp duty rate, which is captured in the 
data. These are homeowners who are purchasing a dwelling for their PPR or purchasing 
a home as their PPR, which is their first home (FHO). Finally, some are purchasing an 
additional dwelling outside of their PPR (non-PPR). Mean, maximum, minimum, the 
range between highest and lowest rates, and standard deviation are calculated for each 
household type. 
As noted earlier, the number of brackets differ between states and over time. For example, 
in 1976 the Western Australian Government had 18 property valuation brackets (Western 
Australia Government 1976). In recent years, these brackets have been reduced to a more 
manageable 4–6 brackets. Towards the end of the sample, NSW had only three brackets 
for owners eligible for the FHO discounted duty rate. 
FHOs often receive discounts on properties up to a certain property value limit. For 
instance, in 2012 New South Wales required FHOs of properties over $625,000 to pay 
the same amount of stamp duty for their home as a PPR homeowner. However, if a FHO 
purchased a property valued less than $625,000, they were eligible for a discount. First 
homes valued less than $550,000 would be exempt from stamp duty. First homes valued 
between $550,000 and $625,000 were levied at 24.72 per cent of dutiable value minus 
$136,070, an effective rate of 1.5 per cent. Table 3.2 outlines the stamp duty policy for 
Victorians eligible for FHO stamp duty discounts from 2011 to 2013. 
An example of the difference between stamp duties levied on housing transactions for 
PPR and non-PPR homeowners in Victoria is shown in Table 3.3 (Victoria Government 
2016a). Stamp duty rates levied on properties that are non-PPR are reported in column 
non-PPR rate. Households who own property as their PPR are levied at rates outlined in 
column PPR rate. The method discussed above is used to determine the percentage of 
stamp duty charged to properties within each reported bracket for every Australian state 
and territory. Table 3.4 presents descriptive statistics for the rates levied on homeowners. 
Households who purchase properties that are not their PPR are levied at the highest tax 
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rate. PPR properties receive a discounted rate, while FHOs pay the lowest amount of 
stamp duties. The minimum land tax rate levied in each state is zero. However, this rate 
is levied annually, rather than at the point of transaction. On average, a household pays 
0.58–0.65 per cent of their property value in land tax rates, although this can vary by 0.5 
per cent. The average maximum land tax for all states and territories is 1.44 per cent of 
the property value, although it could be as high as 3.5 per cent. 




$0–$25,000 (1.4% of the dutiable value of the property) less 20% 
$25,001–$130,000 ($350 plus 2.4% of amount > $25,000) less 20% 
$130,001–$440,000 ($2870 plus 5% of amount > $130,000) less 20% 
$440,001–$550,000 ($18,370 plus 6% of amount > $440,000) less 20% 
$550,001–$600,000 ($28,070 plus 6% of amount > $550,000) less 20% 
More than $600,000 The duty reduction for eligible first home buyers does not 
apply. Please refer to the rates for non-PPR dutiable property. 
Notes: Rates are for FHOs who use their property as their PPR with settlement dates on or after 1 July 2011 
and before 1 January 2013. 
Table 3.3: Stamp duty Victoria 2008–2016 
Dutiable value 
range 
Non-PPR rate PPR rate 
$0–$25,000 1.4% Nil 




$130,000–$440,000 $2,870 plus 6% of 
amount  
> $130,000 
$2,870 plus 5% of amount  
> $130,000 
$440,000 – $550,000 $29,270 plus 6% of 
amount  
> $130,000 
$18,370 plus 6% of amount  
> $440,000 
$550,000–$960,000 $62,270 plus 6% of 
amount  
> $130,000 
See non PPR 
More than $960,000 5.5% See non PPR 
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Table 3.4: Land and stamp duty tax rate summary statistics 
Variable   Obs. Mean Std dev. Min Max 
Land tax Mean 312 0.65 0.31 0.00 1.14 
 Median 312 0.58 0.34 0.00 1.35 
 Maximum 312 1.44 0.83 0.00 3.50 
 Minimum 312 0.13 0.26 0.00 0.90 
 Range 312 1.31 0.90 0.00 3.50 
  Std dev. 312 0.56 0.31 0.00 1.03 
FHO stamp 
duty 
Mean 312 2.19 1.00 0.01 3.77 
Median 312 2.23 1.07 0.08 4.08 
 Maximum 312 3.78 1.62 0.00 5.87 
 Minimum 312 0.92 0.86 0.00 3.28 
 Range 312 3.14 1.22 0.04 5.87 
  Std dev. 312 1.59 0.62 0.68 3.34 
PPR stamp 
duty 
Mean 312 2.60 0.87 0.78 3.82 
Median 312 2.57 0.94 0.78 4.17 
 Maximum 312 4.04 1.20 1.56 5.53 
 Minimum 312 1.16 0.66 0.00 2.42 
 Range 312 2.81 1.00 0.50 4.72 
  Std dev. 312 1.52 0.64 0.68 3.34 
Non-PPR 
stamp duty 
Mean 312 3.09 0.57 2.39 4.35 
Median 312 3.11 0.59 1.89 4.35 
 Maximum 312 4.62 0.86 3.32 6.58 
 Minimum 312 1.65 0.79 0.00 3.73 
 Range 312 2.98 1.14 1.24 5.18 
  Std dev. 312 1.46 0.77 0.68 3.34 
Notes: Summary statistics are of the average rate levied in the middle of each taxation bracket. Obs. 
is observations; std dev. is standard deviation of a taxation rate; PPR is principal place of residence. 
Mean, std dev, min and max statistics are reported in percentage terms. Non-PPR stamp duty is 
levied on dwellings other than the homeowners principle place of residence, these are considered 
to be leived on investors. 
Table 3.4 provides an overview of the summary statistics for the taxation rate variables 
used in the panel analysis. 
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3.2.3 Control variables 
A number of control variables are included to account for the fundamental value of house 
prices. All variables are outlined in Table 3.5. Housing stock has been identified as one 
of the fundamental variables in the determination of house prices in the economic 
literature. There are several ways to account for dwellings stock. Dwellings completed is 
used to capture the additional housing supply from previous periods. 
The construction cost of housing is also included, accounting for the cost of building and 
maintaining a property. This supply-side effect is accounted for in the empirical model 
through the producer price index (PPI) of housing. This captures changes to construction 
costs through appreciation or depreciation in the costs of materials used in the production 
of housing stock. In addition to these two supply-side factors, this chapter includes a 
number of variables that influence demand. 
Fundamentals of house prices have been analysed in the economic literature for a number 
of years. Numerous papers suggest that income, population, rent and interest rates 
contribute to housing demand (Abeysinghe & Gu 2016; Agnello & Sousa 2011; Ambrose, 
Eichholtz & Lindenthal 2013; Barari et al. 2014; Himmelberg, Mayer & Sinai 2005; 
Holly, Pesaran & Yamagata 2010; Kemme & Roy 2012; Kivedal 2013; Meese & Wallace 
2003; Muellbauer 2012; Sommer, Sullivan & Verbrugge 2013). 
The population of each region is calculated from the regional population growth from the 
ABS. It indicates the number of people in a particular region that require a roof over their 
head. The greater the population, the greater the need for dwellings. Income is accounted 
for at the state level through the gross state product. This indicates the total income 
available for each state. As income rises, the willingness of individuals to pay rises, thus 
increasing the price of houses in a particular state. Real interest rates are acquired from 
the World Bank. 
Interest rates represent the opportunity cost of borrowing money. In a competitive market 
with low barriers to enter and exit, an increase in the interest rate enhances the opportunity 
cost of holding debt. Thus, it becomes costlier for homeowners to hold these assets when 
financed through debt. Hence, as interest rates rise, some homeowners may want to leave 
the market, thereby increasing the number of dwellings available in the market. The next 
section outlines the methodology used. 
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Table 3.5: Control variables 
Variable Description Data source 
Income Gross state product. 
Reported in $A million. 
ABS 
Unemployment rate Proportion of labour force 
unemployed and seeking 
work for each state and 
territory. 
6202.0—Labour Force, 
Australia, May 2016. 
Table 12. Labour force 
status by sex, state and 
territory—seasonally 
adjusted. 
Population Number of individuals 










Housing supply Number of dwellings 




Australia, Dec 2015. Table 
80. 
Construction cost Housing producer price 
index (PPI) 
ABS cat. 6427.0—
Producer price indexes 
Interest rates Nominal interest rate World Bank 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Model 
3.3.1.1 Unit root testing 
To avoid spurious regression results, this study considers the inclusion of differenced 
variables. In the following fixed effects analysis, variables have been regressed in first 
differences when the presence of a unit root has been detected. To determine the presence 
of a unit root this chapter uses Harris-Tzavallis (1999) and Hadri (2000) Lagrange 
Multiplier tests for stationarity. The Harris-Tzavallis (ρ) test for unit root has the null 
hypothesis that panels contain unit root and the alternative that panels are stationary. The 
Hadri (2000) Lagrange Multiplier test (z) takes the null hypothesis that the data are 
stationary versus the alternative that at least one panel contains a unit root. The results of 
this test are reported in Appendix G3 Table G3.1. Given that the tax rate variables are 
indicators of the change in policy decision they have been kept in levels. All other 
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variables are modelled in first differences, with the exception of interest rates which is in 
levels. 
3.3.1.2 Regression model 
In the analysis, panel data is first pooled (Equation 3.1), assuming the coefficients are 
constant for all regions in all periods, thus ignoring the possibility of regional 
heterogeneity. The pooled OLS model forms a baseline for a comparison of the results: 
Δ݈݊Rܪ ௜ܲ௧ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶܶܣ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߚଷܦ௜௧்஺௑ ൅ ߚସሺܶܣ ௜ܺ௧ൈܦ௜௧்஺௑ሻ ൅ ߚହ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ݁௜௧  (3.1) 
where ݈݊ represents a variable taken as a natural log, Δ indicates the first difference of a 
variable. RHP indicates real house prices for inner, middle and outer regions of Australian 
capital cities. ܶܣ ௜ܺ௧ is a vector of government tax rates, which may include land tax (LT), 
stamp duty levied at homeowners who use their property for purposes other than as their 
PPR (INV) and discounted stamp duty rates levied at PPR homeowners and first 
homeowners (FHO). These tax rates are included first individually to assess the marginal 
effect of rates on house prices, and then all together to examine the net effect of the tax 
rates. 
D indicates the use of a binary indicator variable that takes the value 1 if there is a 
structural break indicated in the duty or tax series, and 0 otherwise. The superscript of D 
indicates the taxation or duty series that dummy variable applies to. ௜ܺ௧ is a vector of 
control variables that include: dwellings completed (DWELCOMP), population (POP), 
real gross state product (RGSP), the change in the cost of building a property is 
represented through a PPI specific to housing and working age unemployment accounted 
for by U. ݁௜௧ represents the error term. The assumptions of the error terms are outlined 
below: 
ܧሺ݁௜௧ሻ ൌ 0	ሺݖ݁ݎ݋	݉݁ܽ݊ሻ    (zero mean)	
ݒܽݎሺ݁௜௧ሻ ൌ ܧሺ݁௜௧ଶ ሻ ൌ ߪଶ	    (homoscedasticity)	
ܿ݋ݒ൫݁௜௧, ௝݁௦൯ ൌ ܧ൫݁௜௧, ௝݁௦൯ ൌ 0	݂݋ݎ	݅ ് ݆	ݐ ് ݏ	 (all errors are uncorrelated)	
ܿ݋ݒ൫݁௜௧, ݔ௞,௜௧൯ ൌ 0, ܿ݋ݒ൫݁௜௧, ݔ௞ା⋯,௜௧൯ ൌ 0	  (errors are uncorrelated with x). 
However, the pooled least squares ignore the panel nature of the data and are therefore 
restrictive. While the above specification is used as a benchmark, we wish to relax some 
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of these assumptions by using fixed effects analysis—in particular, the assumption of the 
lack of correlation between the error term for the same individual. Any unobservable 
individual characteristics that are excluded from a set of explanatory variables, and hence 
included in the error term, will lead to similar effects in different years for the same 
region. The assumption of zero correlation over time for the same region can be relaxed 
such that heteroscedasticity may be present: 
ܿ݋ݎ൫݁௜௧, ௝݁௦൯ ൌ ߰୧୲. 
This alternative assumption also relaxes the assumption of homoscedasticity, because 
when ݐ ൌ ݏ: 
ܿ݋ݒሺ݁௜௧, ݁௜௧ሻ ൌ ݒܽݎሺ݁௜௧ሻ ൌ ߰௧௧. 
We continue to assume the errors for different regions are uncorrelated. This assumption 
should hold, as the data have been collected from a large sample and the observations are 
sufficiently large. Given that heteroscedasticity may be an issue in the panel, it is 
corrected for by using cluster robust standard errors (Hill et al. 2008). 
To allow for differing regional characteristics over the period, the assumption that 
individuals have the same coefficients is relaxed. Using the fixed effects methodology 
allows these unobserved characteristics to be excluded from the set of explanatory 
variables. Including regional dummies allows us to capture the individual heterogeneity 
that may bias the results. These can include housing structural characteristics and 
characteristics that vary between regions. To do this ߙ௜௥௘௚௜௢௡௦ are included. These are 
dummy variables which take the value of 1 for each individual region i. Time dummies 
for years are also included in specification (3.3). This will capture time-varying 
characteristics such as housing quality: 
Δ݈݊Rܪ ௜ܲ௧ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶܶܣ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߚଷܦ௜௧்஺௑ ൅ ߚସሺܶܣ ௜ܺ௧ൈܦ௜௧்஺௑ሻ ൅ ߚହ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߙ௜௥௘௚௜௢௡௦ ൅ ݁௜௧
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (3.2)	
Δ݈݊Rܪ ௜ܲ௧ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶܶܣ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߚଷܦ௜௧்஺௑ ൅ ߚସሺܶܣ ௜ܺ௧ൈܦ௜௧்஺௑ሻ ൅ ߚହ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߙ௜௥௘௚௜௢௡௦ ൅
ߛ௧௬௘௔௥௦ ൅ ݁௜௧	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 (3.3)	
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3.3.1.3 Stability diagnostics 
This section discusses stability diagnostics explored in the analysis. Bai’s (1997) 
sequential breakpoint test is chosen to investigate when each of the policy variables 
presents regime changes. Once these are identified, dummy variables are incorporated 
into the fixed effects model. 
3.3.1.3.1 Structural break analysis 
This section outlines the structural break analysis performed to confirm the presence of 
parameter instability in the duty and land tax rates, which capture changes in state housing 
policies affecting house prices in Australian capital cities. Testing parameter stability has 
been an important part of applied economics since Chow (1960). It tests known dates of 
structural breaks using an F-statistic. This requirement of a priori knowledge was relaxed 
by Quandt (1960), who modified Chow’s test to consider the F-statistic with the largest 
value over all possible break dates. Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) 
derived the limiting distribution of Quandt and related statistics yielding the commonly 
used Quandt–Andrews Breakpoint Test for one or more unknown structural breakpoints. 
This analysis will focus on the more recent literature that Bai developed regarding 
sequential estimations of multiple breaks (1997a) and estimation of multiple breaks 
(1997b). The benefit of the sequential test lies in its robustness to misspecification of the 
number of breakpoints and computational efficiency. Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) 
provide further extension of the Quandt–Andrews framework by allowing for multiple 
unknown breakpoints.9 
Following Bai and Perron (2003), consider standard multiple linear regression model with 
ܶ  periods and ݉  potential breaks (producing ݉ ൅ 1  regimes). For the observations 
௝ܶ , ௝ܶ ൅ 1, … , ௝ܶାଵ െ 1 in regime ݆ the following regression model is used: 
ݕ௧ ൌ ܺ௧ᇱβ ൅ Z୲ᇱߜ௝ ൅ ߳௧	
for regimes	݆ ൌ 0,… ,݉. Where regressors are divided into two groups, the ܺ variables 
are those whose parameters do not vary across regimes, while ܼ  variables have 
coefficients that are regime-specific. For the moment, we are interested in ascertaining 
                                                 
9 Perron (2006) surveys the literature and provides references to additional commentary. 
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whether the policy parameters are stable such that X will be equal to 0. Breakpoints are 
identified at the beginning of each subsequent regime, and endpoints are 
circumnavigated by setting ଴ܶ ൌ 1  and 	 ௠ܶାଵ ൌ ܶ ൅ 1 . The remainder of this section 
will focus on methodologies that employ sequentially identified breakpoints due to 
political regimes exogenously determining state taxation policy. 
This study conducts tests for multiple breakpoints using Bai’s (1997) sequential 
methodology for each individual taxation time series. This process is chosen as it provides 
an intuitive solution to the identification of more than one break. Breakpoint information 
is then collated and included in the panel. The test determines the break date(s) within a 
full sample by testing parameter constancy. If the test rejects the null hypothesis of 
constancy, therefore indicating the presence of a break date, then the sample is divided 
into two samples, and single unknown breakpoint tests in each subsample are performed. 
This can be viewed as the test of the alternative ݈ ൅ 1 ൌ 2 versus the null hypothesis of 
	݈ ൌ 1 breaks. Breakpoints are added whenever a subsample null is rejected. This process 
is repeated until all subsamples do not reject the null hypothesis or the maximum number 
of breakpoints allowed is reached. 
Table F3.1 in Appendix F3 report structural breakpoints indicated in the data following 
Bai’s (1997) methodology. Here breakpoints are tested in all subsets such that for a given 
݈ breakpoint, each additional ݈ ൅ 1 subset is tested for breakpoints. Having completed the 
stability diagnostics on the policy variables to determine the beginning of each policy 
regime change, policy dummies are then incorporated into the model to account for these 
changes in regimes. These are introduced as a binary variable that is allocated 1 for the 
year in which a structural break has been indicated using Bai’s (1997) methodology, and 
0 otherwise. 
3.3.2 Land taxation estimation example 
To account for the structural breaks identified in the above analysis, intercept indicator 
variables are employed. This is shown by parameter ߚଷ in Equations 3.1–3.3. Assuming 
the model is correctly specified, then	ሺ݁௜௧ሻ ൌ 0, and: 
ܧሺΔ݈ܴ݊ܪܲሻ ൌ ൜ሺߚଵ ൅ ߚଷሻ ൅ ሺߚଶ ൅ ߚସሻܮ ௜ܶ௧ ൅ ߚହ ௜ܺ௧, ݓ݄݁݊	ܦሺܮܶሻ ൌ 1ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶܮ ௜ܶ௧ ൅ ߚହ ௜ܺ௧,																																				ݓ݄݁݊	ܦሺܮܶሻ ൌ 0 
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(LT x D(LT)) is also used as an interaction variable which is the product of the land tax 
rate and the land taxation indicator variable. This would capture the presence of a 
structural break in the land tax rate series in the growth of real house prices. The slope 
indicator takes the value equal to the land tax rate if the presence of a structural break in 
the land taxation series is identified. Therefore, D(LT) equals 1 when a break is present, 
and 0 otherwise. Thus, if there is a statistically significant positive break in the land tax 
rate, real house price growth will increase by a multiple of 15.31 per cent. If a positive 
change in the tax rate is not large enough to cause a break in the series, then the growth 
of real house prices will increase by a multiple of 5.71 per cent. For instance, if there is a 
1 per cent increase in the land tax rate, there will be an increase in the growth of house 
prices by 5.71 per cent. 
߲ܧሺΔ݈ܴ݊ܪܲሻ
߲ܮ ௜ܶ௧ ൌ ൜
ߚଶ ൅ ߚସ, ݓ݄݁݊	ܦሺܮܶሻ ൌ 1
ߚଶ,																			ݓ݄݁݊	ܦሺܮܶሻ ൌ 0 
Based on the z-test for significance, we anticipate that land tax will have a positive effect 
on house prices in Australian capital cities. The results of mean land taxation in Table 3.6 
suggest that the growth of real house prices appears to be approximately 0.95 per cent 
lower when a structural break is not identified. This negative ߚଷ result suggests that a 
statistically significant shock to the mean land taxation rate will cause contemporaneous 
house prices to fall in the first instance. However, the rate of house price growth will 
accelerate, as shown by the highly positive ߚସ  estimate. The results indicate that a 
statistically significant increase in the land taxation rate of 1 per cent will cause house 
prices to increase at a rate of 9.5 per cent faster than if land taxation policy remained at 




Figure 3.1: Land tax mean result 
Figure 3.1 describes how structural breaks are accounted for in the land tax series. In the 
presence of an increase in land tax that causes a break in the land tax series, the growth 
of logged house price falls by 0.1 per cent, although the marginal effect increases by 
almost 10 per cent.  
Section 3.4 reports the results of the above models for three different ways of accounting 
for the housing taxation rate. Table 3.6 reports the above methodology for the mean 
taxation rate levied in each state. Table 3.7 replicated the above models using the 
minimum rate of taxation levied in each state. Table 3.8 reports the results using the 
maximum rate. Section 3.4 also assesses the robustness of the analysis. 
3.4 Results and Discussion 
Table 3.6 analyses the effect of mean stamp duty and land tax rates on Australian house 
prices. Column 1 reports the relationship between house prices and land tax rates, 
columns 2–4 introduce each stamp duty variables individually and column 5 models all 
taxes and duties together, allowing us to examine the net effect of land tax and stamp 
duties on the growth of real house prices. Columns 1–5 include regional and year fixed 
effects, columns 6–10 include regional fixed effects and columns 11–15 are pooled OLS 
results. Intercept dummies are used to indicate the presence of a structural break in the 
taxation rate series for each state. This dummy variable is then interacted with the taxation 











variable to better understand the effect of a government’s decision to change the rate of 
taxation on properties in Australian states. 
Table 3.7 and Table 3.8 use different measurements of taxation rates. Minimum and 
maximum dutiable rates are examined respectively. This allows us to explore whether 
policies that are targeted to houses on the outer limits of house prices valuations in 
Australian regions. For robustness checks, we assess whether the effect of tax rates varies 
between key housing markets by analysing subsamples of the data: Victoria and NSW 
versus the rest of Australia. These results are discussed further in Section 3.4.2. 
Note that D(LT), D(PPR), D(FHO) and D(INV) are all intercept dummy variables 
indicating the presence of a structural break for land tax, as well as stamp duties levied 
towards PPR, FHO and INV, respectively. The introduction of these variables raises the 
question: Does a statistically significant break in the tax and duty rates levied to home 
buyers change the real house price in Australian capital cities, and by how much? This 
essay is specifically interested in the coefficient of the interaction term, as it captures the 
true rate after accounting for any breakpoints. 
Mean results with regional and time fixed effects yield interesting results in terms of the 
effect of stamp duties on the change in real house prices (see Table 3.6). Each stamp duty 
variable is statistically significant. PPR and FHO stamp duties have a positive correlation 
with house prices, while stamp duties levied towards INV present a negative correlation 
with real house price growth. 
Table 3.6 shows that FHO stamp duty rates (column 3) are most significant when 
interacted with the intercept and slope dummy variable. The overall effect of a 1 per cent 
increase in FHO stamp duty is a 3.09 per cent increase in the change in real house prices. 
Stamp duties levied at PPR homeowners (column 2) contribute a 4.24 per cent increase 




Table 3.6: State mean land taxes and stamp duty rates levied to real house prices in Australian capital cities 
 Dependent variable = ΔlnRHP 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
LT 5.708    4.975 7.572    8.651** 1.555    1.619 
 (3.763)    (4.041) (4.720)    (4.004) (1.673)    (1.714) 
D(LT) −0.095**    −0.122*** −0.038    −0.060* −0.077**    −0.100*** 
 (0.040)    (0.045) (0.038)    (0.032) (0.035)    (0.0296) 
LT×D(LT) 9.599*    11.88** 0.653    1.499 5.201    7.026* 
 (4.952)    (5.820) (4.770)    (4.296) (4.427)    (3.728) 
PPR  −1.529**   −1.483***  −1.731   −1.529  −0.682   −0.841 
  (0.709)   (0.547)  (1.142)   (0.990)  (0.513)   (0.618) 
D(PPR)  −0.116*   −0.141*  −0.099*   −0.095  −0.057   −0.052 
  (0.064)   (0.076)  (0.058)   (0.069)  (0.049)   (0.058) 
PPR×D(PPR)  4.239*   4.575  3.556*   2.867  1.976   1.361 
  (2.213)   (2.909)  (2.044)   (2.679)  (1.679)   (2.137) 
FHO   −0.731  0.424   −0.725  0.585   −0.821**  −0.408 
   (0.794)  (0.854)   (0.710)  (0.899)   (0.399)  (0.569) 
D(FHO)   −0.0697**  −0.057**   −0.062***  −0.060***   −0.053***  −0.058*** 
   (0.024)  (0.0268)   (0.017)  (0.018)   (0.016)  (0.016) 
FHO×D(FHO)   3.091***  3.090**   2.827***  3.388***   2.558  3.558*** 
   (0.979)  (1.359)   (0.706)  (1.155)   (0.658)***  (0.934) 
INV    −0.424 −2.498    −1.579 −4.672*    −0.051 1.084 
    (2.788) (3.446)    (2.282) (2.623)    (0.871) (1.243) 
D(INV)    0.082 0.118    0.005 0.0335    0.007 0.0370 
    (0.080) (0.068)*    (0.069) (0.068)    (0.065) (0.0721) 
INV×D(INV)    −2.748 −3.518    −0.026 −0.403    −0.225 −1.016 
    (2.643) (2.145)    (2.101) (1.944)    (1.906) (2.087) 
ΔlnDWELCOMP 0.248*** 0.256*** 0.255*** 0.263*** 0.237*** 0.250*** 0.244*** 0.247*** 0.254*** 0.241*** 0.249*** 0.251*** 0.247*** 0.253*** 0.237*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) (0.032) (0.032) (0.028) (0.0291) (0.027) (0.028) (0.030) 
ΔlnPOP 0.464*** 0.530*** 0.503*** 0.504*** 0.417*** 0.673*** 0.734*** 0.714*** 0.725*** 0.620*** 0.403*** 0.418*** 0.411*** 0.443*** 0.343*** 
 (0.101) (0.105) (0.080) (0.085) (0.105) (0.090) (0.114) (0.119) (0.127) (0.010) (0.088) (0.114) (0.104) (0.105) (0.109) 
ΔlnRGSP −0.846* −0.672 −0.731 −0.957* −0.697 0.198 0.250 0.187 0.177 0.395 0.365 0.259 0.262 0.280 0.404 
 (0.490) (0.482) (0.498) (0.501) (0.478) (0.443) (0.404) (0.407) (0.428) (0.448) (0.274) (0.303) (0.317) (0.286) (0.352) 
ΔlnPPI 1.468*** 1.183** 1.239** 1.293** 1.184*** −0.096 −0.265 −0.185 −0.257 −0.115 −0.070 −0.208 −0.150 −0.205 0.015 




 Dependent variable = ΔlnRHP 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
IR 3.212*** 3.002*** 3.158*** 3.183*** 3.074*** 2.146*** 2.249*** 2.383*** 2.239*** 1.897*** 2.212*** 2.298*** 2.363*** 2.336*** 2.210*** 
 (0.402) (0.438) (0.367) (0.394) (0.443) (0.400) (0.355) (0.332) (0.345) (0.410) (0.342) (0.328) (0.313) (0.315) (0.337) 
ΔU 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.004 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant −0.178*** −0.096*** −0.107*** −0.115 −0.070 −0.105** −0.027 −0.042** −0.007 0.0484 −0.044** −0.0230 −0.026 −0.041 −0.048 
 (0.044) (0.021) (0.020) (0.080) (0.082) (0.042) (0.025) (0.019) (0.070) (0.073) (0.022) (0.023) (0.0185) (0.031) (0.043) 
Observations 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 
R-squared 0.527 0.519 0.522 0.513 0.553 0.379 0.367 0.368 0.358 0.410 0.371 0.360 0.364 0.354 0.392 
Region # 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region are in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Δ represents a variable in first difference. A variable transformed by natural logarithm is identified 
by the prefix ln. D represents a dummy indicator variable that identifies the presence of a structural break within a land tax or stamp duty series. Slope interaction variables are denoted by the product 
of a tax or duty and the corresponding indicator variable. FE stands for fixed effects. Region # is the number of cross-sectional regions in the model. R-squared reports the with-in R-squared value. 
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Investor stamp duty rates (column 4) are shown to have a negative relationship with the 
change in real house prices, although the findings did not prove significant when 
considering the mean of stamp duty rates across all housing valuation brackets. When 
examining all stamp duties and taxes together, the individually modelled results are found 
to be consistent. The net effect of stamp duty rates is positive, although the result is 
dampened by investor stamp duty rates, which are again negative. Investor stamp duty 
rates are again not statistically significant, although the intercept indicator variable 
becomes significant at the 10 per cent level. The land tax rate (column 1) continues to 
have a positive correlation, although the level variable loses its significance. When taking 
into account the structural breaks, the effect of this variable is 9.6 per cent. 
Table 3.6 shows that both PPR and FHO stamp duty rates have a significant correlation 
with the change in real house prices. This indicates that stamp duty rates are particularly 
important for owner occupants. The net effect in both instances is positive, with PPR 
increasing the change in real house prices by 2.6 per cent and FHO stamp duty rates have 
a net increase of 2.3 per cent in the change in real house prices. 
Taxation rates levied on non-PPR homeowners show mixed results. Land tax rates again 
demonstrate a positive bearing (column 1) and are significant at the 10 per cent level, 
while INV stamp duty has a negative bearing on the change in real house prices (column 
4). When examining the combined tax and stamp duty results in column 5, the PPR stamp 
duty rate is shown to lose the little significance it had. FHO stamp duty rates continue to 
be positive and significant, as do land tax rates. The combined effect of stamp duties on 
house prices is positive throughout this model. However, results are not as strong when 
time and regional fixed effects are considered. Overall, the effect of taxation on house 
prices is positive, indicating that households capitalise tax rates into the value of 




Table 3.7: State minimum land taxes and stamp duty rates levied to real house prices in Australian capital cities 
 Dependent variable = ΔlnRHP 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
LT 5.020    3.199 6.745    2.741 −0.495    −0.391 
 (6.594)    (7.642) (6.551)    (6.651) (0.778)    (0.957) 
D(LT) −0.067**    −0.067** −0.062**    −0.065** −0.060**    −0.0619*
 (0.028)    (0.029) (0.028)    (0.032) (0.024)    (0.027) 
LT×D(LT) 17.13***    14.58** 18.25***    21.29*** 16.80***    21.99*** 
 (5.853)    (5.859) (5.880)    (5.652) (5.026)    (5.299) 
PPR  −2.070***   −1.771***  −1.305   −1.852**  −0.725   −1.622**
  (0.690)   (0.660)  (1.028)   (0.606)  (0.611)   (0.541) 
D(PPR)  −0.020   −0.052  −0.0159   −0.0128  −0.022   0.005 
  (0.033)   (0.042)  (0.0421)   (0.041)  (0.026)   (0.027) 
PPR×D(PPR)  1.992   3.770  0.301   −0.898  0.549   −2.398 
  (2.024)   (3.218)  (2.687)   (2.825)  (1.679)   (2.024) 
FHO   0.223  1.445*   0.577  1.277   0.268  0.472 
   (0.542)  (0.823)   (0.604)  (0.842)   (0.398)  (0.659) 
D(FHO)   0.044**  0.070   0.0142  −0.029   0.011  −0.044 
   (0.019)  (0.057)   (0.0142)  (0.044)   (0.011)  (0.034) 
FHO×D(FHO)   −2.276  −3.849   0.101  2.068   0.313  2.665 
   (1.470)  (3.740)   (1.122)  (3.119)   (1.031)  (2.532) 
INV    0.493 0.686    1.127 0.537    1.006* 0.804 
    (1.654) (1.844)    (1.716) (1.493)    (0.556) (0.834) 
D(INV)    0.0423 −0.077    0.035 0.0852    0.038 0.112 
    (0.033) (0.119)    (0.035) (0.089)    (0.031) (0.074) 
INV×D(INV)    −2.421 5.481    −3.155* −4.122    −3.158** −5.492 
    (1.756) (6.724)    (1.656) (4.945)    (1.520) (4.161) 
ΔlnDWELCOMP 0.257*** 0.273*** 0.255*** 0.259*** 0.248*** 0.255*** 0.257*** 0.252*** 0.253*** 0.251*** 0.243*** 0.256*** 0.254*** 0.259*** 0.253*** 
 (0.042) (0.044) (0.041) (0.042) (0.038) (0.034) (0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.0345) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027) (0.032) 
ΔlnPOP 0.473*** 0.523*** 0.514*** 0.504*** 0.420*** 0.694*** 0.729*** 0.753*** 0.702*** 0.699*** 0.469*** 0.428*** 0.469*** 0.430*** 0.452*** 
 (0.108) (0.086) (0.081) (0.100) (0.105) (0.078) (0.131) (0.111) (0.143) (0.093) (0.094) (0.107) (0.110) (0.127) (0.106) 
ΔlnRGSP −0.592 −0.820* −0.857* −0.822 −0.820 0.352 0.207 0.194 0.138 0.400 0.537* 0.266 0.317 0.186 0.464 




 Dependent variable = ΔlnRHP 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
ΔlnPPI 1.354** 1.224** 1.279** 1.289** 1.305** −0.197 −0.288 −0.211 −0.222 −0.215 −0.154 −0.237 −0.185 −0.199 −0.174 
 (0.636) (0.557) (0.559) (0.571) (0.641) (0.312) (0.278) (0.292) (0.303) (0.341) (0.304) (0.277) (0.283) (0.284) (0.329) 
IR 3.083*** 3.073*** 3.327*** 3.103*** 3.543*** 2.094*** 2.243*** 2.438*** 2.259*** 2.057*** 2.206*** 2.256*** 2.427*** 2.264*** 2.015*** 
 (0.424) (0.455) (0.472) (0.385) (0.534) (0.359) (0.360) (0.363) (0.354) (0.397) (0.302) (0.340) (0.322) (0.318) (0.366) 
ΔU 0.0054 0.00673 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.0112) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant −0.118*** −0.113*** −0.136*** −0.132*** −0.147*** −0.043** −0.042* −0.061*** −0.071* −0.034 −0.035** −0.029 −0.051*** −0.055*** −0.023 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.026) (0.035) (0.0433) (0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.038) (0.038) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) 
Observations 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 
R-squared 0.531 0.517 0.517 0.512 0.543 0.380 0.362 0.360 0.360 0.392 0.375 0.357 0.356 0.357 0.388 
Region # 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region are in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Δ represents a variable in first difference. A variable transformed by natural logarithm is identified 
by the prefix ln. D represents a dummy indicator variable that identifies the presence of a structural break within a land tax or stamp duty series. Slope interaction variables are denoted by the product 
of a tax or duty and the corresponding indicator variable. FE stands for fixed effects. Region # is the number of cross-sectional regions in the model. R-squared reports the with-in r-squared value. 
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3.4.1 Stamp duties 
3.4.1.1 Principle Place of Residence (PPR) 
We now examine mean stamp duties for PPR homeowners in column 2 of Table 3.6. Once 
unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for across regions using regional fixed effects, 
PPR stamp duties are found to be statistically significant and positively correlated with 
the growth of real house prices. This coefficient increases once time fixed effects are 
included in the model, as shown in columns 2 and 5. Without incorporating policy 
dummies, PPR stamp duty rates are negatively correlated with the growth of real house 
prices. However, once structural breaks are accommodated for in the series, it is apparent 
that the effect is positive. The net effect of a 1 per cent increase in PPR stamp duty rates 
would induce a change in the growth of real house prices by 2.6 per cent. This indicates 
that the average duty levied on the transfer of property for those who intend to live in the 
property has a positive effect on house prices, indicating that the buyer bears the cost of 
this duty in the transaction. This result is in contrast to findings of Davidoff and Leigh 
(2013) in their assessment of stamp duty bills for Australian properties. 
Next, we examine the minimum stamp duties levied at PPR households in Table 3.7 and 
observe similar results. A priori, minimum rates could represent a discount of stamp 
duties, which is designed to provide equity in the market for households who can only 
afford lower-priced dwellings. The minimum rate levied at PPR homeowners (Table 3.7, 
column 2) suggests that a 1 per cent increase in stamp duties decreases house prices by 
1.99 per cent. However, this result has no statistical significance. Only the duty rate in 
levels is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. Given that the dependent variable 
is the median house price in each region, and that the inner and middle regions are more 
likely to fall closer to the upper quartile of house price, this could be driving the results. 
The minimum duty rate is still picking up some information from the outer regions; hence, 
it is still significant. 
Theoretically, the effect of maximum duty rates is slightly more ambiguous, particularly 
for stamp duties. As this represents a large transaction cost, an increase in the tax rate 
could incentivise households to substitute larger dwellings for smaller dwellings. These 
smaller dwellings have fewer characteristics and amenities (such as entertainment rooms 
or bathrooms) and are therefore cheaper. Thus, dwelling prices could decline if fewer 
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larger and more expensive houses are sought after in the market. On the other hand, the 
increased interest in middle sized properties could also inflate prices. The results show 
that an increase in the maximum duty levied to PPR homeowners increases property 
prices by 0.34 per cent after accounting for possible breaks (see Table 3.8). However, the 
net effect of maximum stamp duty rates is negative, thus highlighting this ambiguity. 
The results are similar when including only regional fixed effects and pooled OLS. In 
columns 2, 7 and 12 of Table 3.8, there appears to be no change in the signs of the 
coefficients. However, they are significantly lower when incorporating time and fixed 
effects compared to incorporating only fixed effects. The mean rate is statistically 
significant at the 10 per cent level, and minimum and maximum rates are not significant. 
3.4.1.2 Non-principle place of residence (INV) 
Stamp duty rates levied to investors are negatively correlated with real house price 
growth. However, they do not appear to be as significant as the other stamp duty and land 
tax rates. In fact, when considering regional and time fixed effects, the maximum stamp 
duty levied on investors D(INV) is shown to be statistically significant and positive at the 
10 per cent level with a coefficient of 1.9 (see Table 3.8, column 4). This could be picking 
up some of the effects of owner occupants, as there is little distinction between the rate 
levied at an investor versus an owner occupant. The only difference is the relative 
discount an owner occupant will receive at the lower house price brackets. 
Brown, Schwann and Scott (2008) examine Australian housing investor decisions over 
the period 1990-2004. Their findings suggest that wealth-related factors drive investment 
decisions in the market. The authors further note that marriage is also a factor as house 
prices rise. This finding may be partly driven by wealth-related factors as families become 
more heavily reliant on dual incomes to afford housing in Australian cities. If wealth-
related factors motivate investment decisions in housing markets, 
investors/flippers/speculators (IFS) may have an impact on the house price dynamics. 
In a model of search‐and‐matching with the endogenous entry of IFS, Leung and Tse 
(2017) show it is possible to construct multiple equilibria with assumed parameter values. 
Moreover, the response of house prices to interest rate is shown to be non‐linear. Within 
certain interest rates, house prices are insensitive to interest rate changes, while under 
other ranges, the house price is very responsive to interest rate changes. Little is known 
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about this dynamic relationship in the Australian context. Future investigation could shed 
light on this issue.  
3.4.1.3 First homeowners (FHO) 
Stamp duties levied to FHOs yield interesting results that are consistent in all three 
specifications of the model (see Table 3.6). The intercept indicator variable of the 
structural break indicates that the growth of real house prices is slightly lower in the 
presence of a statistically significant structural break in the series by approximately 0.06 
per cent. When incorporating this interaction term with FHO stamp duty rates, we find 
that an increase in the rate of 1 per cent contributes to a 3.1 per cent increase in the growth 
of real house prices. When an increase in the stamp duty rate levied to first home buyers 
is not statistically significant, the growth of real house prices is negative by a multiple of 
0.73 per cent.  
Bourassa and Ming (2006) compare home ownership rates among young people in the 
US and Australia. Using a tenure choice model and subsequent simulations, they find 
removing discount tax rates and the provision of new homeowner subsidies have little 
impact on ownership rates. It is difficult to draw direct comparisons between the results 
of this study and findings of Bourassa and Ming (2006). However, without accounting 
for government transfers to FHO, there is a relationship between house prices and the 
discounted stamp duty rate that FHO receive. Future research could benefit from 
exploiting periods with and without government transfers to FHO (if the stamp duty is 




Table 3.8: State maximum land taxes and stamp duty rates levied to real house prices in Australian capital cities 
 Dependant variable = ΔlnRHP 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
LT −0.644    −0.457 0.090    −0.050 −0.375    −0.352 
 (1.242)    (1.357) (1.301)    (1.238) (0.568)    (0.544) 
D(LT) −0.118***    −0.164*** −0.093***    −0.110** −0.107***    −0.120*** 
 (0.039)    (0.050) (0.036)    (0.044) (0.032)    (0.034) 
LT×D(LT) 7.226***    9.380*** 4.659*    5.125** 5.300**    5.486** 
 (2.532)    (3.025) (2.456)    (2.526) (2.214)    (2.141) 
PPR  −1.677***   −0.549  −2.332***   −2.216**  −0.678**   −0.768 
  (0.518)   (0.764)  (0.887)   (1.120)  (0.328)   (0.730) 
D(PPR)  −0.028   −0.074  −0.038   −0.053  −0.0622   −0.075 
  (0.060)   (0.096)  (0.051)   (0.088)  (0.0473)   (0.076) 
PPR ×D(PPR)  0.339   0.480  1.193   1.494  1.429   1.658 
  (1.554)   (1.921)  (1.189)   (1.788)  (1.180)   (1.544) 
FHO   −0.095  −0.204   −0.279  −0.223   −0.473**  −0.097 
   (0.600)  (0.622)   (0.587)  (0.581)   (0.212)  (0.389) 
D(FHO)   −0.128**  −0.146***   −0.013  −0.005   −0.021  −0.025 
   (0.050)  (0.056)   (0.023)  (0.030)   (0.020)  (0.026) 
FHO×D(FHO)   3.613***  4.603***   0.727  0.538   0.878*  1.062* 
   (1.257)  (1.406)   (0.631)  (0.735)   (0.524)  (0.578) 
INV    −0.730 −1.044    −1.603 −0.098    −0.803** −0.047 
    (1.311) (2.194)    (1.391) (1.886)    (0.360) (0.766) 
D(INV)    −0.106** 0.045    −0.082* −0.090    −0.076* −0.082 
    (0.054) (0.137)    (0.045) (0.120)    (0.045) (0.108) 
INV×D(INV)    1.883* −0.061    1.588 1.863    1.423* 1.779 
    (0.968) (2.361)    (0.884)* (2.084)    (0.862) (1.847) 
ΔlnDWELCOMP 0.260*** 0.257*** 0.246*** 0.254*** 0.227*** 0.245*** 0.262*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 0.247*** 0.244*** 0.258*** 0.256*** 0.250*** 0.243*** 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.048) (0.043) (0.053) (0.030) (0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.039) (0.027) (0.030) (0.028) (0.027) (0.031) 
ΔlnPOP 0.476*** 0.513*** 0.520*** 0.513*** 0.393*** 0.681*** 0.730*** 0.736*** 0.702*** 0.665*** 0.428*** 0.416*** 0.440*** 0.431*** 0.386*** 
 (0.090) (0.096) (0.0582) (0.080) (0.089) (0.107) (0.110) (0.118) (0.132) (0.112) (0.099) (0.110) (0.104) (0.103) (0.117) 
ΔlnRGSP −0.893* −0.803* −0.773* −0.810 −1.011* 0.158 0.202 0.123 0.136 0.230 0.238 0.168 0.137 0.259 0.171 
 (0.488) (0.469) (0.451) (0.534) (0.583) (0.415) (0.404) (0.412) (0.451) (0.493) (0.295) (0.321) (0.328) (0.323) (0.371) 
ΔlnPPI 1.095** 1.298** 1.304** 1.334** 0.937** −0.157 −0.307 −0.217 −0.197 −0.164 −0.116 −0.211 −0.178 −0.183 −0.043 
 (0.528) (0.574) (0.553) (0.558) (0.464) (0.314) (0.275) (0.284) (0.293) (0.324) (0.305) (0.275) (0.272) (0.279) (0.320) 




 Dependant variable = ΔlnRHP 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
 (0.407) (0.411) (0.369) (0.410) (0.423) (0.327) (0.334) (0.336) (0.342) (0.374) (0.287) (0.312) (0.310) (0.311) (0.300) 
ΔU 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.003 −0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002 −0.000 −0.000 0.002 0.003 0.003 −0.000 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Constant −0.117*** −0.076*** −0.130*** −0.093* −0.076 −0.052 0.009 −0.050** 0.014 0.022 −0.031* −0.011 −0.027 −0.002 0.007 
 (0.038) (0.022) (0.025) (0.052) (0.075) (0.032) (0.030) (0.022) (0.061) (0.078) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.025) (0.031) 
Observations 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 276 
R-squared 0.523 0.518 0.529 0.513 0.557 0.368 0.369 0.360 0.360 0.386 0.365 0.359 0.356 0.356 0.377 
Region # 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region are in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Δ represents a variable in first difference. A variable transformed by natural logarithm is identified 
by the prefix ln. D represents a dummy indicator variable that identifies the presence of a structural break within a land tax or stamp duty series. Slope interaction variables are denoted by the product 
of a tax or duty and the corresponding indicator variable. FE stands for fixed effects. Region # is the number of cross-sectional regions in the model. R-squared reports the with-in r-squared value. 
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Examining the effects of minimum and maximum duty rates, the minimum rate levied is 
shown to have little bearing on house prices (see Table 3.7), whereas the maximum rate 
levied against FHOs is very significant and positive, with a coefficient of 3.61 and a 
significance level of 1 per cent (see Table 3.8). This could be because FHOs are attracted 
to purchasing properties that are priced closer to the maximum duty rate than the mean. 
This finding could have serious implications for policy makers in Australia, especially as 
these rates appear to be capitalised into house prices. The intended discount is being 
eroded by property price growth. 
This study has found a mix of positive and negative effects from the various taxation rates 
in Australian housing markets. Oates (1972), using a simple Tiebout model, suggests the 
effect of taxation on property values is positive. He further qualifies that it is plausible 
the effect of taxation on property values could be negative “given the level of public 
spending, the higher the property values in a community, the lower are the tax rates 
needed to generate the revenues to finance the [community] program” (pp.171-172). A 
similar argument could be made in relation to the results of this study, as the equation 
estimate may suffer from simultaneous equation bias. This bias will arise if the 
independent variables, tax rates, depend on the dependent variable, house price. 
Future analysis could include an additional specification that determines tax as a function 
of the level of public spending or quality of public services offered in a location. However, 
the wealth of the population in an area may also impact on the resident's expectations of 
public services. 
3.4.1.4 Controls 
In addition to accommodating unobserved heterogeneous relationships between regions 
and across time, a number of economic fundamentals are used to control for known 
demand and supply contributions to house prices. Of these variables, dwellings completed 
is proven to be very statistically significant across all specifications, indicating that the 
changes in housing stock are important to the observed growth of house prices. 
Additionally, the PPI, which indicates the relationship between house prices and the cost 
of construction and maintenance of properties, is observed to be strongly significant and 
positive after including regional and time fixed effects. This indicates that as the cost of 
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building and maintaining property increases so does the growth of house prices in 
Australian capital cities. 
Examining the control variables that may influence housing demand, population and real 
interest rates are found to be significant at the 1 per cent level and positive. Thus, the 
conventional understanding holds for changes to populations. Demand will increase when 
the number of individuals requiring property increases. A 1 per cent increase in 
population has been shown to increase the growth of house prices by approximately 0.5 
per cent. In contrast, real interest rates are found to have a positive correlation with the 
growth of house prices. At first, this appears to be counterintuitive if one thinks of the 
housing market as being perfectly competitive and having zero barriers to entry and exit. 
However, property owners face large opportunity costs in relocating.  
This chapter goes some way to assessing this opportunity cost through stamp duties faced 
by owner occupants in the market. However, in addition to the transaction cost of 
transferring property, they must find new jobs and schools and acclimate themselves to a 
new environment. Furthermore, once we consider that a large proportion of property is 
financed through debt, we can understand that an increase in real interest rates represents 
an increase in the cost of owning a dwelling. Given the difficulty of relocating and the 
illiquid nature of houses as an asset, we can better understand that an increase in the cost 
of owning a property would be passed on to the value of the property. Thus, if there is a 
real interest rate increase of 1 per cent, the increased cost of owning a property passed on 
to the growth of said property is approximately 3 per cent. 
In a world with increasingly integrated economies, there are many transmission channels 
through which house price can be affected by economic activity in other nations. One 
possible avenue is through interest rates. It is not clear which of the many interest rates is 
most important. Chang, Chen and Leung (2011) emphasise the effect of term premiums. 
Jin, Leung and Zeng (2012) show that it is the external finance premium (EFP) that is 
driving the housing price through their dynamic, stochastic general equilibrium model. 
Chang, Chen and Leung (2012, 2013) demonstrate that interest rate in the US may impact 
the house price in Hong Kong and Singapore. The extent to which this international 
transmission may impact on local housing depends on the economic regime. Based on the 
Marinao‐Preve procedure, Chang, Chen and Leung (2016) present a formal statistical 
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comparison of different VAR models in their ability to explain the US house price and 
stock price. Each of the above models emphasises different interest rates.  
This study has chosen the national interest rate as a mechanism to capture monetary policy 
and the opportunity cost of purchasing housing. Further, it does not consider international 
transmission and regime-switching. This essay cannot rule out the possibility of a regime‐
dependent effect of interest rate on house price. Future research would benefit from the 
exploration of this transmission. However, the results of these control variables appear to 
be consistent across each model and prove to be robust when considering the inner, 
middle and outer regions of Australian capital cities in isolation. These findings lend 
strength to the real substance of this analysis, the effect of land tax and stamp duty tax 
rates on house prices. 
3.4.2 Robustness checks 
A number of robustness checks are performed, which can be found in the section 3.7 
Appendices. To check the robustness of the results, the sample is divided into two 
subsamples, Melbourne and Sydney, which have grown at very fast rates compared to 
other states. To determine whether these markets are influencing the results, we compare 
the model for Melbourne and Sydney combined to all other state and territories for mean, 
minimum and maximum rates. All control variables specified above are included, as well 
as time and regional fixed effects. 
Table A3.1 reports the findings for mean rates in Victoria and NSW. Comparing these 
results to Table 3.6, land tax rates (column 1) are shown to lose their statistical 
significance when included individually. In addition, none of the stamp duty rates are 
significant. This indicates that mean land tax and stamp duty rates levied against 
homeowners are fundamental to the determination of house prices in Victoria and NSW. 
However, as shown in the combined regression in Table A3.1 column 5, a number of 
variables have been omitted due to multicollinearity. With so few observations, a small 
amount of variance in the tax rate variables could cause problems when interpreting these 
results. 
The results of the subsample for all other states more closely mirror the findings reported 
in Table 3.6. Table A3.2 shows that PPR stamp duties are significant at the 5 per cent 
level, FHO at the 1 per cent level and INV at the 10 per cent level (columns 2, 3 and 4 
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respectively). Not only are they significant, but their coefficients are also similar in 
magnitude when compared to the full sample. These findings indicate that, when 
considering stamp duty rates, the mean rate levied is most significantly correlated with 
house prices and is more robust than the minimum and maximum stamp duty rates. 
Subsampling of minimum rates in Victoria and NSW (Table B3.1) suffers from a lack of 
observations, mainly because the minimum rates are 0 for most of the sample. Table B3.2 
reports the results for minimum rates levied in states other than Victoria and NSW. These 
results are consistent with those reported in Table 3.6. In particular, there is strong 
evidence to suggest that an increase in the land tax rate (column 1) has a strong and 
statistically significant effect on house prices. The magnitude of the coefficient increases 
from 17.13 to 27.25. 
Similar to minimum stamp duty rates, maximum stamp duty rates suffer from a lack of 
variation in the data when regressed for Victoria and NSW (see Table C3.1). States other 
than Victoria and NSW (see Table C3.2) show that the maximum rate levied at owner 
occupants are positively correlated with house prices. This is particularly the case with 
FHOs, suggesting that a significant increase in the stamp duty rate will increase house 
prices by 5 per cent. This is slightly higher than the 3.6 per cent reported for the full 
sample. 
Overall, the subsamples for states other than Victoria and NSW did not perform as well 
as the subsample of all other states and territories. A number of key variables were 
omitted during the analysis of Victoria and NSW data due to a lack of variation or 
multicollinearity. 
There are a number of results of interest, particularly for the mean tax rates. However, it 
seems that the minimum land tax rate is incredibly important for states and territories 
other than Victoria and NSW (Table B3.2). This finding suggests that an increase in the 
minimum land tax rate affects house price growth by up to 27.25 per cent. This effect was 
larger for Victoria and NSW; however, it was not significant (Table B3.1). 
The findings for FHO stamp duty rates indicate that, as above, increases in the maximum 
duty rate can have a dramatic effect on house prices. Table C3.2 shows that 1 per cent 
significance increase in the maximum FHO stamp duty rate will increase house price 
growth by more than 5 per cent. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter contributes to a greater understanding of the government’s role in the 
Australian housing market. The implications of various stamp duties and land taxes are 
assessed for each state and territory. The contribution made is threefold. First, by using 
panel data that incorporates all of Australia’s states and territories, we learn that housing 
markets behave very differently in different regions. For this reason, the dependent 
variable, real house prices for each of Australia’s state and territory capital cities, is 
broken up into inner, middle and outer regions. 
The key variables of interest are taxes on housing, which are levied at the state and 
territory levels. This study investigates two types of taxes: land taxes and stamp duties. 
Land taxes are levied annually to homeowners, whereas stamp duties are levied at the 
point of transaction of a dwelling and vary according to the type of household who 
purchases the dwelling. The three types of homeowners are those who use the dwelling 
as their PPR, those who own the property as their PPR and who are also FHOs, and those 
who purchase a property for a purpose other than residing in it (INV). This latter type is 
considered an investor because they are likely to rent the dwelling out to maximise their 
property’s yield. To the best of our knowledge, only one paper has explored the 
relationship between house prices and stamp duties in Australia (Davidoff & Leigh 2013). 
This study further enhances the literature by contributing a much wider dataset of stamp 
duty taxes and incorporating the various types of stamp duties into the analysis. 
Additionally, it explores the implication of land tax rates on house prices in Australian 
capital cities. A number of tax rates are used, and the findings show that the mean, 
maximum and minimum tax rates have the most interesting effect on house prices. 
These findings indicate that significant changes in taxation series have a dramatic effect 
on house prices in Australia. Increasing the average mean taxation rate appears to have 
the greatest effect on each type of taxation, particularly taxes levied at owner occupants 
(PPR and FHO). This strong positive correlation is similar for PPR and FHO occupants. 
The increased transaction cost is passed on to the value of the dwelling. The effect was 
even greater for statistically significant increases in land tax rates. However, rates levied 
at individuals who use their dwellings for purposes other than their PPR do not appear to 
have a statistically significant effect. 
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The results suggest that statistically significant mean land tax rates increases—as 
indicated through structural break analysis—have a strong positive correlation with 
capital city house prices in Australia. Increases in mean stamp duty rates do not have as 
strong an effect on house prices. Stamp duties levied at owner occupants—both FHOs 
and existing homeowners—are positively correlated with house prices. A statistically 
significant increase in stamp duty taxes levied at PPR homeowners increased the growth 
of house prices by approximately 2.6 per cent, while an increase in FHO stamp duties 
increased the growth of house prices by 2.3 per cent. An increase in the stamp duty levied 
at investor-type homeowners demonstrated a negative correlation with the growth of 
house prices, although this result was not statistically significant. Negative correlations 
were also apparent between stamp duty rates and house prices when considering the 
average minimum rate levied. 
Minimum duty rates do not appear to be as important for stamp duties as they are for land 
taxes. Significant changes in the minimum rate levied to homeowners do not appear to be 
as important as they are for mean stamp duty rates. For each type of stamp duty, there is 
an overall effect of negative correlation between the key independent and dependent 
variables. However, these results are not statistically significant. The results for PPR 
stamp duties—not taking into account the possibility of structural breaks in the series—
were strongly significant, with a coefficient of around −2 per cent. Further, statistically 
significant positive increases in minimum FHO stamp duties has a positive correlation 
with the growth of house prices. The real story evolving from this section of the analysis 
was that the average minimum land tax rates had a strongly statistically significant and 
large positive correlation with the growth of house prices after taking into account 
structural breaks in the land tax series. 
This result is similar, albeit not as strong, for the average maximum land tax rate. The 
coefficient of land tax rates appeared to be quite large (7 per cent). Maximum FHO rates 
were positively correlated with the growth of house prices, although only once taking into 
account breakpoints in the series. Thus, an increase in the average maximum FHO stamp 
duty rate would induce house price growth to rise by 3.5 per cent. PPR maximum stamp 
duty rates were negatively correlated and strongly significant, reducing real house price 
growth by 1.7 per cent. In this instance, structural breaks did not appear to have a bearing 
on the results. 
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The results show that taxes on housing have some influence on house prices in Australia. 
Policymakers need to be careful when considering how their changes to the taxation 
structure will affect prices, as these changes may have a flow-on effect in the economy—
for example, affordability issues and equity problems as credit constrained renters wish 
to move into the housing market. For instance, of all housing taxes, an increase in land 
taxation rates appears to have the largest effect on house prices. Given that the increase 
in the tax rate is passed on to the value of the property, those who already own property 
are affected significantly less than those who want to enter as FHOs. This is due to the 
increase in house prices being passed on as equity held in the dwelling. 
FHO concessional tax rates appear to behave in a similar way to PPR stamp duty taxes in 
the sense that the average mean tax rate for each owner type has a similar correlation with 
house prices. Given the smaller volume of individuals entering the housing market, it is 
not surprising that the effect of FHO tax rate raises is slightly less than that of PPR owners. 
Generating taxation revenue is an important venture for the central government. It allows 
for the important functions of the welfare state and an equitable redistribution of income. 
However, society must be wary of perverse implications from policy decisions. The 
results indicate that if the government were to increase housing taxation rates, the 
individuals who would be most affected would be those who are currently not in the 
market for housing or who are renting and want to move into home ownership in the 
future. Relative to other owner types, FHOs are particularly vulnerable when the 
maximum taxation rate they are levied increases. This is likely due to the maximum 
concessional rate falling closer to the median house price.  
Given that we do not explicitly take this into account it could be interesting to explore 
how different homeowner types are likely to occupy dwellings which fall into specific 
housing value brackets. For instance, first homeowners and younger populations may be 
less likely to own properties that fall in the top 25 per cent of property values. The 
difficulty lies in finding appropriate instruments to isolate these effects. Future work 
would also benefit by exploring the risk borne by society due to changes to state taxation 
rates. This could arise through increases in homeowner stress or property foreclosures. 
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Appendix A3: Mean rates in Victoria and NSW versus the rest of 
Australia 
Table A3.1: Mean rates for Victoria and NSW 
 Dependant variable = ∆lnRHP 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LT 0.808    11.052 
 (3.896)    (9.003) 
D(LT) −0.013    0.055 
 (0.135)    (0.050) 
LT×D(LT) 3.910     
 (18.650)     
PPR  2.963    
  (16.009)    
D(PPR)  0.237   −0.094 
  (1.546)   (0.091) 
PPR×D(PPR)  −6.485    
  (42.529)    
FHO   −2.687  46.617 
   (8.064)  (36.674) 
D(FHO)   −0.010  −0.136 
   (0.072)  (0.162) 
INV    −4.775 −17.809 
    (8.608) (9.427)* 
D(INV)    0.238 1.187 
    (0.331) (0.678)* 
INV×D(INV)    −5.379 −37.372 
    (10.562) (22.939) 
ΔlnDWELCOMP 0.212 0.206 0.206 0.077 −1.155 
 (0.219) (0.176) (0.222) (0.356) (0.816) 
ΔlnPOP 0.093 −0.075 −0.016 −0.105 −0.164 
 (0.535) (0.460) (0.433) (0.277) (0.609) 
ΔlnRGSP −0.797 −0.497 −0.676 −0.834 −4.441 
 (1.007) (0.877) (0.803) (0.828) (0.998)*** 
ΔlnPPI 4.611 4.814 5.389 5.151 13.159 
 (1.986)** (3.933) (3.117)* (2.256)** (3.656)*** 
IR 4.584 4.736 5.215 4.432 15.434 
 (1.864)** (2.171)** (2.051)** (3.553) (6.879)** 
ΔU −0.010 −0.008 −0.008 −0.006 −0.019 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) 
Constant −0.219 −0.309 −0.200 −0.124 −1.508 
 (0.084)*** (0.332) (0.202) (0.402) (1.352) 
      
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 
R-squared 0.680 0.677 0.677 0.694 0.738 
Region # 6 6 6 6 6 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
 116 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region are in parentheses *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Δ 
represents a variable in first difference. A variable transformed by natural logarithm is identified by the 
prefix ln. D represents a dummy indicator variable that identifies the presence of a structural break within 
a land tax or stamp duty series. Slope interaction variables are denoted by the product of a tax or duty and 
the corresponding indicator variable. FE stands for fixed effects. Region # is the number of cross-sectional 




Table A3.2: Mean rates states and territories other than Victoria and NSW 
 Dependant variable = ∆lnRHP 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LT 9.304    7.269 
 (5.698)    (5.016) 
D(LT) −0.119    −0.386 
 (0.123)    (0.175)** 
LT×D(LT) 12.143    41.120 
 (13.945)    (20.086)** 
PPR  −1.581   −2.357 
  (0.662)**   (0.535)*** 
D(PPR)  −0.161   −0.391 
  (0.079)**   (0.116)*** 
PPR×D(PPR)  6.452   16.823 
  (2.721)**   (5.183)*** 
FHO   −0.583  1.600 
   (0.806)  (0.817)* 
D(FHO)   −0.084  −0.063 
   (0.029)***  (0.029)** 
FHO×D(FHO)   4.220  2.654 
   (1.034)***  (1.363)* 
INV    −1.666 −3.805 
    (3.345) (3.842) 
D(INV)    0.168 0.120 
    (0.091)* (0.077) 
INV×D(INV)    −5.584 −4.125 
    (3.090)* (2.395)* 
ΔlnDWELCOMP 0.227 0.245 0.247 0.249 0.216 
 (0.045)*** (0.049)*** (0.050)*** (0.052)*** (0.054)*** 
ΔlnPOP 0.419 0.479 0.463 0.444 0.255 
 (0.147)*** (0.146)*** (0.125)*** (0.113)*** (0.133)* 
ΔlnRGSP −0.504 −0.393 −0.584 −0.817 −0.057 
 (0.579) (0.689) (0.708) (0.728) (0.511) 
ΔlnPPI 1.343 0.814 0.827 0.787 1.643 
 (0.787)* (0.696) (0.634) (0.630) (0.733)** 
IR 3.269 2.964 3.210 2.980 3.709 
 (0.476)*** (0.440)*** (0.399)*** (0.395)*** (0.491)*** 
ΔU 0.014 0.012 0.014 0.011 0.017 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Constant −0.209 −0.096 −0.108 −0.073 −0.079 
 (0.058)*** (0.025)*** (0.026)*** (0.095) (0.102) 
      
Observations 204 204 204 204 204 
R-squared 0.562 0.559 0.565 0.556 0.614 
Region # 17 17 17 17 17 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Δ represents 
a variable in first difference. A variable transformed by natural logarithm is identified by the prefix ln. D 
represents a dummy indicator variable that identifies the presence of a structural break within a land tax or 
stamp duty series. Slope interaction variables are denoted by the product of a tax or duty and the corresponding 
indicator variable. FE stands for fixed effects. Region # is the number of cross-sectional regions in the model. 
R-squared reports the with-in r-squared value. 
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Appendix B3: Minimum rates in Victoria and NSW versus the rest of 
Australia 
Table B3.1: Minimum rates Victoria and NSW 
 Dependant variable = ∆lnRHP 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LT 3.204    2.685 
 (12.549)    (13.001) 
D(LT) −0.106    −0.105 
 (0.088)    (0.090) 
LT×D(LT) 41.432    40.107 
 (33.330)    (35.025) 
FHO   −16.059  −9.265 
   (5.578)***  (12.870) 
D(FHO)   −0.232  −0.186 
   (0.044)***  (0.046)*** 
ΔlnDWELCOMP 0.193 0.211 0.268 0.211 0.226 
 (0.122) (0.150) (0.165) (0.150) (0.159) 
ΔlnPOP −0.087 −0.051 0.007 −0.051 −0.055 
 (0.272) (0.335) (0.366) (0.335) (0.313) 
ΔlnRGSP −0.285 −0.548 −0.555 −0.548 −0.337 
 (1.271) (0.680) (0.688) (0.680) (1.337) 
ΔlnPPI 2.028 4.789 4.921 4.789 2.180 
 (3.042) (1.425)*** (1.436)*** (1.425)*** (3.207) 
IR 3.857 4.740  4.740  
 (1.013)*** (1.105)***  (1.105)***  
ΔU −0.014 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.014 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) 
Constant −0.150 −0.237 0.258 −0.237 0.205 
 (0.086)* (0.046)*** (0.048)*** (0.046)*** (0.106)* 
      
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 
R-squared 0.706 0.676 0.681 0.676 0.707 
Region # 6 6 6 6 6 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Δ 
represents a variable in first difference. A variable transformed by natural logarithm is identified by the 
prefix ln. D represents a dummy indicator variable that identifies the presence of a structural break within 
a land tax or stamp duty series. Slope interaction variables are denoted by the product of a tax or duty and 
the corresponding indicator variable. FE stands for fixed effects. Region # is the number of cross-sectional 
regions in the model. R-squared reports the within r-squared value. 
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Table B3.2: Minimum rates states and territories other than Victoria and NSW 
 Dependant variable = ∆lnRHP 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LT 20.417    24.178 
 (10.217)**    (16.521) 
D(LT) −0.062    −0.057 
 (0.038)    (0.038) 
LT×D(LT) 27.246    29.193 
 (9.726)***    (10.178)*** 
PPR  −2.314   −0.822 
  (0.724)***   (0.637) 
D(PPR)  −0.012   −0.010 
  (0.032)   (0.044) 
PPR×D(PPR)  2.590   1.366 
  (1.926)   (3.536) 
FHO   −0.190  0.521 
   (0.571)  (0.950) 
D(FHO)   0.044  0.044 
   (0.020)**  (0.056) 
FHO×D(FHO)   −2.189  −4.021 
   (1.539)  (3.838) 
INV    −0.223 −0.642 
    (1.855) (2.310) 
D(INV)    0.034 −0.041 
    (0.036) (0.119) 
INV×D(INV)    −1.536 4.275 
    (2.021) (6.781) 
ΔlnDWELCOMP 0.243 0.266 0.243 0.246 0.233 
 (0.046)*** (0.050)*** (0.046)*** (0.050)*** (0.043)*** 
ΔlnPOP 0.339 0.485 0.473 0.486 0.257 
 (0.159)** (0.122)*** (0.113)*** (0.147)*** (0.150)* 
ΔlnRGSP −0.220 −0.659 −0.627 −0.589 −0.390 
 (0.556) (0.655) (0.710) (0.778) (0.788) 
ΔlnPPI 1.034 0.717 0.897 0.869 1.042 
 (0.809) (0.665) (0.682) (0.711) (0.843) 
IR 2.984 3.035 3.127 3.010 3.315 
 (0.508)*** (0.562)*** (0.491)*** (0.472)*** (0.617)*** 
ΔU 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.008 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
      
Constant −0.125 −0.114 −0.128 −0.119 −0.132 
 (0.033)*** (0.031)*** (0.030)*** (0.044)*** (0.057)** 
      
Observations 204 204 204 204 204 
R-squared 0.578 0.559 0.557 0.550 0.591 
Region # 17 17 17 17 17 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
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Notes: Standard errors clustered by region are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Δ represents a 
variable in first difference. A variable transformed by natural logarithm is identified by the prefix ln. D represents a 
dummy indicator variable that identifies the presence of a structural break within a land tax or stamp duty series. Slope 
interaction variables are denoted by the product of a tax or duty and the corresponding indicator variable. FE stands for 




Appendix C3: Maximum rates in Victoria and NSW versus the rest of 
Australia 
Table C3.1: Maximum rates Victoria and NSW 
 Dependant variable = ∆lnRHP 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
LT −0.071    2.876 
 (1.104)    (2.282) 
D(LT) 0.054    −0.062 
 (0.074)    (0.489) 
LT×D(LT) −5.026    −0.717 
 (6.615)    (25.474) 
D(FHO)   −0.045  0.089 
   (0.016)***  (0.165) 
INV    −0.019 −3.825 
    (4.418) (8.856) 
D(INV)    0.457 0.394 
    (0.590) (1.370) 
INV×D(INV)    −7.433 −3.870 
    (10.529) (25.856) 
ΔlnDWELCOMP 0.191 0.211 0.268 0.176 0.405 
 (0.199) (0.150) (0.165) (0.396) (0.996) 
ΔlnPOP −0.075 −0.051 0.007 −0.005 0.029 
 (0.384) (0.335) (0.366) (0.355) (0.579) 
ΔlnRGSP −0.005 −0.548 −0.555 −0.639 0.219 
 (1.257) (0.680) (0.688) (0.927) (3.704) 
ΔlnPPI 5.390 4.789 4.921 5.445 2.053 
 (1.806)*** (1.425)*** (1.436)*** (2.639)** (13.875) 
IR 5.214 4.740 4.037 5.932 4.832 
 (1.718)*** (1.105)*** (1.169)*** (3.728) (12.228) 
ΔU −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.007 −0.010 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Constant −0.259 −0.237 −0.199 −0.302 −0.080 
 (0.083)*** (0.046)*** (0.046)*** (0.407) (0.451) 
      
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 
R-squared 0.683 0.676 0.681 0.690 0.710 
Region # 6 6 6 6 6 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Δ 
represents a variable in first difference. A variable transformed by natural logarithm is identified by the 
prefix ln. D represents a dummy indicator variable that identifies the presence of a structural break within a 
land tax or stamp duty series. Slope interaction variables are denoted by the product of a tax or duty and the 
corresponding indicator variable. FE stands for fixed effects. Region # is the number of cross-sectional 
regions in the model. R-squared reports the with-in r-squared value. 
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Table C3.2: Maximum rates states and territories other than Victoria and NSW 
 Dependant variable = ∆lnRHP 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LT 1.345    1.248 
 (1.864)    (1.775) 
D(LT) −0.122    −0.271 
 (0.094)    (0.115)** 
LT×D(LT) 8.013    16.428 
 (5.547)    (6.841)** 
PPR  −1.640   −0.173 
  (0.556)***   (1.256) 
D(PPR)  −0.045   −0.191 
  (0.071)   (0.112)* 
PPR×D(PPR)  0.931   3.409 
  (1.892)   (2.542) 
FHO   −0.072  −0.272 
   (0.642)  (0.620) 
D(FHO)   −0.181  −0.252 
   (0.060)***  (0.081)*** 
FHO×D(FHO)   5.035  7.529 
   (1.463)***  (2.102)*** 
INV    −1.232 −3.962 
    (2.333) (2.965) 
D(INV)    −0.077 0.232 
    (0.077) (0.183) 
INV×D(INV)    1.385 −3.936 
    (1.676) (3.550) 
ΔlnDWELCOMP 0.234 0.249 0.219 0.241 0.179 
 (0.049)*** (0.050)*** (0.058)*** (0.049)*** (0.068)*** 
ΔlnPOP 0.471 0.484 0.472 0.474 0.288 
 (0.142)*** (0.143)*** (0.068)*** (0.134)*** (0.141)** 
ΔlnRGSP −0.479 −0.597 −0.452 −0.695 −0.699 
 (0.587) (0.676) (0.601) (0.779) (0.705) 
ΔlnPPI 0.807 0.821 0.916 0.923 0.579 
 (0.654) (0.699) (0.669) (0.672) (0.535) 
IR 3.082 2.908 3.321 2.991 3.376 
 (0.488)*** (0.459)*** (0.373)*** (0.494)*** (0.436)*** 
ΔU 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.013 
 (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) 
Constant −0.159 −0.071 −0.128 −0.072 0.005 
 (0.051)*** (0.028)** (0.033)*** (0.086) (0.099) 
      
Observations 204 204 204 204 204 
R-squared 0.558 0.556 0.586 0.550 0.625 
Region # 17 17 17 17 17 
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Standard errors clustered by region are in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Δ 
represents a variable in first difference. A variable transformed by natural logarithm is identified by the 
prefix ln. D represents a dummy indicator variable that identifies the presence of a structural break within a 
land tax or stamp duty series. Slope interaction variables are denoted by the product of a tax or duty and the 
corresponding indicator variable. FE stands for fixed effects. Region # is the number of cross-sectional 






Appendix D3: State tax and duty rate sources 
Table D3.1: State tax and duty rate sources 
State Land Tax Stamp Duty on Conveyances 
Victoria Land Tax Act 1958 (Victoria) Table of provisions Stamps Act 1958 (Victoria) Table of provisions  Land Tax Act 2005 (Victoria) s 116 Duty Act 2000 (Victoria) s 284  Victoria, SRO 2016, Historical rates of land tax, State 
Government Victoria, retrieved 13/12/2016, 
<http://www.sro.vic.gov.au/historical-rates-land-tax> 
 
 Victoria, SRO 2015a, Current Duty Rates, State 
Government Victoria, retrieved 16/07/2015, 
<http://www.sro.vic.gov.au/node/1491>. 
 
 Victoria, SRO 2015b, Historical Duty Rates, retrieved 
06/07/2015, <http://www.sro.vic.gov.au/node/1611>. 
 
New South Wales Land Tax Act 1956 (New South Wales) No 27 Stamp duties Act 1920 (New South wales) Scheduel 2   Duties Act 1997 (New South Wales) No 123 Part 3 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
Rates and Land Tax Act 1926 (Australian Capital 
Territory) s 13 
Australian Capital Territory Stamp Duty Act 1969 
(Australian Capital Territory) Schedule 1  Land Tax Act 2004 (ACT) s 14 Duties Act 1999 (Australian Capital Territory) Part 2.3 
 Taxation Administration (Land Tax) Determination 
2004 (Australian Capital Territory) No 1 
ACT, Revenue Office 2016, Land and improvements, 






State Land Tax Stamp Duty on Conveyances 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
Taxation Administration (Land Tax) Determination 
2005 (Australian Capital Territory) No 1 
 
 Taxation Administration (Land Tax) Determination 
2012 (Australian Capital Territory) No 1 
 
 Taxation Administration (Land Tax) Determination 
2013 (Australian Capital Territory) No 1 
 
 Taxation Administration (Land Tax) Determination 
2014 (Australian Capital Territory) No 1 
 
Queensland Duties Act 2001 (Queensland) Part 3 Duties Act 2001 (Queensland) Part 3 
Northern Territory No land tax Stamp Duty Act (Northern Territory) Schedule 1 & 
Schedule 2 
Western Australia Finance, Department of 2016. Land Tax Rates Archived, 




Stamp Act 1921 (Western Australia) Schedule 2 
 Metropolitan Improvement Tax Act 1959 (Western 
Australia) 
Duties Act 2008 (Western Australia) s 1 & 2 
 Land Tax Act 2002 (Western Australia) s 5  
South Australia  Land Tax Act 1936 (South Australia) s 8 Stamp Duties Act 1923 (South Australia) Schedule 2 
Tasmania The Land Tax and Income Tax Act 1910 (Tasmania) 1 
Geo V, No 37 
Stamp Duties Act 1931 (Tasmania) Schedule 2 
 Land Tax Act 2000 (Tasmania) Stamp Duties Regulations 1998 (Tasmania) Schedule 2 
 Land Tax Rating Act 2000 (Tasmania) Schedule 1 Duties Act 2001 (Tasmania) s 30 & Schedule 3 
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Appendix E3: Tax rate variable calculation 
To test the impact of taxation on house prices the true tax rate (ݐݎ௜) is calculated for each 
taxation bracket i. This rate takes into account any taxation that was paid in prior taxation 
brackets. First, an average is taken for each taxation bracket. This gives us the value of a 
property which falls in the middle of each bracket, ௜ܲ.  
௜ܲ ൌ ௅೔ି௎೔ଶ          (E3.1) 
Where i is an indicator of taxation bracket, i=1,...,N. ܮ௜ is the lower bound of the taxation 
bracket and ௜ܷ is the upper bound. If no upper limit is reported, such as the upper bracket, 
we double the value of the lower bound.  
The midpoint, ௜ܲ, is then subtracted from the lower bound, ܮ௜ and multiplied by the tax 
rate for that bracket, ݎ௜. That value is added to the additional tax paid through previous 
taxation brackets, ܶ ௜ܸ, then multiplied by the corresponding rate for that bracket ݎ௜. This 
product is then divided by the middle bracket value ௜ܲ yielding the true rate, ݐݎ௜. 
ሺሺ௉೔ି௅೔ሻൈ௥೔ሻା்௏೔
௉೔ ൌ ݐݎ௜        (E3.2) 
where  ܶ ௜ܸ ൌ ሺሺ ௜ܲିଵ െ ܮ௜ିଵሻൈݎ௜ିଵሻ ൅ ܶ ௜ܸିଵ. Here i is an indicator of the bracket for 
which we are calculating the true rate. Having obtained the true rate for each reported 
bracket we then proceed to calculate a number of descriptive statistics to be included in 
our tax policy analysis. Firstly, the mean tax rate is calculated for that state in each period. 
ܶܣܺ௠௘௔௡ ൌ ∑ ௧௥೔భಿே         (E3.3) 
This is the sum of the true rate of each bracket i=1,..,N divided by the number of brackets, 
N. The standard deviation of these rates has also been calculated, ܶܣܺ௦௧.ௗ௘௩. 
ܶܣܺ௦௧.ௗ௘௩ට∑ሺ௧௥೔ି்஺௑೘೐ೌ೙ሻ
మ
ேିଵ        (E3.4) 
In addition to the mean average we also note the median tax rate, this is obtained by taking 
the middle tax rate once the rates are ordered from smallest to largest, ܶܣܺ௠௘ௗ௜௔௡ . 
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Minimum and maximum rates are accounted for, as well as the range between these two 
rates, ܶܣܺ௠௜௡, ܶܣܺ௠௔௫ and ܶܣܺ௥௔௡௚௘ respectively. 
These rates have been calculated for land tax as well stamp duties levied at the principal 
place of residence and first homeowners occupants, and non-principal place of residence 
homeowners. 
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Appendix F3: Indicated structural breaks 
Table F3.1: Sequential breakpoint test results Bai (1997) 
  Max Min Mean 
State year LT PPR FHO INV LT PPR FHO INV LT PPR FHO INV 
ACT 1999             
ACT 2000         1 1 1  
ACT 2001     1 1 1      
ACT 2002 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 
ACT 2003             
ACT 2004             
ACT 2005             
ACT 2006             
ACT 2007             
ACT 2008             
ACT 2009             
ACT 2010             
ACT 2011    1    1     
NSW 1999             
NSW 2000             
NSW 2001             
NSW 2002             
NSW 2003 
NSW 2004 1 1 1 1 1 
NSW 2005             
NSW 2006             
NSW 2007 1    1    1    
NSW 2008            1 
NSW 2009 1        1    
NSW 2010            1 
NSW 2011   1    1      
NT 1999   1          
NT 2000             
NT 2001   1          
NT 2002             
NT 2003  1 1 1 1  1   1  1 
NT 2004             
NT 2005             
NT 2006       1   1   
NT 2007  1   1      1  
NT 2008       1   1   
NT 2009       1      
NT 2010          1  1 
NT 2011    1   1      
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  Max Min Mean 
State year LT PPR FHO INV LT PPR FHO INV LT PPR FHO INV 
Qld. 1999             
Qld. 2000             
Qld. 2001     1        
Qld. 2002   1  1        
Qld. 2003             
Qld. 2004   1  1       1 
Qld. 2005 1    1    1    
Qld. 2006  1 1 1       1 1 
Qld. 2007        1     
Qld. 2008 1 1 1 1   1 1 1   1 
Qld. 2009 1            
Qld. 2010          1   
Qld. 2011  1 1  1 1 1      
SA 1999    1         
SA 2000            1 
SA 2001             
SA 2002   1       1   
SA 2003             
SA 2004   1          
SA 2005             
SA 2006             
SA 2007 
SA 2008 1 1 
SA 2009 1 1 
SA 2010 1            
SA 2011             
Tas. 1999             
Tas. 2000             
Tas. 2001             
Tas. 2002 1        1    
Tas. 2003             
Tas. 2004             
Tas. 2005 1        1    
Tas. 2006             
Tas. 2007             
Tas. 2008             
Tas. 2009             
Tas. 2010          1 1 1 
Tas. 2011 1            
Vic. 1999             
Vic. 2000           1  
Vic. 2001         1    
Vic. 2002           1  
Vic. 2003             
Vic. 2004             
Vic. 2005         1    
Vic. 2006 1            
Vic. 2007         1 1 1  
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  Max Min Mean 
State year LT PPR FHO INV LT PPR FHO INV LT PPR FHO INV 
Vic. 2008 1   1        1 
Vic. 2009             
Vic. 2010    1      1 1 1 
Vic. 2011    1   1      
WA 1999             
WA 2000          1   
WA 2001             
WA 2002 1        1    
WA 2003   1       1   
WA 2004             
WA 2005 1           1 
WA 2006             
WA 2007 1    1    1   1 
WA 2008 1            
WA 2009  1 1 1 1 1  1 1 1 1 1 
WA 2010             
WA 2011      1       
Notes: 1 indicates the presence of a structural break as identified using Bai (1997) sequential structural 
breakpoint test. Act is Australian Capital Territory. NSW is New South Wales. NT is Northern Territory. 
Qld. is Queensland. SA is South Australia. Tas. is Tasmania. Vic. is Victoria. WA is Western Australia. 
Max indicates maximum, min is minimum. LT indicates the land tax rate series. PPR is principal place 




Appendix G3: Unit root testing 
Table G3.1: Harris-Tzavallis and Hadri LM unit root tests 
 Level First Difference 
Test ߩ ݖ ߩ ݖ 
Real House Prices 0.414 (8.259)*** −0.170 (0.001) 
 (−0.784)  (−17.764)***  
Dwelling Completed 0.505 (14.783)*** −0.429 (−2.162) 
 (−5.516)***  (−24.983)***  
 (−0.610)  (−18.497)***  
Regional Population 1.0089 (32.068)*** 0.000 (1.710)** 
 (4.890)  (−14.175)***  
Real Gross State Product 0.920 (25.609)*** 0.1409 (1.738)** 
 (3.133)  (−11.761)***  
Housing Producer Price Index 0.500 (14.625)*** −0.092 (−1.098) 
 (0.553)  (−16.263)***  
Real Interest Rates −0.548 (−4.199)   
 (−15.790)***    
Unemployment (Persons) 0.592 (13.591)*** 0.010 (1.074) 
 (1.989)  (−14.280)***  
Real Other Dwelling price 0.475 (9.216)*** −0.021 (1.226) 
 (0.166)  (−14.895)***  
Number of Panels 24 24 24 24 
Number of Periods 13 13 12 12 
Notes: ߩ represents the Harris-Tzavallis test for unit root has the null hypothesis that panels contain 
unit root and the alternative that panels are stationary. These include trends where appropriate and all 
allow for small panel adjustment to the test statistic. The Hadri LM test (z) has the null hypothesis that 
all panels are stationary with the alternative that some panels contain unit roots. Test statistics rho are 
reported, the parenthesis contain z values of the respective test. Significance levels are determined by 
p-values and are indicated by asterisk *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Chapter 4: Resident Migration and Its Effect on House Prices 
in Australia 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Aim and motivation 
Australia’s strong history of immigration has the potential to affect house prices around 
the nation significantly. However, the literature provides little evidence of the effect of 
domestic population displacement due to the contemporaneous influx of migrants. 
Bourassa and Hendershott (1995) attribute house price growth in Australia from 1979 to 
1993 in part to population growth through net immigration. However, they do not 
consider the potential for house price growth being offset due to out-migration of locals, 
as discussed in Sa (2015). This chapter explores the flow of migrants and their effect on 
house prices in Australian states and territories. Key contributions are made by assessing 
the effect of both net immigration and domestic interstate migration. This is done in a 
panel setup with the dependent variable, growth of house prices for Australian capital 
cities. The Australian Bureau of Statistics’ (ABS) quarterly historical house price index 
(HPI) between 1986 and 2005 is used as the dependent variable in the analysis for two 
reasons. First, the methodology used to calculate this index is consistent over the period. 
Second, it allows us to examine immigration and migration flows during a number of 
different government regimes. The Australian example is interesting for several reasons. 
First, there are vast distances between the capital cities, where migrants overwhelmingly 
choose to live. This contributes to the expensive transaction costs involved in relocating 
a household interstate. Arthur Calwell, Australia’s first Minister of Immigration, was the 
first to state that Australia must ‘populate or perish’. During his time as minister (July 
1945–May 1946), Australia committed to increasing its population by 2 per cent per 
annum. Where 50 per cent of this growth was due to immigration (Department of 
Immigration and Border Control 2015a, p.26). During the sample period of this study, the 
contribution of immigration to population growth has been closer to 66 per cent. In 
particular, the late 1980s was a period of very strong population growth due to net 
overseas migration (ABS 2016). 
During the Hawke–Keating regime, Australia progressed to a more qualitatively informed 
decision-making process in which potential Australian citizens are categorised in 
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Australia’s permanent Migration Programme. The programme incorporates economic 
and family reunion migration and is the main pathway to permanent residence. Migrants 
may also obtain permanent residency in Australia on humanitarian grounds. The 
Migration Programme is based on non-discriminatory principles relating to nationality, 
gender and religion. People who meet the criteria set out in the Migration Act 1958 can 
apply to migrate. The government is currently targeting a ratio of 68 per cent skilled 
workers to 32 per cent family visa streams (Department of Immigration and Border 
Control 2016). 
Skilled migration focuses on enabling the permanent entry of those who can make a 
positive contribution to Australia through their skills, qualifications, entrepreneurial spirit 
and employment potential. Conversely, family migration permits the entry of close family 
members of Australian citizens, permanent residents and eligible New Zealand citizens. 
According to the Australian Government, this stream is currently dominated by partners 
and dependent children (Department of Immigration and Border Control 2016). Figure 
4.1 shows the change in the Permanent Migration Programme10 over the past ten years.11 
From the early 1980s, Australia has adopted a permanent migration policy that 
differentiates between skilled immigration and immigration of a humanitarian nature. 
Prior to 1979, immigration to Australia was biased, with intakes favouring white people, 
often of an Anglo-Saxon heritage. In 1979, the incumbent government moved to a more 
qualitative selection policy that was based on three categories: humanitarian grounds, 
family reunion and skilled migrants. Under the Labour government in the 1980s, 
immigration tended to favour the family category (Wright 2012). Under the Liberal 
government in 1996–2007, skilled immigration became preferred to promote the growth 
of the Australian economy (Wright 2014). 
                                                 
10 Permanent migration refers to outcomes in any given year, without taking into account whether the visa 
recipient actually arrived and settled in Australia. 
11 See ‘Australia’s Migration Programme—permanent migration outcomes 2014–15’ for more information 
on the size and composition of the Skill Stream, Family Stream and Special Eligibility for the 2014–15 
Migration Programme (Department of Immigration and Border Control 2015b). 
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Figure 4.1: Australian migration program 2005–06 to 2014–15 
Source: Department of Immigration and Border Protection (2016) 
 
Figure 4.2: Number of immigrants in Australian capital cities—2006 
Source: ABS Census of Population and Housing (2006) 
Melbourne and Sydney are large cities that have been globally recognised for their 
‘liveability’. According to The Economist’s Global Liveability Ranking 2016, Melbourne 
has ranked number one for the past six years (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2016). 
ABS census data from 2006 (taken at the end of the sample period) show that most 
immigrants decided to reside in Sydney (1.6 million) and Melbourne (1.2 million) (see 
Figure 4.2). Thus, it is possible that Melbourne and Sydney can be considered gateway 
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cities similar to Toronto and Vancouver (Hou & Bourne 2006; Ley 2007; Ley & 
Tutchener 2001). Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth also accommodate a significant number 
of immigrants, and Hobart, Canberra and Darwin host significantly smaller, but still 
sizable, immigrant populations. 
 
Figure 4.3: Percentage of migrants in Australian capital cities—2006 
Source: ABS Census of Population and Housing, 2006 








NSW 4,955.40 1,787.30 6,742.70 26.51 
Vic. 3,729.50 1,331.80 5,061.30 26.31 
Qld. 3,218.10 789.9 4,008.00 19.71 
SA 1,212.60 339.9 1,552.50 21.89 
WA 1,436.70 613.9 2,050.60 29.94 
Tas. 433.1 56.2 489.3 11.49 
NT 176.3 32.7 209.1 15.64 
ACT 256.1 79.1 335.2 23.6 
Source: Migration, ABS Cat. No. 3412.0 (2016) 
Considering the proportional size of Australian capital cities, there is a slightly different 
story. Figure 4.3 shows that immigrants in Sydney and Perth represent a larger proportion 
of the total city population (more than 60 per cent). Melbourne’s foreign-born population 
comprises 55 per cent of its total population, while foreign-born residents in Brisbane, 
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Adelaide, Darwin and Canberra comprise approximately 40 per cent of the total city 
population. Only 20 per cent of Hobart’s population were born abroad. Comparing these 
figures to Table 4.1 shows that, while immigrants choose to reside in capital cities rather 
than the rest of the state, no state or territory has more than 30 per cent of immigrants 
making up the total state population. Western Australia has the greatest proportion of 
immigrants at 29 per cent. Most states are closer to 25 per cent. Notable exceptions are 
Hobart with only 11.5 per cent and the Northern Territory 16 per cent. Despite the clear 
importance of immigration to state economies and the aggregate economy, little is known 
about their relationship with local housing markets. 
4.1.2 Background and contribution to literature 
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, it builds on Bourassa and 
Hendershott’s (1995) work by examining the effect of recent net overseas migration on 
house prices in a contemporary panel analysis. Second, it assesses not only immigration 
but also interstate migration. This is done in two ways: through the net effect of interstate 
migration and through interstate arrivals and departures separately. This is an important 
feature, as the inflow of immigrants may cause locals to decide to relocate. 
Labour economics suggests that even within cities, immigrants are attracted to different 
areas depending on their ability to move, the proportion of individuals from their country 
of origin and labour availability. Wozniak and Murray (2012) analyse the short-run causal 
effect of immigration on native populations at the local labour market level. They posit 
that the inflow of migrants may have a negative effect on local populations, causing the 
local populations to out-migrate to seek lower-cost housing. This is believed to be in line 
with conventional displacement theory, where immigrants increase the local labour 
supply in a market, which in turn lowers wages in the market relative to other markets 
(Borjas 2006). 
A similar argument can be made in relation to housing markets. Where this argument 
diverges from labour markets is that immigrants may possess differing propensities to 
consume housing. For instance, if immigrants enter a gateway city such as Sydney with 
little intention to settle in an area outside of the metropolitan area, then their demand for 
housing will not match that of native individuals, who have a greater sensitivity to prices. 
This at least holds at the inner-city level, as individuals prefer to be closer to where they 
grew up, yet are still willing to relocate to neighbouring suburbs (Saiz 2003). Given that 
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Sydney and Melbourne are the most popular destinations for migrants, this chapter will 
conduct subsampling to determine whether these locations are driving the results. 
The effect of immigration on some local housing markets has the potential to be greater 
than the effect on Australia at the aggregate level. This is because some cities attract more 
immigrants than others. International literature labels these cities as gateway cities (Hou 
& Bourne 2006; Knapp & Vojnovic 2016; Ley 2007; Ley & Tutchener 2001; Mocetti & 
Porello 2010). Given that such large proportions of immigrants are residing in Melbourne 
and Sydney, it is possible that migration is contributing significantly to house prices in 
these areas. It is also possible that, in the vein of developing literature, the inflow of 
migrants induces a displacement response from locals (Hatton & Tani 2005; Hou & 
Bourne 2006; Mocetti & Porello 2010). This chapter focuses on the effect of migration 
movements at the state level. 
Previous analyses of inter-region migration, particularly within the United Kingdom, 
indicate that population or labour force movements are in response to variables 
representing regional labour market conditions. Such variables include unemployment 
and vacancy rates, wages and house prices (McCormick 1997). Jackman and Savouri 
(1992) corroborate these assertions by analysing National Health service data through the 
mid-1980s, except for the relative wage rate.12 Given the availability of Australian data, 
this chapter assesses migration into states rather than city areas. Although this is at a more 
aggregate level, a key benefit is that the migration variable is not necessarily determined 
by house prices in city areas. This will allow for more definitive results. 
Additionally, immigrants may be more willing to pay for the same quality of housing in 
a given location due to the value they attribute to settling in a location with similar 
individuals and being near immigrant-specific amenities (Accetturo et al. 2014; Fischer 
2012; Rambaldi et al. 2013). A greater willingness and ability to consume housing in 
these areas could cause future generations of natives who would have resided in or near 
the areas in which they grew up to seek more appropriate accommodation that matches 
their willingness to pay for a similar quality of dwelling and lifestyle. Displacement may 
occur if local residents possess a level of sensitivity to house prices that is greater than 
                                                 
12 For studies on regional mobility that use individual-level data, see Hughes and McCormick (1994) and 
Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989). The authors typically tend to find conventional wage effects; however, 
weaker or perverse effects for some of the other key variables have also been noted. 
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that of immigrants. In addition, if immigrants have a greater propensity to purchase 
dwellings due to relatively larger incomes, this effect may broaden. Therefore, one must 
consider how local residents’ demand profiles compare to those of immigrants. For this 
reason, this paper explores the relationship between both net overseas migration and net 
interstate migration and house prices in Australia. 
According to Hatton and Tani (2005), regional dispersion of people following an 
immigration shock is a possible mechanism to which labour markets adjust. The authors 
conduct an examination of net internal migration between 11 regions in Britain over two 
decades. They find evidence that immigration flows into a specific area pushes non-
immigrants out. Hatton and Tani (2005) find consistently negative displacement effects, 
although the magnitude and significance varies. This dispersion also appears to be 
significant for housing markets. Saiz (2003, 2007) finds a large increase in the price of 
rental housing within a one-year shock to the size of the local immigrant population. 
Muellbauer and Cameron (1998) find that house prices have a strong negative effect on 
inter-regional migration, and the expectation of capital gains through house price 
increases has a positive effect. Braakmann (2016) employs a fixed effects methodology 
with shift-share-based instrument variables to suggest that increases in regional 
immigration (depending on the specification) either decrease prices at the lower end of 
the distribution up to the median, or leave them unchanged and have almost no effect on 
mean property prices or prices above the median. The author suggests that this can be 
explained by the interaction between markets for rented and owner occupant properties, 
as well as changes in the type of usage of housing spaces. 
Head, Lloyd-Ellis and Sun (2014) model the empirical properties of United States (US) 
house prices in 106 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). They characterise the joint 
dynamics of city-level per capita income, house prices, growth in sales of existing houses, 
construction rates and population growth. Over the short term, house price growth 
exhibits a positive serial autocorrelation but reverts to its mean in the long-run (Head, 
Lloyd-Ellis & Sun 2014). Their panel vector analysis concludes that sales growth is 
volatile relative to income and is positively autocorrelated with, but lags, population 
growth. Quasi-experimental evidence supports the relationship between immigration and 
rent prices. 
Quasi-experimental evidence of Syrian refugee immigration to Turkey sheds further light 
on the dispersion of immigrants at the country level. Tumen (2016) analyses regional 
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variations in movement patterns of Syrian refugees who are forced to emigrate from Syria 
to neighbouring nations as a natural experiment in a difference-in-differences setting. The 
author uses a two-stage moving pattern where refugees first immigrate to Turkey, 
triggered by an exogenous shock induced by civil unrest. These refugees cluster around 
a number of constructed accommodation camps to capture various amenities provided by 
the Turkish government. In terms of the effect on housing rents, Tumen (2016) finds that 
inflows of refugees increased the demand for higher-quality neighbourhoods in hosting 
regions. This was due to the influx of refugees seeking low-cost rental units in low-cost 
neighbourhoods inducing an outflow of natives to higher-quality residential areas (Tumen 
2016, pp. 459–60). A similar natural occurrence observed in the Miami area of the US 
demonstrated an increase in rents due to an immigration shock (Saiz 2003). 
Saiz (2003) provides evidence of a causal relationship between immigration and housing 
rents using the ‘Mariel Boatlift’ natural experiment, which was a short-run immigration 
permitted by the then Castro government of an estimated 80,000 migrants who decided 
to settle in Miami, partly due to its proximity to Cuba and the pre-existing Cuban migrant 
population. This exogenous immigration shock represented a 9 per cent increase in 
Miami’s renter population in one year. This resulted in an 8 per cent increase in Miami’s 
rent prices compared to other Florida metropolitan areas and two other groups of 
comparison cities (2003).13 
Like many countries, numerous factors have contributed to prolonged periods of house 
price growth in Australia, including unprecedented low interest rates, deregulation in the 
mortgage market, rising income and irrational exuberance. Australia has experienced 
large international migration inflows during the sample period. This may have boosted 
demand for housing because individuals are attracted to Australia as a destination outside 
of their native country. The effect of this on Australian city house prices is yet to be made 
clear. This phenomenon is similar to experiences in the Canadian ‘gateway cities’ of 
Toronto and Vancouver, as well as US cities such as Los Angeles.14 
                                                 
13 The difference-in-differences approach used in this chapter has a number of notable shortcomings, as 
discussed in Saiz (2007, pp. 347–348). 
14 Ley and Murphy (2001) find that Sydney is a key port of entry for immigrants. Wright, Ellis and Reibel 
(1997) discuss US cities with a focus on displacement of locals in New York, Los Angeles and Miami. Ley 
and Tutchener (2001) explore Toronto and Vancouver. 
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It is difficult to separate the effect on increased housing demand (immigration) from the 
potential decreased demand associated with native displacement (out-migration). Given 
that a local response to increased immigration can occur through out-migration, we must 
be careful in the interpretation of the coefficient of immigration on house prices. In 
general, immigration should not correspond to housing supply elasticity. Ceteris paribus, 
if natives are not extremely sensitive to changes in housing costs and they are not 
displaced ‘one-for-one’ in the labour market, immigration should have a positive effect 
on prices (Hatton & Tani 2005). 
This study explores the relationship between the net movement of migrants (both 
internationally and domestically) and house prices in Australian capital cities. It controls 
for the expected increase in housing supply through a number of dwelling approvals in 
Australian states. The interpretation of results will assume homogeneity in labour quality 
and wages. This study assumes that housing quality is the same within cities and across 
states, and that individuals who choose to move from one housing market to another are 
doing so to obtain a better quality of living outside of their city of origin (either within or 
outside of Australia). This could be in the form of capturing greater utility from amenities 
or lifestyle which better match their preferences. 
4.1.3 Empirical specification and key findings 
Modelling migration flows and house prices presents a number of challenges that must 
be considered. Omitted variables are one such challenge. Housing markets can be driven 
by a number of factors at both a micro and macro level. This could include interest rates, 
which affect the cost of borrowing and therefore financing property for both the owner-
occupant and the investor. In contrast, individuals are influenced by numerous factors at 
the local level that will affect their decision to purchase property in one location over 
another—for example, the style of the property and how many bedrooms it has. For these 
housing characteristics, hedonic modelling has come a long way (Hill 2013). Further, 
cities vary in their characteristics, from climate to the amount of infrastructure. 
Estimations that omit key variables are at risk of omitted variable bias and overestimation. 
This study does not specifically account for these quality-type variables; however, the 
fixed effects model presented later allows for a degree of heterogeneity between cities. 
Thus, these city differences are captured in the constant. 
Net overseas migration, net interstate migration and interstate arrivals and departures 
form the key variables of interest in this analysis. A number of macroeconomic and state-
 140 
specific factors that may contribute to house prices are accounted for with the inclusion 
of control variables such as state expenditure, unemployment, interest rates, rent index 
and dwellings approved. This study also includes one-period-lagged house prices to 
account for price expectations. State fixed effects are included to account for any state-
varying heterogeneity. Time fixed effects account for inflationary and housing quality 
adjustments during the sample. 
In addition to the fixed effects model, this chapter investigates whether there is a long-
run relationship between migration and house prices. It applies Pedroni (1999, 2001) and 
Westerlund’s (2007) cointegration tests before conducting panel dynamic ordinary least 
squares (PDOLS) analysis. Overall, only a slight cointegrating relationship between 
house prices and interstate arrivals is observed. 
Interstate arrivals have a positive and statistically significant relationship with house 
prices in most of the specifications. Net overseas migration, net interstate migration and 
interstate departures show little statistical significance. Thus, local population movements 
are of greater significance to house prices in Australia than the net effect of international 
migration. This could be due to immigrants electing to rent instead of owning dwellings, 
combined with the possibility that domestic households may not sell their property before 
moving interstate or overseas, but instead use it as equity for future investments, or as 
income through renting it out. 
Overall, this chapter cannot establish a long-run relationship between net overseas 
migration and house prices. Evidence of a short-run relationship between net overseas 
migration and house prices is also weak. However, interstate migration has a small 
positive relationship with house prices, particularly interstate arrivals. Baseline results 
indicate that an increase of 1,000 interstate arrivals is associated with an approximately 
0.2 per cent rise in the growth of house prices. Further investigation proves that the arrival 
of individuals is the most important migration variable in relation to house prices. The 
results indicate a 0.1 per cent increase in the growth of house prices when an additional 
1,000 people enter the state. Comparing this to the study’s long-run model, it suggests an 
increase of 0.4 per cent in house prices due to an additional 1,000 individuals entering the 
state. This study also includes a government dummy variable to capture potential effects 
of government regimes and finds that the Liberal–National government had a positive, 
but not statistically significant, relationship with house prices during the sample. 
Subsampling suggests that states other than New South Wales and Victoria behave most 
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like the aggregate model. There is little evidence to suggest that migration has a 
statistically significant effect on house prices in New South Wales and Victoria. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the data. Section 4.3 
specifies the econometric model and describes the estimation strategy. Section 4.4 
contains a detailed discussion of the empirical results. Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2 Data 
This chapter uses a quarterly panel of all eight Australian state and territories from June 
1986 to June 2005 obtained from the ABS. Both internal and external net migration of 
individuals are assessed in this analysis. Information relating to the foreign-born 
population entering Australian borders is captured for each state and year through net 
overseas migration reported by the ABS. Conceptually, net overseas migration is the total 
number of individuals immigrating to live in an Australian state minus the Australian 
citizens who have chosen to migrate from that state or territory to an overseas location. 
Immigration authorities monitor the movements of individuals who have relocated to 
Australia when Australia has been their usual place of residence for 12 or more months. 
The information for state distributions of net overseas migration is obtained from 
incoming and outgoing passenger cards. Incoming passenger cards provide the intended 
address of an overseas immigrant, while outgoing passenger cards provide information 
of where an individual lives or has spent most of their time. These data are reported 
quarterly by the ABS (2015).15 
                                                 
15 This method has been modified to use a 12/16 rule, where a person is assessed as being a resident of 
Australia if they spent 12 months in the country over a 16-month period from June 2007 (ABS 2006). 
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Figure 4.4: Estimated contribution to population growth 
Source: ABS demographic statistics (3101.0), June 2014 
Although Australia is geographically isolated from the rest of the world, immigration 
continues to be an important avenue of population growth. Figure 4.4 shows that net 
overseas migration (i.e., the permanent flow of residents into and out of Australian 
borders) has been increasing over the past three decades. It currently comprises more than 
50 per cent of the national population growth. Given this evolution in migration policy, 
Australia is cultivating an ever-increasing multicultural society. This trend has not always 
been the case. As shown in Figure 4.4, net overseas migration in 1993 was less than 20 
per cent, and it peaked at approximately 68 per cent in 2009. Growth in the foreign-born 
population has obvious implications for demand for resources such as housing. Given that 
everyone who enters Australia needs a place to live, this chapter examines the effect of 
this requirement on house prices. It is particularly interested in house prices for Australian 
capital cities, as this is where most immigrants enter and settle. Developing literature 
posits that the ease of access to points of entry for immigrants is a good indication of the 
choice of where immigrants will choose to settle. Given that Melbourne and Sydney's 
airports are the largest international airports in Australia, this supports the notion that, as 
‘gateway cities’, they will entice a large proportion of the immigrant population.16 
The ABS’ Australian demographic statistics also provide evidence for population change 
attributed to net interstate migration. This is the number of individuals who have relocated 
                                                 
16 See Hou and Bourne (2006), Ley (2007), Ley and Tutchener (2001) and Mocetti and Porello (2010) for 
further discussions regarding the relationship between gateway cities and immigration. 
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to a particular Australian state, i, from all other states, minus the total number of 
individuals who have moved out state i. This information is estimated using post-census 
data. Currently, the data used by the ABS include information on interstate changes of 
address from Medicare Australia. In the case of movements of military individuals, 
Department of Defence data may be used (ABS 2015). This chapter further deconstructs 
the issue of interstate movements with the use of interstate arrival and departure data. 
Interstate arrivals capture the total number of individuals that have relocated to an 
Australian state or territory from all other states and territories. Interstate departures 
capture the total number of individuals that have departed from one Australian state or 
territory to reside in another. For each of these migration variables, the data are divided 
by 1,000 to provide the movements in units of 1,000 persons. 
Table 4.2: Key variables 
Variable Description Data Source 
House price Established house price index 
uses the ABS methodology 
prior to 2005, 1990 = 100. 
Established house price index, 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
6416.0—Residential Property 
Price Indexes: Eight Capital 
Cities, Mar 2016: Table 8 
 Overseas migration Net number of individuals 
who have immigrated into an 
Australian state from overseas 
minus the Australians who 
have emigrated overseas. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics: 
3101.0 Australian 
Demographic Statistics. Table 
2: Population change, 
components—States and 
Territories (number) 
Interstate migration Net number of individuals 
who have migrated into an 
Australian state from all other 
states or territories minus 
those who have elected to 
emigrate to another state or 
territory. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics: 
3101.0 Australian 
Demographic Statistics. Table 
2: Population change, 
components—States and 
Territories (number) 
Interstate arrivals Number of domestic migrants 
who have arrived from all 
other state or territories. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics: 
3101.0 Australian 
Demographic Statistics. Table 
16A. Interstate Arrivals, States 
and Territories (Persons)  
Interstate departures Number of domestic migrants 
who have left an Australian 
state or territory to reside in 
another. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics: 
3101.0 Australian 
Demographic Statistics. Table 
16B. Interstate Departures, 
States and Territories (Persons) 
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House price data are from the ABS’ established house price index and are available 
quarterly from 1986 to 2005. In 2005, the ABS changed its methodology for estimating 
house price indexes, and the new information is not comparable with previous estimates. 
This time series allows us to examine an interesting period of Australian migration. In 
addition, it spans periods of varying federal governments, which might affect the type of 
migration that occurs, and therefore house prices. 
 
Figure 4.5: Change in log house price (%) 
Source: ABS category 6416.0: Residential property price indexes—eight capital cities (2016) 
On average, house prices grew by 2 per cent per quarter between 1986 and 2005. This 
has an average standard deviation of 3 per cent. The maximum quarterly growth of house 
prices was estimated at 13 per cent in NSW in September 1988. Conversely, the largest 
depreciation in house prices was 10 per cent in the Northern Territory in June 1988. We 
can see from the Figure 4.5 that the volatility in house prices was smaller for all states 
and territories during the middle of the sample, between 1994 and 1997.  
Net overseas migration has seen an average increase of 3,170 additional foreign-born 
individuals residing within each Australian state and territory (see Table 4,3). However, 
this varies substantially between states, with a standard deviation of 4,072 individuals. 
This is because foreign-born residents prefer some states over others, and there is 
variation in the number of movements between years. The largest influx of immigrants 
due to net overseas migration was 22,036 people, whereas net overseas migration in one 
state saw 2,497 residents emigrate to overseas locations. 
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Net interstate migration has also seen a large amount of variation between states. The 
largest net loss of residents was 11,540 people, and one state observed a net interstate 
migrant gain of 16,150 people entering from other states and territories. However, the 
average quarterly net movement of individuals is close to zero, although the standard 
deviation is 3,730 people. 
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics (1986–2005) 
Variable Observations Mean Std dev. Min Max 
∆log house price 
index 
608 0.02 0.03 −0.10 0.13 
Net overseas 
migration 
616 3.17 4.07 −2.50 22.04 
Net interstate 
migration 
616 .001 3.73 −11.54 16.15 
Interstate arrivals 616 11.15 8.44 1.88 36.50 
Interstate departures 616 11.15 8.23 2.08 36.04 
Income 616 25,917.53 23,950.94 1742 967 
Unemployment rate 616 7.86 1.98 3.09 12.96 
Rent index 616 57.02 8.56 31.8 75.9 
Dwellings approved 616 3,348.45 2,932.59 69 9,927 
Interest rate 616 10.174 3.599 6.05 17 
Notes: ∆ represents a variable in the first difference. Log is the natural log of a variable. Std dev. 




Table 4.4: State control variables 
Variable Description Data Source 
Income State final demand 
comprising of household 
consumption expenditure, 




Reported in $AU million. 
5206.0—Australian National 
Accounts: National Income, 
Expenditure and Product, 
Mar 2016. Table 25. 
Unemployment rate Proportion of labour force 
that are unemployed and 
seeking work for each state 
and territory. 
6202.0—Labour Force, 
Australia, May 2016. Table 
12. Labour force status by 
sex, state and territory—
seasonally adjusted. 
Rent index Australian capital city rent 
index 1990 = 100. 
4102.0—Australian Social 
Trends—housing indicators 
Housing supply Number of dwellings 
approved in states and 
territories. 
ABS cat. 8752.0—Building 
Activity, Australia, Dec 
2015. Table 80. 
Interest rates Average Australian standard 
variable bank lending rate 
lived to owner occupants. 
The mean monthly rate is 
taken over each quarter. 
RBA F5: FILRHLBVS 
In addition to the key variables discussed above, a number of control variables are 
included in the analysis to account for exogenous economic effects on house prices. These 
variables are outlined in Table 4.4. 
4.3 Methodology 
The following model is used to estimate the effect of immigration on house prices: 
Δ lnሺܪ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ൌ ߙଵܱܰܯ௜௧ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߚଶݎ ൅ ϕ௜ ൅ ߩ௧ ൅ ߳௜௧    (4.1) 
where Δ lnሺܪ ௜ܲ௧ሻ is the change in the log of the house price index for an Australian capital 
city i between years ݐ െ 1 and	ݐ. Four main variables capture the movements of citizens 
across both national and international borders. These are introduced in specifications 
(4.1–4.3). In the above specification, ܱܰܯ௜௧ captures the annual net flow of migrants 
across Australian borders into state ݅	at year ݐ. The coefficient ߙ can be interpreted as the 
percentage change in house prices corresponding to an annual increase of 1,000 
immigrants. 
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௜ܺ௧  is a set of socio-economic state-specific variables in levels that may affect house 
prices. It includes: state expenditure, which is used as a proxy for income to capture 
changes in demand within the state; unemployment rate, to control for state 
macroeconomic conditions; rent index, to control the opportunity cost of owning a 
property compared to other forms of accommodation; and dwellings approved, to capture 
the housing supply. In addition, it includes a one-period lag of the dependent variable to 
allow for a degree of endogeneity of contemporaneous house prices. All of these variables 
differ across states and change over time. This chapter also includes national mortgage 
rates to capture the cost of borrowing. These are an average rate offered as a standard 
mortgage to homeowners across the country. There is little variation between financial 
institutions, and changes in these rates closely mirror the cash rate offered by the Reserve 
Bank of Australia. 
Results are reported using state-specific effects (ϕ௜) to capture differences in housing 
types and state specific conditions which may influence house prices at the state level. As 
the model is written in first differences, time-invariant factors that are specific to each 
state and that affect house prices in levels have been differenced out. However, quarterly 
dummies (ߩ௧ሻ are included to capture national trends in inflation and other economic 
variables. 
Δ lnሺܪ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ൌ ߙଵܰܫܯ௜௧ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߚଶݎ ൅ ϕ௜ ൅ ߩ௧ ൅ ߳௜௧ (4.2) 
Further, we should bear in mind that social and economic conditions evolve as people 
change. Individuals choose to relocate within national borders to seek a better quality of 
life (Ottaviano & Peri 2012; Sa 2015; Saiz 2007; Saiz & Wachter 2011). Therefore, to 
understand the true effect of migration on house prices, we must consider population 
movements between states. To do so, we postulate the above model, which substitutes 
ܰܫܯ௜௧ as the main independent variables. Here, we interpret ߙ as the percentage increase 
in house prices corresponding to an increase of 1,000 individuals residing in state ݅ at 
time ݐ  who were residing in another state ݅ ് ݅  at time ݐ െ 1 . These movements are 
further explored in Equation (4.3). 
The below model identifies both the interstate arrivals ܫܵܣ௜௧  to state i at time t, and 
interstate departures ܫܵܦ௜௧ of individuals to all other states and territories from state ݅ at 
time ݐ. This provides the coefficients ߙଵ and ߙଶ, which are interpreted as the percentage 
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change in house prices attributed to a movement of 1,000 residents across Australian state 
borders: 
Δ lnሺܪ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ൌ ߙଵܫܵܣ௜௧ ൅ ߙଶܫܵܦ௜௧ ൅ ߚଵ ௜ܺ௧ ൅ ߚଶݎ ൅ ϕ௜ ൅ ߩ௧ ൅ ߳௜௧ (4.3) 
The effect of net overseas migration is identified between changes in the inflow of 
international residents from a location outside of Australian borders to state ݅ and the 
departure of domestic residents from state ݅ to a location beyond Australia’s borders. 
Some problems may arise when attempting to make causal interpretations of these 
correlations. First, immigration and house prices may be spatially correlated because 
common influences such as the climate and local amenities are fixed. This may result in 
a correlation between the two variables with the absence of genuine effects of 
immigration. Second, the direction of causality between house prices and immigration is 
not clear, as immigrants are not randomly allocated to states or even locations within 
states. The sign of the bias is difficult to predict ex-ante. Rational migrants are likely to 
select to settle in states that have prosperous regions and in which house prices are likely 
to grow faster. Conversely, they may choose to reside in a region where house prices are 
lower (Sa 2015). To report consistent and accurate results, we first determine whether a 
unit root is present. 
4.3.1 Unit root testing 
This section tests whether the series displays a unit root (random walk), which is said to 
be integrated of order one, or	ܫሺ1ሻ. If the series is stationary in levels without a trend, it 
is said to be integrated of order 0, or	ܫሺ0ሻ. This section performs a number of tests for 
unit roots within the panel. If a series is found to have a stochastic trend, it is differenced 
to become stationary and is thus reported as integrated of order ݀,ܫሺ݀ሻ: 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߩ௜ݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ࢠ௜௧ᇱ ߛ௜ ൅ ߳௜௧ (4.4) 
Where ݅ ൌ 1,… ,ܰ indexes a panel (in this case a state); ݐ ൌ 1,… , ௜ܶ indexes time; ݕ௜௧ is 
the variable being tested; and ߳௜௧  is a stationary error term. ࢠ௜௧ᇱ  may represent panel-
specific means and a time trend, or nothing, depending on the chosen specification. The 
Im–Pesaran–Shin (IPS), Fisher-type and Hadri tests do not require strongly balanced 
panels. Conversely, a strongly balanced panel, such that ௜ܶ ൌ ܶ for all ݅, is required for 
the Levin–Lin–Chu (LLC), Haris–Tsavalis (HT) and Breitung tests. Given that the panel 
is strongly balanced, each of these options are possible. 
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Panel unit root tests are used to test the null hypothesis ܪ଴: ߩ௜ ൌ 1 for all ݅ versus the 
alternative	ܪ௔: ߩ௜ ൏ 1. Depending on the test, ܪ௔ may hold for one	݅, a fraction of all ݅ or 
all	݅. 
Equation (4.4) can alternatively be written as: 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߶௜ݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ࢠ௜௧ᇱ ߛ௜ ൅ ߳௜௧ (4.5) 
where ߶ is panel-speciﬁc, indexed by i. Here, the null hypothesis is then ܪ଴: ߶௜ ൌ 0 for 
all i versus the alternative ܪ௔: ߶݅ ൏ 0. 
LLC, HT and Breitung tests make the simplifying assumption that all panels have the 
same autoregressive parameter, leading ߩ௜ ൌ ߩ for all	݅. Others allow for a panel-specific 
autoregressive parameter. Considering the dependent variable (Δ݈݊ܪ ௜ܲ௧), the percentage 
change is shown to vary considerably across states, as does the deterministic trend. 
Assuming the rate of change of house prices (and many of the other variables of interest) 
converge to the same long-run value for all Australian states may be too strong, 
consideration is also given to the asymptotic distributions of these tests. 
The tests differ in the assumptions made over whether the number of panels, N, and the 
number of time periods, T, tend to infinity, or whether N or T are fixed. In macroeconomic 
panels, it is generally assumed that T tends towards infinity while N is fixed. Given that 
the dataset depicts a larger number of time observations relative to cross-sections in the 
panel, unit root tests that assume that T tends to infinity at a faster rate than N, or that 
assume that N is fixed, will perform better than tests designed for large N.17 
Given the above information, this essay wishes to highlight tests that assume ߩ is panel-
specific and that T approaches infinity at a faster rate than N. All results are reported for 
all unit root tests, but highlight IPS, Fisher-type and Hadri LM tests for unit roots. The 
cross-sectional averages are subtracted from the series to mitigate the effect of cross-
sectional dependence, as suggested by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002). One exception to this 
rule is interest rates, which remains the same across panels. Further information on each 
of these tests is provided in Appendix A4. 
 
                                                 
17 Hlouskova and Wagner (2006) provide an overview of the types of panel unit root tests available. They 
also present exhaustive Monte Carlo simulations examining the tests’ performance. 
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Table 4.5: Unit root test results 
Study Test lnሺ ௜ܲ௧ሻ ܱܰܯ௜௧ ܰܫܯ௜௧ ܫܵܣ௜௧ ܫܵܦ௜௧ ௜ܻ௧ ݑ௜௧ ܴ݁݊ݐ௜௧ ܪ௜௧ ݎ௜௥ 
Im et al. (2003) ௧ܹ 2.28 −3.164*** −3.779*** −13.085*** −16.715***
4.392 −2.39*** 3.37 −4.63*** 1.32 
Levin et al. (2002) ߬௧ 1.64 −2.08 −0.97 −13.18*** −17.87*** 2.112 −2.52** 2.66 −2.50*** 2.97 
Fisher-type (Choi 2001) ஺ܲ஽ி 20.65 8.70 17.25 27.33** 32.60** 2.01 12.97 23.52* 68.07*** 41.63*** 
 ஺ܼ஽ி −0.50 0.91 −0.84 −1.34** −2.55*** 4.32 0.05 −1.43** −5.62*** −4.09*** 
 ܮ஺஽ி∗  −0.52 0.83 −0.80 −1.88** −2.63*** 4.52 0.02 −1.38** −6.53*** −3.99*** 
 ܲ݉஺஽ி 0.82 −1.29 0.22 2.00** 2.94*** −2.47 −0.54 1.33** 9.21*** 4.53*** 
 ௉ܲ௉ 6.88 348.55*** 95.41*** 322.24*** 372.30*** 3.24 39.37*** 4.50 40.19*** 9.03 
 ܼ௉௉ 2.14 −17.13*** −6.33*** −16.07*** −17.85*** 3.87 −3.30*** 2.79 −3.80*** 0.49 
 ܮ௉௉∗  2.13 −34.37*** −9.17*** −31.77*** −36.71*** 4.01 −3.40*** 2.70 −3.76*** 0.44 
 ܲ݉௉௉ −1.61 58.79*** 14.04*** 54.14*** 62.99*** −2.25 4.13*** −2.03 4.28*** −1.23 
Harris & Tzavalis (1999) ߩ 0.67 −33.65*** −6.66*** −26.71*** −29.99*** 2.098 −8.183*** 3.32 −4.10*** 0.95 
Breitung (2000) ߣ 2.76 −10.17*** −5.39*** −9.73*** −13.15*** 3.50 −4.215*** 4.67 −3.53*** −0.09 
Hadri LM (2000) ݖ 11.68*** 7.90*** 6.89*** 5.79*** 4.70*** 17.99*** 12.09*** 6.94*** 7.76*** 46.21*** 
Notes: All tests, with the exception of Hadri LM have the null hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root. The Hadri LM test takes the null hypothesis that the data are stationary 
versus the alternative that at least one panel contains a unit root. All variables are tested in levels. All tests are implemented with a trend and constant. Cross-sectional means are 
subtracted to mitigate the effect of cross-sectional dependence, as suggested by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002). Augmented Dickey–Fuller regressions fitted by Levin, Lin and Chu 
automatically select the number of lags such that the Akaike criterion for the regression is minimised. Bartlett kernel is employed so that the test statistic is robust to serial 
correlation. Lags are selected using the Newey-West (1994) bandwidth selection algorithm where possible. All other bandwidths and lag orders are set according to the 
rule	4ሺܶ 100⁄ ሻଶ ଽ⁄ . This rule has been used in unit root testing conducted by Westerlund (2007). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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4.3.2 Cointegration testing 
This study conducts the panel dynamic ordinary least squares (PDOLS) analysis in a 
similar vein to Adams and Füss (2010) who apply the PDOLS estimator introduced by 
Saikkonen (1991), Phillips and Moon (1999), and Pedroni (2000). This approach 
accounts for serial correlation and endogeneity of the regressors by augmenting the 
conventional OLS estimator. Further, they apply a series of Monte-Carlo simulations 
following Kao and Chiang (2000) and Mark and Sul (2003) to test the small sample 
performance of the panel DOLS estimator and show that it generally outperforms single-
equation estimation techniques. The results indicate that real economic activity and 
construction costs have a positive and statistically significant effect on house prices. 
Additional papers account for endogeneity in their regressors by applying the PDOLS 
technique.  
Hasssan and Shakur (2015) apply the PDOLS estimator to deal with endogeneity in the 
exploration of externality effects in Asian economic growth. They suggest that the 
PDOLS is asymptotically unbiased and normally distributed even when these endogenous 
regressors are included without the need for exogeneity assumptions or instrument 
variables (p.6). Vihriälä (2017) explores the connection between consumption, income 
and asset levels. This relationship may not necessarily be stable, nor will the economy be 
at the equilibrium most of the time. Therefore, following Mark and Sul (2003), Vihriala 
(2017) applies PDOLS using lags and leads to account for these short-run deviations. An 
alternative to this approach described in the literature is the application of system 
generalised method of moments (GMM). 
Given the short time series and persistence of independent variables, an argument can be 
made for using system GMM over PDOLS. A benefit of the system GMM model is that 
time-invariant additive measurement error can be absorbed into region-specific effects 
and by applying suitably long lags which delineate the instrument sets of the dependent 
variable (Brulhart & Sbergami 2009). In comparison, the PDOLS approach which allows 
for the selection of leads and lags of the regressors to eliminate feedback effects and 
endogeneity. Brulhart and Sbergami (2009) apply the system GMM proposed by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) while studying the impact of within-country spatial concentration of 
economic activity on country-level growth. Additionally, Sassi and Gasmi (2014) apply 
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system GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991) to assess the effect of enterprise and 
household credit on economic growth in European Union countries.  
In the ensuing analysis, exploits the ability to select lags and leads in PDOLS rather than 
using lags as instruments has influenced the decision to proceed with PDOLS analysis 
over a system GMM approach. Additionally, using numerous instruments in the GMM 
process may lead to instrument proliferation resulting in erroneous estimates of the effect 
of migration decisions on house prices (Roodman 2009). 
This study test for cointegration using Pedroni's (1999) seven test statistics under a null 
of no cointegration in a heterogeneous panel (medium to large N, large T) with one or 
more nonstationary regressors. These test statistics are panel-v, panel-rho, group-rho, 
panel-t (non-parametric), group-t (non-parametric), panel-adf (parametric t) and group-
adf (parametric t). All of the statistics, except for panel-v, diverge to negative infinity as 
the p-value converges to 0. All test statistics are distributed N(0,1) under a null of no 
cointegration and diverge to negative infinity (except for panel v, which diverges to 
positive infinity). As a result, large negative values are required to imply that the null of 
no cointegration is rejected. Conversely, the panel v test requires large positive values to 
support evidence of a cointegration relationship. 
Further, we implement Westerlund’s (2007) four panel cointegration tests. The 
underlying idea is to test for the absence of cointegration by determining whether error 
correction exists for individual panel members or for the panel as a whole. The Ga and 
Gt test statistics test H଴:	a୧ ൌ 0	for all i versus Hଵ: a୧ ൏ 0	for at least one i. These statistics 
start from a weighted average of all individually estimated ܽ௜  and their t-ratio’s 
respectively. Rejection of null provides evidence of cointegration in at least one of the 
cross-sectional units. The Pa and Pt test statistics pool information over all cross-
sectional units to test H଴: a୧ ൌ 0	 for all i vs Hଵ: a୧ ൏ 0	 for all i. Evidence for a 
cointegrating relationship of the panel as a whole is given, supporting the rejection of the 
null hypothesis. The number of lags between 0 and 1 are automatically selected using 
ACI. 
These tests establish a very slight cointegrating relationship between interstate arrivals 
and house prices in Australian capital cities. Given this information, we proceed with 
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panel dynamic cointegration analysis of interstate arrivals and house prices using 
Pedroni’s (2001) cointegrated panel regression: 
ܪ ௜ܲ,௧ ൌ ߪ௜ ൅ ߚ௜ݔ௜,௧ ൅ ∑ ߛ௜,௝Δݔ௜,௧ି௝ ൅ ߤ௜௧∗௉௝ୀି௉  (4.6) 
where i = 1, 2, …, N is the number of units in the panel, t = 1, 2, ..., T is the number of 
time periods, p = 1, 2, ..., P is the number of lags and leads in the DOLS regression. These 
lags are automatically selected in the specification. ߚ௜ is the slope coefficient and ݔ௜,௧ is 
the explanatory variable. The ߚ coefficients and associated t-statistics are then averaged 
over the entire panel using Pedroni’s group mean method. 
We also use Kao and Chiang’s (1999) specification of DOLS for cointegrated panel data 
with homogeneous long-run covariance across cross-sectional units. The results are 
discussed in the next section. 
4.4 Results and Discussion 
4.4.1 Fixed effects model 
Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 explore the flow of citizens between states and their relationship 
with house prices in Australian capital cities. In theory, the increase in population creates 
additional demand for housing within a given state. If this shock causes a population 
change that is greater than the natural population growth, there will be upward pressure 
on housing (Head, Lloyd-Ellis & Sun 2014; Sa 2015; Saiz 2003, 2007; Saiz & Wachter 
2011). 
Table 4.6 investigates the combined effect of interstate arrivals and departures. These are 
reported in columns (1) and (4). There is an association between house prices and the net 
effect of domestic migration in Australian states. Columns (2) and (5) depict the 
movements of citizens from states other than i to state i at time t, while columns (3) and 
(6) show the relationship between citizens migrating from state i to all other states at time 
t. Columns (4)–(6) account for house prices lagged by one quarter. The addition of this 
variable drastically reduces the state-specific constant. The positive value of lagged house 
prices is interpreted as the expectation of house prices. Table 4.7 includes a number of 
control variables. The positive effect of lagged house prices persists, indicating that 
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individuals who observe a house price increase during the previous period will expect 
house prices to grow in the current period. 
Table 4.6: Interstate movements of existing population—no controls 
 Dependent variable = ∆lnHP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Interstate 
Arrivals 
0.018 0.020  0.003 0.002  
 (0.009)** (0.006)***  (0.001)*** (0.000)***  
Interstate 
Departures 
0.008  0.014 −0.002  −0.001 
 (0.013)  (0.012) (0.001)*  (0.001) 
∆lnHP(Lag 1)    0.963 0.961 0.972 
    (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.008)*** 
Constant 5.197 5.238 5.293 0.200 0.205 0.168 
 (0.058)*** (0.066)*** (0.094)*** (0.051)*** (0.052)*** (0.040)*** 
Observations 616 616 616 608 608 608 
Number of state 8 8 8 8 8 8 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in log of the established house price index for Australian 
capital cities. Δ represents the change of a variable. lnHP represents house price in natural log form. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by Australian states). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. 
Interstate arrivals appear strongly statistically significant, although the magnitude of the 
coefficient reduces from 0.02 to less than 0.002. This result indicates that an increase in 
interstate arrivals by 1,000 people would correspond with a 0.002 per cent rise in house 
prices. The positive shock to population appears to shift the demand for housing outward. 
Supply is unable to adjust to this shock in the short-run, resulting in upward pressure on 
house prices. Sa (2015) finds a negative effect between immigration and housing supply, 
suggesting that it takes more than one year to adjust to such a population shock. It is likely 
that a similar mechanism is at work here. Additionally, interstate arrivals may be more 
willing to pay for housing than locals. This could be due to their need to settle quickly 
when relocating from a vast distance. 
Interstate departures do not have a bearing on contemporaneous house prices. This 
provides some evidence of the notion that individuals arriving from interstate are less 
sensitive to prices. The inclusion of one-quarter-lagged house prices proves to be 
incredibly important. During the period 1986q3 to 2005q2, a 1 per cent increase in house 
prices from one quarter prior correlates with a 0.93 per cent increase in the contemporary 
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house price index. This indicates that expectations influence contemporaneous house 
prices at the city level. An argument could be made here for irrational exuberance. 
Table 4.7: Interstate movements of existing population and house prices 
 Dependent variable = ∆lnHP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Interstate 
Arrivals 
−0.004 −0.001  0.001 0.001  
 (0.004) (0.003)  (0.001)* (0.000)***  
Interstate 
Departures 
0.010  0.009 0.000  0.000 
 (0.003)***  (0.003)*** (0.001)  (0.001) 
∆lnHP(Lag 1)    0.929 0.929 0.927 
    (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.021)*** 
State 
Expenditure 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)* (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment −0.028 −0.027 −0.027 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 
 (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Interest Rate −0.160 −0.160 −0.148 −0.038 −0.038 −0.041 
 (0.073)** (0.072)** (0.069)** (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) 
Rent Index 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dwellings 
Approved 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant 5.078 5.158 5.002 0.573 0.573 0.599 
 (0.619)*** (0.635)*** (0.611)*** (0.190)*** (0.186)*** (0.185)*** 
       
Observations 616 616 616 608 608 608 
Number of state 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in log of the established house price index for Australian 
capital cities. Δ represents the change of a variable. lnHP represents house price in natural log form. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by Australian states). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. 
Table 4.7 explores the relationship between interstate arrivals and departures and house 
prices with the inclusions of controls. If population growth is constant and without 
migration shocks, then any expected growth in population, or indeed a consistent shift 
induced from renters entering the housing market, will be met with additional dwellings. 
This occurrence is controlled for by including dwellings approved, which can capture 
both supply and demand effects. The above results indicate that dwellings approved has 
a positive effect on house prices. Given that the result is strongly statistically significant, 
this positive correlation is due to the anticipated addition of new housing, and this is 
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reflected in contemporaneous house prices. As individuals expect more dwellings to be 
made available in the market in future periods, savvy homeowners may decide to shift 
their relocation decision forward to take advantage of a current supply shortage. 
Unemployment is shown to be negatively correlated with house prices. This is consistent 
with a priori expectations. This may be due to an income effect when household wealth 
falls due to a loss of wages. Additionally, the utility of living in a particular area would 
decline as people get less enjoyment from their day-to-day activities. The results show 
that, as unemployment rises by 1 per cent, house prices decrease by 0.003 per cent. The 
imputed cost of occupying a dwelling, which is accounted for by the rent index, is 
positively correlated with house prices and is strongly significant. As the rent index 
increases by 1 per cent, house prices also increase by 0.001 per cent. The rent index could 
be interpreted as an imputed cost of living. However, the result is no longer significant 
once the lagged effect of house prices is controlled from one quarter prior. Most notably, 
the key variable of interest—interstate arrivals—is consistently positive at the 1 per cent 
level. The coefficient indicates a positive association between house prices and the inflow 
of individuals from other states. 
Table 4.8 reports the results for net overseas migration and net interstate migration. 
Columns (1) and (3) include the lagged log of house prices, while this variable is excluded 
in columns (2) and (4). Net overseas migration has no association with house prices in 
Australian capital cities, while net interstate migration is correlated with house prices, but 
only when lagged house prices are excluded. This is not consistent with the observed net 
effect of interstate arrivals and departures in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. 
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Table 4.8: Net overseas and net interstate migration 
 Dependent variable = ∆lnHP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Net Overseas 
Migration 
0.001 0.002   
 (0.001) (0.002)   
Net Interstate 
Migration 
  0.000 −0.007 
   (0.001) (0.003)** 
Constant 0.459 4.909 0.588 5.206 
 (0.148)*** (0.659)*** (0.192)*** (0.688)*** 
     
Observations 608 616 608 616 
Number of state 8 8 8 8 
Lagged ∆lnHP YES NO YES NO 
State FE YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in log of the established house price index for 
Australian capital cities. Δ represents the change of a variable. lnHP represents house price in 
natural log form. Robust standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by Australian 
states). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
To better understand the effect of local population flows, the same regression is conducted 
on a subsample of all states outside of Victoria and New South Wales in Table 4.9. These 
results indicate that a similar effect is occurring. The two drivers of this model are lagged 
house prices and the population shock of individuals migrating from outside the state of 
interest.18 An increase of interstate arrivals of 1,000 is associated with a 0.001 per cent 
increase in the house price index. 
  
                                                 
18 Additionally, we regress a subsample of Victoria and New South Wales and find that the model is less 
predictable. This further indicates that our results are being driven by states outside of Victoria and New 
South Wales. These results can be found in Appendix B4 
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Table 4.9: Interstate arrivals and departures—states other than Victoria and New 
South Wales 
 Dependent variable = ∆lnHP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Interstate 
arrivals 
0.003 0.002  0.001 0.001  
 (0.007) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.000)***  
Interstate 
departures 
−0.005  −0.001 −0.000  0.001 
 (0.016)  (0.011) (0.002)  (0.001) 
∆lnHP(Lag 1)    0.951 0.951 0.951 
    (0.019)*** (0.020)*** (0.020)*** 
State 
expenditure 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment −0.019 −0.020 −0.020 −0.003 −0.004 −0.004 
 (0.009)** (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Interest rate −0.090 −0.087 −0.094 −0.028 −0.028 −0.029 
 (0.052)* (0.055) (0.056)* (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) 
Rent index 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.009)** (0.008)** (0.009)** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dwellings 
approved 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 4.377 4.342 4.400 0.442 0.438 0.448 
 (0.578)*** (0.565)*** (0.588)*** (0.181)** (0.165)*** (0.179)** 
       
Observations 462 462 462 456 456 456 
Number of state 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in log of the established house price index for Australian 
capital cities. Δ represents the change of a variable. lnHP represents house price in natural log form. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by Australian states). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. 
Table 4.10 introduces a government dummy variable that captures the different federal 
governments during the sample period. During this period, Australia had two federal 
governments. The Hawke–Keating Labour Government was in power from 1983 to 1996 
and consisted of two Prime Ministers: Bob Hawke (1983–1991) and Paul Keating (1991–
1996). This government was eventually replaced in 1996 by a coalition government 
consisting of the Liberal and National parties, led by Liberal Prime Minister John 
Howard. The reason we are interested in determining whether these governments have a 
bearing on the model is that the Labour and Coalition governments have different 
philosophies on the types of individuals that Australia should prioritise entry for. The 
Labour governments of the 1980’s favoured family-type visas, which grant entry more 
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favourably to family members who reside outside of Australia. In contrast, the Howard 
Coalition government favoured the immigration of skilled workers. The results show that 
the Liberal government has a positive effect on house prices; however, the effect is not 
statistically significant, so it cannot be concluded that the type of government in power 
has a bearing on house prices 
Table 4.10: Interstate arrivals and departures: Liberal–National government 
 Dependent variable = ∆lnHP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Interstate 
arrivals 
−0.004 −0.001  0.001 0.001  
 (0.004) (0.003)  (0.001)* (0.000)***  
Interstate 
departures 
0.010  0.009 0.000  0.000 
 (0.003)***  (0.003)*** (0.001)  (0.001) 
∆lnHP(Lag 1)    0.929 0.929 0.927 
    (0.020)*** (0.020)*** (0.021)*** 
State 
expenditure 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)* (0.000)* (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Unemployment −0.028 −0.027 −0.027 −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 
 (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Interest rate −0.160 −0.160 −0.148 −0.038 −0.038 −0.041 
 (0.073)** (0.072)** (0.069)** (0.030) (0.030) (0.028) 
Rent index 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Dwellings 
approved 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Liberal −0.261 −0.253 −0.214 −0.098 −0.098 −0.110 
 (0.263) (0.254) (0.243) (0.103) (0.102) (0.096) 
Constant 5.338 5.411 5.216 0.671 0.671 0.710 
 (0.843)*** (0.847)*** (0.818)*** (0.289)** (0.284)** (0.276)** 
       
Observations 616 616 616 608 608 608 
Number of state 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in log of the established house price index for Australian 
capital cities. Δ represents the change of a variable. lnHP represents house price in natural log form. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by Australian states). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1. 
4.4.2 Cointegration analysis 
Table 4.11 reports cointegration tests to determine whether there is a long-run association 
with the variables of interest and house prices in Australian capital cities. The top section 
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of Table 4.11 reports the seven test statistics of Pedroni (1999, 2001). All test statistics 
are distributed N(0,1) under a null of no cointegration and diverge to negative infinity 
(except for ݒ௉ , which diverges to positive infinity). Thus, large negative values are 
required to imply that the null of no cointegration is rejected. The exception is	ݒ௉, which 
requires large positive values to support evidence of a cointegrating relationship. The 
Pedroni test results offer little indication of a cointegrating relationship.  
Table 4.11: Cointegration tests 












Pedroni (1999, 2001) Value Value Value Value 
	ݒ௉ −0.628 −0.661 −0.879 −0.59 
ߩ௉ 0.019 −0.959 0.739 0.31 
ܲ ௉ܲ −0.300 −1.309 0.082 −0.374 
ܣܦܨ௉ −0.601 0.79 −0.024 −0.519 
ߩீ  0.535 −0.816 1.266 0.964 
ܲܲீ  −0.051 −1.122 0.265 −0.141 
ܣܦீܨ  −1.332 −1.571 −0.892 −0.810 
     
















߬ீ  −1.304 0.110 1.015 1.000 0.35 1.000 2.847 1.000 
ߙீ  −1.071 0.880 1.506 1.000 −0.025 0.991 0.339 0.995 
߬௉ −3.493 0.040 2.032 0.960 1.586 0.995 7.989 1.000 
ߙ௉ −0.988 0.360 1.012 0.980 0.091 0.862 0.338 0.909 
Notes: The dependent variable is log of the established house price index for Australian capital cities. The 
null hypothesis is that the variables are not cointegrated. All Pedroni test statistics are distributed N(0,1)
under a null of no cointegration and diverge to negative infinity (except for panel v). Data have been time-
demeaned. Westerlund (2007) reports robust p-values for a one-sided test on the bootstrapped distribution.
100 bootstrap replications are used. p-val reports bootstrap (100) p-values. 
To corroborate these results, a bivariate test is conducted on the key variables of interest 
and the log of house prices using Westerlund (2007). These can be observed in the bottom 
half of table 4.11. For net overseas migration and net interstate migration and interstate 
departures, the Westerlund test clearly rejects the presence of a cointegrating relationship. 
However, some evidence can be found for cointegration between interstate arrivals and 
house prices. Given this information, Pedroni and Kao and Chang PDOLS are presented 
below to explore this further. The interstate arrival regression shows a positive and 
statistically significant correlation with house prices. Positive associations can also be 
seen in the other variables, although little weight is given to these results. 
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4.4.3 Panel dynamic OLS 
Table 4.12 reports Kao and Chang’s (1999) PDOLS results with the control variables 
included. Column (1) includes state-fixed effects, while column (2) includes state and 
time fixed effects. As the information is time-demeaned, we draw attention to column (1).  
Table 4.12: PDOLS (Kao and Chang) 
 Dependent variable = lnHP 
 (1) (2) 
   
Interstate arrivals 0.004 −0.003 
 (0.003)* (0.003) 
   
State expenditure 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)** (0.000)*** 
Unemployment −0.062 −0.033 
 (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
Standard interest rate −0.050 −0.038 
 (0.004)*** (0.010)*** 
Rent index 0.005 0.007 
 (0.003)* (0.003)** 
Dwellings approved −0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
   
Observations 584 584 
Number of state 8 8 
State FE YES YES 
Year FE NO YES 
Adjusted R-squared 0.684 0.875 
Notes: The dependent variable is log of the established house price index for 
Australian capital cities. Kao and Chang’s (1999) methodology is used in the 
estimation of panel DOLS. lnHP represents the natural log of house prices. 
This result suggests that interstate arrivals have a positive effect on house prices in the 
long-run. The inclusion of time-fixed effects diminishes the significance of interstate 
arrivals. Notably, dwellings approved changes from negative to positive, although the 
magnitude is negligible. Other controls appear consistent. 
Table 4.13 reports Pedroni’s PDOLS bivariate regression for the key variables. The 
results confirm that there is small evidence of a cointegrating relationship between 
interstate arrivals and house prices in Australian states and territories. 
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Table 4.13: Pedroni cointegrated regression (panel DOLS) 
Test Statistic Coefficient t-stat 
Interstate arrivals 0.045 6.226 
Interstate departures 0.020 2.97 
Net overseas migration 0.024 2.897 
Net interstate migration 0.057 4.041 
Notes: The dependent variable is log of the established house price index for Australian capital cities. All 
test statistics are distributed N(0,1). Data have been time-demeaned. 
Overall, there is little evidence of a long-run cointegrating relationship between house 
prices and migration in Australia. The exception to this is interstate arrivals. This 
demonstrates a slightly significant positive relationship with house prices. However, once 
time-fixed effects are included, this statistical significance is removed. In comparison to 
the literature, Latif (2015) establishes a cointegrating relationship between immigration 
and rent in Canada. This may indicate that immigrants are more likely to find temporary 
accommodation when entering a nation. 
Leung, Shi and Tang (2013) study how commodity price movements affected house 
prices in commodity-dependent economies of Australia and New Zealand. Their 
geographically hierarchical empirical model finds that commodity prices influence house 
prices directly as a source of income and also indirectly through other macroeconomic 
variables such as unemployment, interst rate and GDP. Commodity price fluctuations in 
the international market may have an impact house prices in some cities, but not all. The 
authors control for migration as a macroeconomic variable in their New Zealand model; 
results indicate a positive correlation between migration and house prices. It is possible 
that the effect of migration impacts on house prices through a commodity price channel. 
Migrants influencing  house price dynamics through commodity price channels could 
explain the muted impact of immigration on house prices in the short run analysis. This 
study examines the direct effect of immigrations rather than the various channels through 
which immigration may affect house prices. Future research could benefit from such 
investigation. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the relationship between house prices and migration in 
Australia. A priori, one would expect that the strong record of immigration would be an 
influencing factor in the determination of house prices, particularly in Australian capital 
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cities. This belief has been long held in the Australian media (Corderoy 2016; Robb & 
Lucas 2016; Sprague 2016). Additionally, this effect could be ambiguous given the 
outflow of local residents due to migration patterns. This phenomenon is receiving 
continued attention in the academic literature (Hatton & Tani 2005; Hou & Bourne 2006; 
Mocetti & Porello 2010; Rabe & Taylor 2012). Given Australia’s popularity as a nation 
with high-quality living standards and geographically isolated capital cities, where most 
migrants choose to settle, this is an interesting question to pursue. 
To assess this issue, this chapter collects panel information of Australian house prices and 
migration variables from the ABS. Migration is assessed for both overseas and interstate 
migration in the form of the net movement of people across borders. Building on Bourassa 
and Hendershott (1995), who found a positive effect of net overseas migration in an early 
examination of Australian house prices, this study employs contemporary panel data 
methodologies to investigate this relationship. To our knowledge, no previous studies 
have discussed the relationship between house prices and overseas and interstate 
migration in Australia.  
First, this chapter analyses the relationship between house prices and migration using a 
fixed effects approach. State and time-fixed effects are included to account for possible 
heterogeneity across time and between regions. The results are unable to establish a 
statistically significant relationship between net overseas migration and house prices in 
Australian capital cities. However, there is a strong relationship between interstate 
arrivals and house prices. This may be due to local residents resettling in new states after 
migrants have settled in existing areas. However, it is likely that these movements are 
also driven by employment or social opportunities. Further investigation is required to 
understand these relationships. 
Second, this chapter explores the possible existence of a long-run cointegration 
relationship between house prices and migration. It assesses the presence of cointegration 
using Pedroni (1999, 2001) and Westerlund’s (2007) techniques, but is unable to identify 
a strong cointegrating relationship in the specified model. There is a small indication that 
interstate arrivals are cointegrated with house prices and have a positive effect in the long-
run. Overall, interstate arrivals appear to be an important factor contributing to house 
prices in Australia. 
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Net movements of individuals across national borders does not have a significant effect 
on house prices. This could be due to two key points. First, there is no substantial transfer 
of wealth across international borders such that the income effect of households entering 
a state from overseas is mitigated by residents who locate themselves in other nations. 
Second, there is not a large enough population increase in foreign-born residents to 
significantly increase the demand for housing by that alone. 
Interstate arrivals are a slightly stronger indicator of house prices. This could be due to a 
higher willingness to pay for housing in their preferred state, which would result in 
considerably smaller price elasticity compared to local individuals. The effect of 
individuals seeking higher wages has not been completely ruled out as a reason for 
households relocating to states. Queensland, which saw a dramatic increase in migration 
during the late 1990s, experienced a large economic boom due to mining and exports. 
Migrants seeking higher wages in these areas could cause house prices to rise. This type 
of mechanism cannot be ruled out. 
This chapter assesses the relationship between house prices and migration patterns while 
controlling for some macroeconomic variables such as income and population. It is also 
possible that spatial aspects also play a role in individual’s decisions to migrate to a 
particular area. Spatial attributes could include access to the CBD or geographical 
attributes such as proximity to water bodies. Future studies could benefit from 
investigating how spatial attributes of the Australian housing market interact with house 
prices and individual’s economic decisions of where to relocate. Further, the literature 
would benefit from the development of appropriate instruments to measure migration at 
a more local level. It would be interesting to identify the proportion of skilled versus 
unskilled workers immigrating to an area. The proportion of these types of immigrants in 
selected areas could have a significant effect on prices and the associated inflow or 
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Appendix A4: Unit root testing—additional information 
Im–Pesaran–Shin Test 
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003; IPS) developed a set of tests that relax the assumption of a 
common autoregressive parameter. This test fits the panels separately and then takes the 
mean of the resulting individual unit root t-statistics. This is compared to the LLC test, 
which pools the data before fitting an equation, thus computing a test statistic based on 
the pooled regression results.19 IPS assumes that ߳௜௧ is independently distributed normal 
for all i and t, and they allow ߳௜௧	to have heterogeneous variances ߪ௜ଶ	across panels. The 
null hypothesis is that all panels contain a unit root, so that ߶௜ ൌ 0. This is tested against 
the alternative—that the fraction of panels that follows stationary processes is non-zero.20 
When serial correlation is apparent, further lags of the dependent variable are added to 
the augmented Dickey–Fuller regression; thus: 
Δݕ௜௧ ൌ ߶௜ݕ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ݖ௜௧ᇱ ߛ௜ ൅ ∑ Δݕ௜,௧ି௝ ൅ ߳௜௧௣௝ୀଵ       (A1) 
where p represents the number of lags selected, and a panel-specific slope is introduced 
when a trend is required to be specified. We choose for the number of lags to be specified 
automatically through the minimisation of the ACI criterion. Whether serial correlation 
is allowed for (or not) determines the test statistics that are produced. Allowing for serial 
correlation produces the IPS W_(t-bar) statistic, which has an asymptotically standard 
normal distribution as T→∞ followed by N→∞. In practice, this method is most 
appropriate when both T and N are large and the number of lags are limited to eight, as 
expected values are not calculated beyond p = 8 lags (IPS 2003). 
  
                                                 
19 See Maddala and Wu (1999) for a comparison of the LLC and IPS test to the Fisher test. 
20 Where a fraction of panels follows a stationary non-zero process, N tends to infinity, the fraction N_1/N 
converges to a non-zero value, where N_1 is the number of panels that are stationary. 
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Fisher-type Test 
To conduct the Fisher-type test, unit root tests are performed on all panels, the p-values 
are combined to obtain an overall test of whether the panel series contain a unit root. 
These panel-specific tests use the four methods proposed by Choi (2001). Three of the 
methods differ in whether they use the inverse ߯ଶ , inverse-normal or inverse-logit 
transformation of p-values; these methods are appropriate where N is finite and T 
approaches infinity. The fourth method is a modification of the inverse ߯ଶ	 
transformation and is suitable when N tends to infinity. Here, we report both the 
Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and Phillips–Perron (PP) unit root tests under the null 
hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root. Trend terms are included where apparent, 
and drift terms are selected when a variable displays a non-zero mean. Lags used are 
informed by AIC criteria obtained in the previous test. Cross-sectional means are 
removed. 
Hadri LM test 
The Hadri (2000) LM test takes the null hypothesis that the data are stationary versus the 
alternative that at least one panel contains a unit root. This is best performed when the 
data depict large T and moderate N. The intuition can be explained by considering the 
following series of ݕ௜௧, where a panel-specific time trend is included: 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ݎ௜௧ ൅ β୧ݐ ൅ ߳௜௧ (A2) 
where ݎ௜௧ is random walk, ݎ௜௧ ൌ ݎ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ݑ௜௧, and ߳௜௧	and ݑ௜௧ are zero-mean i.i.d. normal 
errors. If the variance of ݑ௜௧ were zero, ݎ௜௧	would collapse to a constant; therefore, ݕ௜௧ 
would be stationary. Hadri LM tests the following hypothesis under this logic: 
ܪ଴: ߣ ൌ ఙ
మೆ
ఙചమ ൌ 0 versus  ܪ௔: ߣ ൐ 0 
Selecting errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity across panels will ease the 
assumption that ߳௜௧ is i.i.d., although normality is still required. Asymptotically, the Hadri 
LM test is justified as T and N→∞ sequentially. 
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Appendix B4: Fixed effects subsampling 
Table B4.1: Interstate movements of existing population—Victoria and NSW 
 Dependent variable = ∆lnHP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Interstate 
Arrivals 
0.005 0.004  −0.002 −0.002  
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  
Interstate 
Departures 
−0.003  −0.003 0.000  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)*** 
∆lnHP(Lag 1)    0.819 0.818 0.812 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)*** 
State 
Expenditure 
0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)*** 
Unemployment −0.035 −0.038 −0.040 −0.014 −0.014 −0.012 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)*** 
Interest Rate −0.399 −0.379 −0.395 −0.000 −0.002 −0.005 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.157) 
Rent Index 0.035 0.030 0.033 0.006 0.006 0.007 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)*** 
Dwellings 
Approved 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)*** 
Constant 5.355 5.613 5.691 0.982 0.967 0.807 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (1.132) 
       
Observations 154 154 154 152 152 152 
Number of 
states 
2 2 2 2 2 2 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in log of the established house price index for Australian 
capital cities. Δ represents the change of a variable. lnHP represents house price in natural log form. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by Australian states). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 




Table B4.2: Interstate movements of existing population—states other than 
Victoria and NSW 
 Dependent variable = ∆lnHP 













 (0.002)*** (0.000)***  (0.000) (0.000)  
Interstate 
Departures 
-0.013  -0.004 -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.003)***  (0.001)*** (0.000)  (0.000)*** 
Est. House 
Price (lag1) 
   1.027 1.029 1.029 
    (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
State 
Expenditure 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Standard 
Interest Rate 
-4.442 1.201 0.641 0.032 0.057 0.055 
 (2.335)* (1.588) (1.549) (0.045) (0.053) (0.051) 
Rent Index 2.592 5.154 4.988 0.022 0.023 0.021 
 (1.064)** (0.455)*** (0.464)*** (0.045) (0.043) (0.042) 
Dwellings 
Approved 
-0.015 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.003)*** (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 48.830 -201.325 -162.496 -3.020 -4.109 -3.798 
 (79.649) (41.23)*** (42.68)*** (2.811) (2.732) (2.653) 
       
Observations 462 462 462 456 456 456 
Number of 
states 
6 6 6 6 6 6 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
State FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: The dependent variable is the change in log of the established house price index for Australian 
capital cities. Δ represents the change of a variable. lnHP represents house price in natural log form. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses (observations are clustered by Australian states). *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, 




Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Australia is a large nation with vast distances between its major housing markets. These 
markets have been characterised by strong growth in house prices since the late 1980s. 
During this period separate and distinct housing markets have developed in each of 
Australia’s capital cities. Housing markets appear to grow at different rates both between 
and within cities. This is partly due to a reliance on central business districts (CBDs) for 
jobs and entertainment creating a premium for dwellings located closer to the CBD. These 
characteristics combined with a lack of panel analysis of Australian housing markets 
makes this an interesting case study. 
There are a number of studies which sheds lights on factors influencing the house prices 
in Australia (Abelson (1997); Abelson et al. (2005); Ball et al. (2014) & Costello (2014); 
Davidoff & Leigh (2013); Fry, Martin & Voukelatos (2010); Wadud, Bashar & Ahmed 
(2012)). These studies suggest numerous factors contribute to house price growth in 
Australia. These factors include income, unemployment, interest rates, construction costs 
and changes to housing supply. However, little is known about the relationship between 
government decisions and their impact on house prices in Australia. This study fills this 
void. 
In particular, this thesis explores three transmission channels through which government 
decisions can affect house prices in three standalone chapters. The first, Chapter 2, 
investigates the relationship between government revenue extracted from housing 
markets by state and local government and house prices. These government revenues are 
used to proxy for the regulatory burden of government. The other two channels are 
explored in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 respectively. Chapter 3 examines how state and 
territory government taxation rates levied on household’s impact on house prices.  
The effect of these taxation rates on house prices differs depending on the type of taxation 
and the household type they are levied to. Chapter 4 analyses the relationship between 
overseas and interstate migration and house prices. The underlying premise of the final 
chapter is that the number and type of immigrants permitted into the country may affect 
house prices both in the short-run and long-run. Additionally, the impact of these 
population flows may vary depending on the response of local residents who choose to 
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remain in the same location/state or relocate to a different location/state. The 
contributions of this thesis are as follows. 
Chapter 2 investigates the direct effect of government regulation on house prices in 
Australian capital cities while controlling for a number of supply side factors. 
Specifically, government revenue extracted from taxation the transfer or continued 
possession of housing stock is used as a proxy for the regulatory burden of government. 
Further, a number of variables are incorporated in the analysis to account for housing 
growth in Australia (e.g., dwellings completed and dwellings approved). Lastly, the 
opportunity cost of developing and redeveloping dwellings is accounted for by 
incorporating a construction cost variable.  
This study takes a two-pronged approach to assessing this issue. First, a panel fixed 
effects model allows for regional and time-varying heterogeneity. Controlling for 
heterogeneity and a number of known determinants of house prices, this study introduces 
government regulation variables and a number of key supply-side variables . While the 
fixed effects analysis provides an indication of the key determinants of house prices in 
the Australian panel, the coefficients may be biased due to the joint determination of 
house prices and government revenue. To address the potential issue of endogeneity, this 
chapter uses the results of the fixed effects analysis to inform variable selection in a 
PVAR model following Love and Zicchino (2006). 
Results in chapter 2 indicate municipality taxation revenue shocks and conveyance 
revenue shocks both have an initial positive and statistically significant effect before 
dampening over time. Further, the effect of land tax revenue appears very volatile over 
time in the PVAR model. This signals that shocks to owner occupants appear to be 
capitalised into house prices while revenue shocks to landlords takes time to redistribute 
across the market. The effect of dwellings completed also appear very volatile. This could 
be due to the pent-up demand underpinning the housing market. 
Overall it appears that government revenue has a positive bearing on house prices. The 
use of government revenue allows us to assess the burden of an additional dollar extracted 
from the housing market. This infers that a regulatory burden would arise due to the 
additional costs incurred from complying with regulation. The results indicate 
government regulatory burden, which affects owner-occupants is largely reflected in 
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positive house price growth. Thus, governments (and policy makers) should be careful 
when considering regulatory constraints that will affect the redevelopment of existing 
zones. 
Building on Chapter 2, Chapter 3 examines the explicit tax rates levied at homeowners. 
There are four kinds of tax rates investigated in this study, land tax and three types of 
stamp duties. Land tax is levied annually and predominately aimed at landlords while 
stamp duties are levied at the point of transaction. There are three categories of stamp 
duties which vary according to the type of homeowner examined. Principal place of 
residence (PPR) and first homeowners (FHO) are both considered owner occupants. Non-
PPR occupants are considered investors as they do not use their dwellings for their own 
residential purposes. 
This study has collated these tax rates from state revenue offices and legal registries. To 
obtain plausible results, a number of tax rate identifiers are calculated. The study 
investigates the mean, median, minimum, maximum, the range between minimum and 
maximum rates, and the standard deviation of tax rates. Structural break analysis is 
conducted on each tax series to identify significant policy changes. Interacting these 
breakpoints with the tax rates identifies the effect of government tax policy changes on 
house prices in Australian states and territories. 
The findings suggest increasing the mean tax rate has the greatest effect on house prices, 
particularly for stamp duties levied at owner occupants. This indicates a proportion of this 
additional transaction cost is capitalised into house prices. An even larger effect was 
observed for land tax rates. 
Increases to the minimum tax rate has a statistically significant relationship with land tax 
rates, resulting in a coefficient of 17.13. The magnitudes of stamp duty rates are much 
smaller, approximately 2, and not statistically significant. Maximum tax rates appear to 
be consistent with mean rates; however, the magnitudes are slightly smaller. The 
exception being PPR rates which present a very small and statistically insignificant 
relationship with house prices. 
The findings in Chapter 3 appear to support those of Chapter 2. Government decisions to 
alter legislation in relation to the ownership or occupation of dwellings may affect house 
prices. Generally, this appears to be an increase in the growth of house prices. This gives 
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further weight to the previous statement that when governments decide to change policies 
in the housing market they must be aware of the potential flow on effects to house prices. 
This has the potential to cause a number of negative repercussions including creating 
difficulties for new entrants into the housing market. 
Chapter 4 sheds light on another avenue through which government policy decisions may 
affect house prices in Australia. This is through migration flows. The a priori expectation 
was that the strong record of immigration could have been an influencing factor in the 
determination of house prices, particularly in Australian capital cities. This could occur 
through two possible avenues. First, an increase in population creates upward pressure on 
demand, raising house prices. Alternatively, the inflow of residents from overseas could 
induce existing locals to relocate to alternate states. The direction of the effect caused by 
the dispersion of locals is more ambiguous. 
To investigate this issue, panel information was collected of Australian house prices and 
migration variables from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). Net migration is 
assessed for both overseas and interstate population flows. Interstate arrivals and 
departures are also examined. Contemporary panel data methodologies are used to 
investigate the relationship between house prices and these migration variables. This 
chapter makes the following two novel contributions. 
First, the relationship between house prices and migration is assessed using a fixed effects 
approach. State and time fixed effects have been included to account for possible 
heterogeneity across time and between regions. The results, however, do not reveal a 
statistically significant relationship between net overseas migration and house prices in 
Australian capital cities. On the other hand, interstate arrivals have a strong bearing on 
house prices. Given that this relationship is not as prevalent in net movement of interstate 
arrivals and interstate departures, the study concludes that it is the flow of domestic 
residents into a region that has the greatest effect on house prices. This result could be 
attributed to the fact that it is likely individuals who own property and relocate to another 
state do not necessarily wish to sell their property. Instead, they may opt to keep it as 
equity or as a source of income in the future. 
Second, this chapter investigates the possibility of long-run cointegrating relationships 
between house prices and the migration variables. The presence of cointegration is 
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assessed using Pedroni (1999, 2001) and Westerlund (2007) techniques. However, there 
is no strong cointegrating relationship in the specified model. There is little information 
indicating that interstate arrivals are cointegrated with house prices and have a positive 
effect in the long-run. Overall, interstate arrivals depict a small but significant effect on 
house prices in Australia. 
Neither net overseas nor net interstate migration appear to have any significant impact on 
house prices, contrary to a priori expectations. This could be attributed to a couple of 
potential explanations. First, there is no substantial transfer of wealth across international 
borders such that the income effect of households entering a state from overseas is 
mitigated by those residents relocating outside Australia or to other states. Second, the 
net effect of immigration into and emigration out of Australia negate each other. Future 
work in this field would benefit from isolating immigration into Australia from 
emigration out of Australia and assessing the impact of these flows at a more local level. 
In conclusion, this thesis contributes towards a better understanding of government 
involvement in Australian housing markets using novel data and applying contemporary 
empirical techniques. Government actions in determining tax rates and revenue collection 
appear to affect house prices in Australia through the decisions they make. Regulatory 
burden is assessed through revenue extracted from housing markets in the form of land 
tax, stamp duty and municipality rate revenues. In addition, there appears to be a positive 
relationship with house prices when governments decide to increase taxation rates. This 
thesis assesses whether government regimes had a bearing on house prices through their 
immigration policies. While interstate arrivals do have an impact on house price growth, 
there is a lack of evidence to support that this effect is due to immigration policy or 
government regimes. 
While the use of government revenue has allowed us to infer the impact of government 
burden on housing markets in Australia a lot more could be done to identify the specific 
effect of regulatory changes and their relationship with house prices. Typically, these 
regulatory burdens arise at local and state levels where the development and 
redevelopment of dwellings are heavily reliant on complying with rules are regulations 
set at these levels of government. Future research could look to identify appropriate 
instruments to isolate these effects. Additionally, there is the possibility of conducting 
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analysis on house prices before and after regulatory events. This would enable the 
assessment of relevant treatment and control groups. 
The exploration of different taxation rates investigates how rates targeted toward 
homeowner types affect house prices. However, these dwellings may differ in their 
characteristics. Different owner types may occupy dwellings which fall into specific 
housing value brackets. For instance, first homeowners and younger populations may be 
less likely to own properties that fall in the top 25 per cent of property values. Exploring 
how government policy may affect homeowners disproportionately would be of great 
importance to the literature, particularly in the understanding of housing affordability. 
Future work would also benefit from exploring the risk borne by society due to changes 
in government policy. This could arise through increases in homeowner stress or property 
foreclosures. 
This thesis has not explicitly accounted for immigrant types entering Australia. Future 
research would benefit from developing appropriate instruments to measure migration at 
a more local level. Of particular interest would be the identification of the proportion of 
skilled versus unskilled workers immigrating to an area. The proportion of these types of 
immigrants in selected areas could have a significant impact on prices, as well as having 
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